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Foreword 
The purpose of this report is to shed light on the evolution of high-technology 
clusters, and to explain why Norway, exemplified by the high-tech milieus in 
Oslo and Trondheim, does not perform well in international comparison. The 
report is the final report from the project originally named ‘Innovation, 
financing and entrepreneurship’, which was funded by the Norwegian 
Research Council through the FAKTA programme.  To reflect changes in 
the focus of the project, the project was renamed “Evolution of high-
technology clusters”.  
The main objective of the project has been to analyse high-tech industry 
in Oslo and Trondheim. By comparing the two cities with some of the 
internationally leading high-technology cities in Europe, the objective has been 
to explain the relatively poor performance of Oslo and Trondheim. The 
research project was initially designed to examine the role of entrepreneurs 
and financial actors in cluster formation, and on the interplay between these 
two groups of actors. We later changed the focus of the project towards a 
more holistic approach to analysing clusters and cluster evolution. Partly, this 
was motivated by recent research in the field of innovative milieu and cluster 
evolution, and partly by the fact that other projects funded by the Norwegian 
Research Council in the same period, have worked more explicitly with the 
role of financial actors. 
When working on this project, we have taken advantage of valuable 
support from various sources. 
Statistical data for the Norwegian part of the study were obtained from 
Statistics Norway. Data for Sweden were obtained during a stay at the 
Jönköping International Business School in February 2002. Data for Finland 
were obtained from Statistics Finland. 
Data for Sophia Antipolis and other valuable information on the region 
and its science park were obtained during a stay at CERAM, Sophia 
Antipolis, during April-May 2002, thanks to Michel Bernasconi and his staff. 
Data and other information on Dublin were obtained from various 
sources, partly Eurostat, the Department of Trade and Industry, Enterprise 
Ireland and through contacts with a number of people in various institutions. I 
would like to thank Margaret Wheelan, the Dublin Institute of Technology; 
Kathleen Quinlan, Enterprise Ireland; and Colm O’Gormann, University 
College Dublin. 
Data and other information on Cambridge were obtained, partly by 
reading reports and articles on the ‘Cambridge Phenomenon’, partly by 
meeting people involved in research and consultancy. In particular, I would 
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like to thank David Keeble and Thelma Quince at the Centre for Business 
Research, Cambridge University; Elisabeth Garnsey, Department of 
Geography, Cambridge University; and Bob Hodgson, consultant, for valuable 
information and discussions. 
During the early stages of this project, I was able to spend time at 
MERIT – Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and 
Technology – a stay which provided ample opportunity to discuss central 
issues related to recent research on innovation systems. 
This project was organised in parallel with other research projects funded 
by the Norwegian Research Council, on closely related issues. Informal 
workshops were organised with some of these projects. Special thanks to 
Heidi Wiig Aslesen, Arne Isaksen, Ove Langeland and Knut Halvorsen for 
interesting exchanges of information and helpful discussions on issues related 
to innovation systems, cluster evolution and the role of different actors. 
As a part of this project, a survey was organised to collect information on 
high-technology small firms in Oslo and Trondheim in collaboration with the 
Centre for Value Creation at BI. I am grateful to Cato Salter and his team, 
who were responsible for the tedious work of obtaining the sufficient number 
of completed questionnaires. 
Bjørnar Reitan, who participated in the first part of the project, has 
written a working paper on high-technology industries and institutions in 
Trondheim, which has provided a valuable basis for our analysis of 
Trondheim. 
Last, but not least, I would like to thank Jartrud Steinsli, who has worked 
on the project the past fourteen months, for her significant contributions to the 
project. Without her contributions, it would not have been possible to 
complete the project in the way it now has been concluded. 
Although this is the final report from the project, the issue of high-
technology industries in Norway is far from exhausted. To the contrary, this 
project is one of very few that has addressed this crucial issue in Norway. It 
is my hope that this report may stimulate the formulation of new research 
questions, in order to further explore the many interesting and challenging 
issues involved in the evolution of high-technology industries. 
 
Sandvika, March 25, 2003 
 
Olav R. Spilling 
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Summary 
The issue addressed in this project is why the Norwegian cities Oslo and 
Trondheim are not among the internationally leading high-technology cities. 
While the two cities perform well in a national context and are home to fairly 
dynamic high-technology industries, it is the purpose of this project to analyse 
why the two cities are not performing well internationally. To develop insights 
into this issue, we need to identify the characteristics of dynamic high-tech 
clusters and determine the key factors – external as well as internal – which 
facilitate the dynamic processes of clusters. We also  summarise policy 
issues related to cluster development, and in this way provide a basis for 
analysing policy options and recommendations related to the future 
development of high-technology industries in Norway.  
Based on these objectives, the report sets out by summarising recent 
theories in the field of clusters, innovation systems and innovative milieu. As 
illustrated in the report, there are significant similarities between the various 
approaches. Although the main focus may vary between the approaches, 
they describe in similar terms the important actors and critical processes 
which constitute working systems. 
This project concerns dynamic processes, i.e. how systems evolve, the 
main actors involved, and key mechanisms at work in system evolution. After 
having summarised theory in the field, the cases of Cambridge, Dublin and 
Sophia Antipolis are presented and discussed. These cases clearly 
demonstrate the diversity of cluster evolution. Each story is unique and 
strongly dependent on the specific prerequisites of the regions and the 
characteristics of their actors. However, there are similar groups of actors 
involved, and similar mechanisms at work. What varies, is the mix of factors 
and the extent to which the different mechanisms are at work. 
In chapter 4 the report turns to the role of high-tech industries in Norway 
and how these industries have evolved and currently perform in the cities of 
Oslo and Trondheim. Based on the definition adopted for high-technology 
industries, there are a total of about 10 000 firms with some 106 000 people 
employed in high-tech in Norway. The vast majority of these firms are small; 
no more than 2-3 per cent employ more than one hundred people. However, 
these same firms employ close to 60 per cent of all high-tech employees. 
Oslo is, by far, the most important Norwegian city in the high-technology 
field. Close to fifty per cent of the national employment and more than sixty 
per cent of total turnover is located in the Oslo area. For ICT, the dominance 
of Oslo is even higher, with 60 per cent of total employment. The cities of 
Bergen, Stavanger and Trondheim each have between 6 000 and 7 000 
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employees. In fact, Oslo has more than twice the employment of the other 
three cities together, and more than seven times that of Trondheim. Given the 
role of Trondheim as Norway’s ‘capital of technology’, one might have 
expected the city to be closer to Oslo and significantly ahead of the 
competing cities Bergen and Stavanger. An explanation for this situation may 
lie in the poorer industrial environment found in the Trondheim area, which 
has not provided synergies to the same extent as in the other cities. 
After having outlined the main pattern of evolution and the current 
structure of high-technology industries in Oslo and Trondheim, an 
international comparison is provided. The general conclusion from this 
comparisons is that high-tech industries in Oslo and Trondheim are 
outperformed by their counterparts in leading European cities, due to several 
factors. One aspect of this, is that the manufacturing sectors of Oslo and 
Trondheim are not well developed. Compared to other cities, larger 
companies that serve as drivers of industrialisation are missing in the 
Norwegian cities. In the case of Oslo, there are a few larger manufacturing 
companies, but the potential that seemed to exist in this field during the 1980s, 
has gradually fragmented. With a few exceptions, leading international 
companies are also missing in the case of Trondheim, where the absence of 
larger firms, national as well as international, is striking. 
This situation may partly reflect the inability of the two cities to attract 
international high-tech companies to settle in the area. Although Oslo has 
attracted a few multinationals, it is not because of the attractiveness of the 
local area per se, but because of an interest in exploiting market 
opportunities. Furthermore, most multinationals in Oslo are in reproductive 
and distributive functions, and do not contribute to developing uniqueness and 
competitive advantage. Another explanation for the lack of larger 
manufacturing companies, may be related to less capacity for developing 
indigenous firms, i.e. as a result of spin-offs from universities or existing 
firms.  
It is widely recognised that the unavailability of risk capital, particularly in 
the early stages of development, may represent an important barrier to 
development. There are weak traditions in this field in Norway, and the 
Norwegian venture capital market is immature. The situation may also be 
related to government policies which have allocated less money to the risk 
capital market. Furthermore, the situation may be explained on the 
background of limited growth in R&D funding. In particular, there has not 
been a clear focus on processes of commercialisation and how research 
institutions and intermediate institutions, may be designed in order to improve 
these processes. 
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In Chapter 5, the role of small firms in cluster evolution is discussed. 
First, to illustrate key evolution mechanisms related to high-technology 
businesses and the commercialisation of specific technologies, we present 
details related to one particular case on the development of businesses based 
on Internet technology in Oslo during the 1990s. This case illustrates how 
complicated evolutionary processes can be, with a mixture of competing and 
collaborating actors related in many different ways. In the early stages of 
development, small firms and entrepreneurs with academic backgrounds 
were of great importance, while later  actors from larger companies with 
access to adequate financial resources gained significance.    
Second, to give a more representative view of the role of small high-tech 
firms, data based on a survey of firms in Oslo and Trondheim are presented. 
Although these data, to a large extent, are cross sectional, retrospective data 
on evolution is also included, in order to reflect important aspects of 
evolutionary processes. Among other things, the role of small firms in 
innovation processes is analysed, and it is indicated that small high-tech firms 
are highly innovative. However, they take on different roles in the innovation 
systems. A typology of three different innovative behaviours is suggested, i.e. 
the R&D based innovator, the competition based innovator and the supplier 
based innovator. 
In the final chapter, the role of policy is discussed. In general, cluster 
development in one specific region is based on a unique mix of preconditions, 
and cannot be replicated elsewhere. Thus, no general recipe for policy 
intervention to support cluster evolution may be suggested. However, there is 
still a lot to learn about the role of policy. In the cases analysed in this report, 
i.e. Cambridge, Dublin and Sophia Antipolis, public policy has varied 
considerably. In the case of Cambridge, there are no cluster specific 
strategies evident in public policy, and consequently, the role of public policy 
has been rather weak, working indirectly through University and R&D policy. 
In the cases of Sophia Antipolis and Dublin, the role of public policy has been 
much more specific. 
Based on our analysis of the three areas, as well as a summary of the 
role of policy in the evolution of Oslo and Trondheim, future policy issues are 
discussed along the following lines:  
1) Strengthen the knowledge base 
2) Strengthen the capacity for commercialisation 
3) Develop more research-based industrial activity 
4) Develop regional organisation(s) that can facilitate information and 
communication between actors and provide the necessary regionally 
based initiatives 
5) Develop appropriate physical infrastructure. 
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1 Introduction 
It is widely recognised that Norway does not perform well in terms of high-
technology industrial development. Norway is at the forefront in applying new 
technology and developing infrastructures based on the new technology, but 
when it comes to developing industries that produce the new technology, 
Norway’s performance is comparatively low, lagging, for instance, behind its 
two neighbours, Sweden and Finland. 
When preparations for this project were in the initial stages, Norway’s 
poor performance was highlighted in a ranking of Europe’s 22 leading high-
technology ‘hot spots’, published in Wired Magazine in 2000. According to 
Wired Magazine, these hot spots are places ‘where the Internet of 
tomorrow is being created today’. The list included, among others, cities like 
Dublin, Cambridge, Stockholm and Oulu. Not surprisingly, neither Trondheim 
nor Oslo was found on the list. However, on a longer list of 47 cities, 
Trondheim was included in the lower end, but Oslo still received no mention. 
Although the methodology for ranking the cities may be questioned (see 
section 2.5), the ranking provides an important reminder about significant 
weaknesses in the industrial structure and performance of the Norwegian 
economy. 
Against this background, the issue addressed in this project is why Oslo 
and Trondheim are not among the internationally leading high-technology 
cities. While the two cities perform well in a national context and are home to 
a number of dynamic high-technology industries, it is the purpose of this 
project to analyse why the two cities are not performing well internationally. 
To develop insights into this issue, we need to identify the characteristics of 
dynamic high-tech clusters and determine the key factors – external as well 
as internal – which facilitate the dynamic processes of clusters. We will also 
summarise policy issues related to cluster development, and in this way 
provide a basis for analysing policy options and recommendations related to 
the future development of high-technology industries in Norway. 
As we are particularly interested in the dynamics of clusters; special at-
tention will be paid to evolutionary approaches to analysing clusters and 
innovation systems. Within this framework, we are interested in holistic 
approaches as well as a more specific focus on actors and institutions that 
may have a key role in the development of clusters.  
In order to study the evolution of high-technology clusters, a systemic ap-
proach is applied. There are two important aspects or characteristic s of 
business systems and their driving forces that form the point of departure for 
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our investigations: 1) the importance of technological development as a major 
driving force in economic development, and 2) the facilitation  of this 
development by industries organised in clusters, i.e. based on physical 
proximity and the development of a critical mass of competing and com-
plementary actors forming an environment conducive to industrial develop-
ment. 
Regarding the first point, there seems to be broad understanding among 
scholars that technology is a key driving force in economic development. As, 
for instance, stated by Edquist (1997:1): ‘It is almost universally accepted that 
technological change and other kinds of innovations are the most important 
sources of productivity growth and increased material welfare – and that this 
has been so for centuries.’ This understanding is in accordance with a 
number of other authors (cf. Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993, Verspagen 2000), 
and is both widespread and non-controversial. Thus, innovation may be 
regarded as the most important driving force behind competitive economic 
growth (Simmie 2001). The main issue for economic development and policy 
related to industrial development, is to identify the most efficient way of 
organising activities in order to exploit opportunities provided by technology 
and technological development.  
There are many ways of applying a systemic approach to analyses of 
industrial evolution (Carlsson et al 2002). Michael Porters concept of cluster 
(Porter 1990, 1998a, 1998b) is the point of departure for this project, in the 
sense that we focus analytically on regionally confined business systems with 
various actors related to each other in different ways. Rather than discussing 
to what extent clusters ‘exist’, we will use this concept and rela ted concepts 
like innovation systems and industrial milieu, as analytical tools to facilitate 
our understanding of central issues related to the evolution of business 
systems, and the importance of different mechanisms in determining their 
‘performance’. 
In the following chapter on high-technology clusters, central concepts and 
approaches are presented. This discussion will be used later as a background 
and framework for an empirical analysis of high-technology industries in 
Trondheim and Oslo. 
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2 High-technology clusters 
2.1 The cluster concept 
The widely acknowledged importance of clusters in economic development 
may, to a significant extent, be traced back to Porter’s seminal work on 
competition and the advantages of clusters for developing competitive ad-
vantage (Porter 1990). Porter’s more recent emphasis on geographical 
proximity (Porter 1998a, 1998b), has also received a great deal of attention: 
‘a cluster is a geographically proximate group of interconnected companies 
and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and 
complementarities.’ (Porter 1998b:199). In his discussion, Porter points out 
that clusters ‘encompass an array of linked industries and other entities im-
portant to competition’ (Porter 1998a:78), including the following factors:  
· suppliers of specialised input like components, machinery and ser-
vices 
· providers of specialised infrastructure; 
· customers 
· manufacturers of complementary products 
· companies in industries related by skills, technologies or common in-
puts 
· governmental and other institutions; universities, standards-setting 
agencies, think tanks, vocational training providers, trade associa -
tions. 
The main focus of Porter’s analysis is on competition and factors af-
fecting competitive advantage. He argues that clusters affect competition in 
‘three broad ways’; by 1) increasing productivity of companies based in the 
area; 2) driving the directions and pace of innovation which underpins pro-
ductivity growth; and 3) by stimulating the formation of new businesses 
(Porter 1998b:80). 
In a recent discussion of clusters, Cooke (2001:24) takes Porter’s and 
other’s definitions of clusters as his point of departure, and determines that 
there is ‘nothing wrong with these definitions except that they are all static, 
whereas the key feature of clusters is that they are dynamic’. Cooke identi-
fies a number of factors that should be incorporated in definitions of clusters, 
including:  a cluster displays a shared identity and future vision; it is 
characterised by ‘turbulence’ (spin-offs, spin-outs and start-ups); and vertical 
linkages and horizontal inter-firm networks are found within a cluster. 
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Cooke’s overview of clusters also identifies the presence of representative 
governance associations.  
In his discussion of the dynamics of clusters, Cooke refers to virtually the 
same factors as Porter, i.e. productivity gains, innovation gains and the 
formation of new businesses. Thus, there seems to be a strong 
correspondence in their understanding of the key dynamic mechanisms of 
clusters. 
Other definitions of clusters are similar, although there are some differ-
ences. In a comparative European analysis of regional clusters, Isaksen 
(2001) refers to the influential writings of Porter (op. cit.), but advocates a 
more ‘narrow and precise’ definition of the cluster concept. He argues: 
 
We are in favour of restricting regional clusters to geographical con-
centrations of interconnected firms, and use the concept regional inno-
vation system to denote regional clusters surrounded by ‘supporting 
organisations’. A regional innovation system, then, contains a specialised 
cluster of firms supported by a developed infrastructure of supplies firms 
and knowledge and technology diffusion organisations, which tailor their 
service to the specific need of the dominating regional industry. 
 
Isaksen makes a distinction between the cluster concept and regional 
innovation systems in the sense that clusters consist of a number of 
(geographically proximate) interconnected firms, while the supporting infra-
structure together with the cluster constitute the wider concept of the re-
gional innovation system. This is a narrower use of the cluster concept than 
that applied by Porter and Cooke (op. cit.). Kuijper and van der Stappen 
(1999) move in the same direction as Isaksen. In their analysis they identify 
clusters as regionally concentrated economic activity linked in vertical supply 
chains, although they are not explicit whether institutional factors should be 
included or not. 
In a recent study coordinated by David Keeble on high-technology 
clusters in Europe (Keeble and Wilkinson 2000), there is no explicit definition 
of high-tech clusters, but the study provides a thorough discussion of clusters 
in terms of high-technology and SMEs. The cluster phenomenon is analysed 
in terms of concepts like innovative milieu, learning regions and regional 
collective learning. Although not stated explicitly, their analysis seems to be 
based on an approach in which ‘the whole system’ is included, not least 
because significant parts of their analysis are influenced by the ‘innovative 
milieu’ approach (Camagni and Capello 2000). This approach puts stronger 
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emphasis on institutional and socio-cultural factors than ‘traditional’ 
approaches towards innovation systems. 
Analyses of clusters have also received the attention of the OECD 
(1999), which characterises clusters as ‘drivers of national innovation sys-
tems’ (OECD 2001). Based on Porter’s definition of clusters, the OECD has 
adopted the following definition: 
 
Clusters can be characterised as networks of production of strongly 
interdependent firms (including specialised suppliers) linked to each other 
in a value-adding production chain. In some cases, clusters also 
encompass strategic alliances with universities, research institutes, 
knowledge-intensive business services, bridging institutions (brokers, 
consultants) and customers. (Roelandt and den Hertog 1999) 
 
Expanding on this definition, Roelandt and den Hertog emphasise dif-
ferences to traditional sectoral approaches and argue that clusters include 
strategic groups with primarily complementary and dissimilar network po-
sitions. Furthermore, clusters include actors along the value chains as well as 
complementary and interrelated industries based on, for instance, common 
technology or skills (Roelandt and den Hertog 1999). 
The OECD analysis on clusters is part of a larger work on national in-
novation systems (NIS), where clusters are related to the NIS concept ‘re-
duced-scale national innovation systems’ (OECD 1999:8). It follows implicitly 
from this that the features and processes of clusters are virtually the same as 
those of national innovation systems, the main difference being that clusters 
are characterised by geographical proximity, while the national innovation 
systems (and the original cluster concept) are not. 
In their recent volume on ‘Innovative Cluster’ (OECD 2001), the idea of 
a cluster as a ‘reduced-NIS’ is maintained, but with reference to new analy-
ses of regional innovation systems, the authors take a step further, suggesting 
that the concept of a ‘double  reduced-NIS’ is an even better conceptualisa-
tion of regional innovation systems (RIS), i.e. ‘consisting of fewer and more 
locally manageable industrial clusters that share uniquely regional externalities 
of the type envisioned by Marshall’. The idea of RIS has been floating 
around for nearly a decade now, usually in conjunction with industrial district 
and local cluster concepts. The second reduction is two-fold: geographic 
specificity (rather than national generality); and greater distance from 
national policy frameworks (Bergman, Charles and den Hertog 2001:9). 
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2.2 Clusters and regional systems of innovation 
Contemporary interest in clusters is closely related to research on innovation 
systems and technology, and it may be difficult to identify significant 
differences in these approaches. A common background for research on 
innovation systems as well as clusters seems to be the emerging interest in 
Marshallian industrial districts during the 1980s, particularly inspired by the 
developments in ‘the Third Italy’ (Becattini 1990, Brusco 1986 and 1990, 
Garofoli 1984, Pyke et al 1990, Asheim 1992). This triggered considerable 
research into ongoing processes of industrial change, partly by raising 
questions related to shifts towards a structure characterised by flexible 
specialisation (Piore and Sabel 1984), partly by analysing the seemingly 
growing importance of small firms and the organisation of small scale activity 
in the economy (Loveman and Sengenberger 1991, Sengenberger et al 1991). 
An important aspect of this development was the spatial concentration of 
firms in agglomerations due to opportunities for taking advantage of external 
economies (Simmie 2001), including common factors of production such as 
land, labour, capital, energy etc., which according to Marshall laid the 
foundation for a special ‘industrial atmosphere’. Later, emphasis was given to 
the importance of skills, information and knowledge and how they are 
embedded in local structures. 
Spatial concentration of firms also means spatial concentrations of in-
novations, and the phenomenon of industrial districts and flexible speciali-
sation may also be interpreted as ‘a strategy of permanent innovation’ 
(Simmie 2001).  
According to Edquist (1997:8) and Lundvall (1992), Christopher Freeman 
(1987) was the first to apply the concept of a national system of innovation, 
which he defined as ‘the network of institutions in public and private sectors 
whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new 
technologies’. Freeman’s comments stem from an analysis of Japan’s na-
tional system of innovation in which he introduced elements which are now 
commonly included in the concept. However, it was not until after the publi-
cation of two major books on national innovation systems (Lundvall 1992 and  
Nelson 1993) that the concept was taken into broad use. 
After defining a system as ‘anything that is not chaos’, Lundvall (1992) 
goes on to define a system of innovation as a system ‘constituted by elements 
and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, 
and economically useful, knowledge and that a national system encompasses 
elements and relationships, either located within or rooted inside the borders 
of a nation state’ (Lundvall 1992:2). In his discussion, Lundvall makes a 
distinction between innovation systems in a narrow sense and these systems 
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in a broad sense. In a narrow sense, the system includes organisations and 
institutions ‘involved in searching and exploring’, like universities and R&D 
departments and technological institutes, while the system in a broad sense 
includes ‘all parts and aspects of the economic structure and the institutional 
set-up affecting learning as well as searching and exploring – the production 
system, the marketing system and the system of finance present themselves 
as sub-systems in which learning takes place’ (Lundvall 1992:12).  
Elaborating on this, Lundvall emphasises that a definition of innovation 
systems to some degree must be kept open and flexible regarding which sub-
systems and which processes should be studied. Furthermore, he argues that 
there is not one single, legitimate approach to an analysis of innovation 
systems, as different theoretical perspectives may illuminate different aspects 
of the system. However, a main focus of the approach is clearly on 
knowledge and learning; knowledge is the most important resource in the 
modern economy, and the most important process is learning. Thus, the most 
important aspect of the ‘performance’ of an innovation system is related to 
‘effectiveness in producing, diffusing and exploiting economically useful 
knowledge’ (Lundvall 1992:6). 
In Nelson’s book on national innovation systems, published the year after 
Lundvall’s, he defines innovation in a broad sense; ‘to encompass the 
processes by which firms master and get into practice product designs and 
manufacturing processes that are new to them, if not to the universe or even 
to the nation’ (Nelson 1993:4). As pioneering firms are often not the firms 
that capture the bulk of economic rents associated with innovation, analyses 
of innovation are not restricted to firms in the forefront of high-technology or 
the most advanced scientific research institutions, ‘but more broadly on the 
factors influencing national technological capabilities’ (p4). 
In contrast to the industrial district and agglomeration literature which 
has a clear regional or localised perspective, the initial literature on innovation 
systems was national in scope. This national focus was in keeping with 
Porter’s (1990) early concept of clusters, which did not pay much attention to 
innovation as a process localised and embedded in local structures. 
A significant change of perspective was introduced by the concept of 
regional innovation systems (Braczyk, Cooke and Heidenreich 1998), in 
which the previous tradition related to industrial districts was integrated in an 
analysis of innovation systems. Drawing ties with Marshallian industrial 
districts, Cooke (1998) discusses an evolutionary approach to regional in-
novation systems. Instead of ‘tightly defined districts’, Cooke’s model en-
compasses ‘loosely defined clusters of inter-firm relationships’. He provides 
the following definition: 
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The innovative regional cluster will consist of firms, large and small, 
comprising an industry sector in which network relationships exist or can 
be commercially envisaged, research and higher education institutes, 
private R&D laboratories, technology transfer agencies, chamber of 
commerce, agencies and appropriate government departments. (Cooke 
1998:10) 
 
Here, Cooke refers to the learning aspect of clusters, drawing upon the 
concept of the learning economy as elaborated by Dalum, Johnson and 
Lundvall 1992 (see also Asheim 1996, 1998), who discuss various stages of 
learning; i.e. learning by doing, learning by using, learning by interaction and 
eventually learning by learning. 
As very few regions have all the attributes of a regional innovation 
system, Cooke introduces a RIS typology. The typology is based on two 
dimensions grouped into three categories, i.e. the governance infrastructure 
which is classified into grassroots, network and dirigiste; and the business 
interrelationship which is classified into three different kinds of innovative 
milieu, i.e. the globalised, the interactive and the localist. (Cooke 1998:22, cf. 
Figure 1.2).  
The conclusion of this review is that there are not significant differences 
between the concepts of industrial districts, regional innovation systems and 
regional clusters. Each of these concepts refers to a similar construct. 
However due to different stages of research slight variations in the main 
focus of the approaches may be found. 
 
2.3 The innovative milieu 
A somewhat different concept found in the literature on innovation systems, 
is the concept of the innovative milieu as developed by the GREMI-school1 
(Simmie 2001). The idea of the innovative milieu is referred to frequently in 
analyses of clusters and cluster performance (e.g. Keeble 1994; Keeble and 
Wilkinson 1999, 2000; Maillat 1995, 1998; Capello 1999; Camagni and 
Capello 2000). Keeble has defined the concept in the following way:  
 
The core characteristic of an 'innovative milieu' is a form of networking 
characterised both by vertical subcontracting chains and horizontal 
linkages with the providers of financial, technical, fashion, design, 
                                                 
1 Groupement Européen des Milieux Innovateurs 
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marketing and training services and advice. The consequent Marshal-
lian-type 'industrial district' generates economies which are external to 
the firm, and include specialisation of product and service supply, pools 
of skilled labour, and synergetic flows of technical, scientific and other 
strategic information. (Keeble 1994:208) 
 
A slightly different definition of the concept is the following: ‘a set of 
territorial relationships encompassing in a coherent way a production system, 
different economic and social actors, a specific culture and a representation 
system, and generating a dynamic process of collective learning’ (Camagni 
and Capello 2000, Keeble et al 1999). 
While geographic proximity is a necessary prerequisite, it is in no way a 
sufficient condition for forming an innovative milieu. As pointed out by 
Camagni and Capello, in addition to forming a simple agglomeration of 
economic activities based on geographical proximity, there should be a set of 
close inter-firm relations, based on a) an economic element characterised by 
backward and forward linkages as well as horizontal networks and based on 
market as well as non-market exchanges of goods, services, information and 
human capital. Furthermore, there should be b) a socio-cultural element 
characterised by the relatively homogenous cultural and social background 
that link economic agents; and c) an institutional element characterised by a 
network of public and private institutions supporting economic agents and the 
cluster (Camagni and Capello 2000).  
Based on this, Camagni and Capello argue that within the milieu there 
are two kinds of co-operative processes at work:  informal, ‘non-traded’ 
relationships (Storper 1995) between the different actors of the cluster, like 
tacit transfers of knowledge through professional mobility and inter-firm 
imitation processes; and more formalised co-operation agreements. It is the 
first set of processes that is regarded as the ‘glue’ that creates the milieu 
effect (Camagni and Capello 2000). An effect of the innovative milieu is that 
it reduces the uncertainty inherent in innovation (Simmie 2001) and reduces 
obstacles to change.  
It follows from this definition that the concept of the innovative milieu is 
very similar to that of the innovation system, as it includes many of the same 
components, although they are conceptualised slightly differently. For in-
stance, emphasising the importance of ‘non-traded’ interdependencies, a 
concept introduced by Storper in 1995, is common in recent literature on 
innovation systems. There may also be differences in the way that the inno-
vative milieu approach pays greater attention to social and cultural aspects of 
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the environments, but even this is not obvious, as social aspects also are 
included in the innovation system approach. 
One important aspect of the innovative milieu approach is its strong 
focus on processes of learning and the concept of collective learning. This 
is explained as the capacity ‘to generate or facilitate innovative behaviour by 
the firms which are members of the milieu’ (Keeble et al 1999), or, as out-
lined by Capello (1999), this is at the heart of the milieu innovateur theory: 
‘The presence of common knowledge which goes beyond the boundaries of 
the firm, but which remains within the spatial boundaries of the innovative 
milieu, gives rise to a process of cumulative local know-how.’ The phe-
nomenon of collective learning may be regarded as the ‘highest’ level of 
system ‘performance’. Capello points to the following preconditions for 
forming different types of systems (based on Capello 1999, Figure 1): 
· inter SME stable linkages and stable local labour market (specialised 
area) 
· presence of cultural and organisational proximity (industrial district) 
· presence of strong and stable innovative synergies among local 
actors and labour force (milieu characterised by the presence of 
collective learning) 
· exploitation of collective learning (milieu innovateur). 
In this regard, the innovative milieu approach is comparable to learning 
economy approaches (Lundvall 1992) and learning regions (Asheim 1996, 
1998). 
 
2.4 High-technology 
Like many other concepts in the social sciences, there is ambiguity related to 
the concept of high-technology. The concept implies that it is possible to 
distinguish between different ‘levels’ of technology in the sense that some 
kinds of industrial activity is based on a more ‘advanced’ technology than 
other industries, which is often related to the level of ‘knowledge’ which the 
technology is based on. However, it is important to be aware that there is no 
easy way to distinguish ‘high’ technology from other forms of technology, in 
particular when it comes to operationalisations. Among those sceptical of the 
concept, is Porter, who refutes the idea of low tech industry (1998a): 
 
In fact, there is no such thing as a low-tech industry. There are only 
low-tech companies - that is, companies that fail to use world-class 
technology and practices to enhance productivity and innovation. A vi-
brant cluster can help any company in any industry compete in the most 
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sophisticated ways, using the most advanced, relevant skills and 
technologies. (Porter 1998a:86) 
 
The main point here is that technology at the firm level may be regarded 
as something relative, i.e. relative to the industry. In industries which are 
exposed to international competition, ‘high’ technology is defined through the 
practices of the leading and most competitive companies. Thus, in each 
industry the leading companies define ‘high-tech’; it does not make sense to 
distinguish between high- and low-tech industries. For the same reason it 
does not make sense to identify specific industries as particularly knowledge-
based, as doing so immediately raises the question whether some industries 
are not knowledge-based. Of course, all industries and firms are in some 
way based on knowledge. 
However, as we will return to later, it may be possible to analyse in-
dustries based on the role of knowledge resources in the production process, 
and the extent to which businesses develop ‘new’ knowledge and ‘new’ 
technology. 
Reflecting on the problem of identifying high-tech industries, Segal-
Quince-Wicksteed (1998) claims that:  
 
High-tech industry constitutes an archetypal ‘chaotic concept’, which is 
very difficult to define in any functional sense as it is not united by any 
common product, process, skill or market. One consequence is that it is 
almost impossible to draw meaningful generalisations. For instance, 
some firms that manufacture a high-tech product rely on processes that 
are - by any definition - low skilled, so the labour market implications of 
‘high-tech’ growth are very ambiguous. Equally, the range of high-tech 
activities is simply vast: from Internet service providers to those engaged 
in genomics research, and from the manufacture of scientific 
instruments to telecommunications. As a result, the nature and 
implications of any measure of (say) local sourcing across such a 
differentiated group is far from clear. Arguing that Cambridge (or 
anywhere else) has a ‘functional cluster’ of ‘high-tech’ firms is, 
therefore, conceptually ambiguous. 
 
Similar reflections have been presented by others, for instance Keeble 
and Wilkinson (2000). However, in spite of problems related to definitions, 
there is so much interest in the concept, that it is obviously a phenomenon 
that needs to be identified. 
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An analysis that has received a great deal of attention in the field, is 
Butchart’s article from 1987. Taking the point of departure that ‘no one 
doubts the significance of the high-technology industries’, and based on a 
review of previous definitions of high-technology industries, he suggests a 
definition of high-tech firms mainly based on the R&D intensity of the in-
dustry and their proportion of scientists, professional engineers and techni-
cians in the workforce. His analysis resulted in the list of industries presented 
in Table 2.1. 
In an analysis of the role of technology in various industries, the OECD 
(1999) has differentiated between high-technology, medium high-technology, 
medium low technology, and low technology. For reasons of available 
statistics, this definition is based on indicators of direct as well as indirect 
technology intensity, which reflect to some degree ‘technology producers’ as 
well as ‘technology users’. The indicators are the following: 
a) R&D expenditures divided by value added; 
b) R&D expenditures divided by production; 
c) R&D expenditures plus technology embodied in intermediate and 
capital goods divided by production. 
Table 2.1: Classification of high-technology industries in the UK. Based on 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 1980. 
2514 Synthetic resins and plastic materials  
2515 Synthetic rubber 
2570 Pharmaceuticals products 
2571 Office machinery manufacture 
2572 Electronic data-processing equipment manufacture (computer hardware) 
2573 Basic electrical equipment 
2574 Telegraph & telephone apparatus & equipment 
2575 Electrical instruments & control systems  
2576 Radio and electronic capital goods 
2577 Components other than active components mainly for electrical equipment 
2578 Active components and electronic subassemblies 
2579 Aerospace equipment manufacturing and repairing 
2580 Measuring, checking & precision instruments & apparatus 
2581 Medical & surgical equipment & orthopaedic appliances 
2582 Optical precision instruments 
2583 Photographic and cinematographic equipment 
2584 Telecommunications 
2585 Computing services 
2586 Research and development 
Source: Butchart 1987. 
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According to the OECD, this classification is useful for analysing industry 
information, for example on employment or value added by technology in-
tensity (OECD 1999:60). The classification covers at present only the 
manufacturing industry since no data is available for the service sectors, cf. 
Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Classification of manufacturing industries by level of technology. 
Level of 
Technology 
Industries 
High aircraft, office and computing equipment, drugs and medicines, 
radio, TV and communication equipment 
Medium 
High 
professional goods, motor vehicles, electrical machinery excluding 
communication equipment, chemicals excluding drugs, other 
transport equipment, non-electrical machinery 
Medium Low rubber and plastic products, shipbuilding and repairing, other 
manufacturing, non-ferrous metals, non-metallic mineral products, 
metal products, petroleum refineries and products, ferrous metals  
Low paper, paper products and printing, textiles, apparel and leather, 
food, beverages and tobacco, wood products and furniture 
Source: OECD 1999.  
 
Comparing Butchart’s definition of high-technology to the OECD’s, it 
may be observed that Butchart’s definition is more specific than the 
OECD’s. The OECD definition is based on two-digit NACE codes, while the 
UK definition is developed at a more detailed level. The OECD restricts their 
specification of high-technology to manufacturing, while Butchart’s 
specification also includes telecommunication services, computing services 
and R&D. 
Butchart’s definition of high-technology (cf. Table 2.1) has been applied 
to a European analysis of high-technology clusters (Keeble and Wilkinson 
2000), but as they emphasise in their report, there are ‘many research-based 
firms producing technology-intensive goods and services to be found in other 
sectors’ (p.5). Thus, the list has been a starting point for identifying high-
technology firms, and other firms have been included when they have met the 
criteria of being research-based and involved in producing technology-
intensive goods and services. 
A similar strategy has been pursued in this project. However, as we need 
to identify firms by their industrial classification, we had to translate and 
define the list based on the new industrial classifications (SN94 based on 
NACE codes) as illustrated in Table 2.3. 
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When considering what to include in high-technology sectors, it is 
important to reflect on the functions involved in the development and dis-
tribution of new technology. Processes related to this may be divided into 
three groups: a) developing and producing the technology, b) implementing 
and applying the technology in production processes, and c) spreading the 
technology. This means that in addition to processes related to R&D and 
manufacturing, relevant industries may also include functions like teaching, 
consultancy, marketing, selling and support. This leads us to a somewhat 
broader definition of high-technology industries than applied in other analyses, 
in particular by including sectors related to wholesale and retail sale of high-
technology equipment, and technical consultancy and technical testing and 
analysis.  
Table 2.3: High-technology industry sectors as applied in this project, 
classification based on SN94 
Nace 2 Detailed classification 
24 24.13 Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals  
24.14 Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals  
24.16 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms  
24.4 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and 
botanical products 
30 30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers (whole group) 
31 31.2 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 
31.6 Manufacture of electrical equipment n.e.c. 
32 32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus 
33 33.1 Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic 
appliances 
33.2 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, 
checking etc 
33.4 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 
35 35.3 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft  
51 51.64 Wholesale of office machinery and equipment 
52 52.485 Retail sale of computers, office equipment and telecommunication 
equipment 
64 64.2 Telecommunications, except 64.201 ‘chat lines’  
72 72 Computer and related activities (whole group) 
73 73.1 Research and experimental development on natural sciences and 
engineering 
74 74.209 Other technical consultancy work 
74.3 Technical testing and analysis  
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2.5 Cluster performance 
The rationale for analysing clusters, or more generally systems of firms, is 
that specific ways of organising industrial activity may contribute positively to 
the overall industrial performance of a region or country. Thus, it is important 
to reflect on the concept of ‘performance’ and the focus of the different 
systemic approaches to analyses of industrial evolution. 
Generally, it may be useful to distinguish between the internal and ex-
ternal performance of a system. External performance is related to the output 
of the system in terms of production and value creation. It may be measured 
in different ways, like GDP, employment, turnover, exports etc., and is the 
main concern of economic development. Internal performance, on the other 
hand, is related to processes within the system and may be measured by the 
numbers and quality of innovations, start-ups, technology-based spin-offs etc. 
Alternatively, a measure of internal performance may focus on the quality 
and quantity of the interaction between the actors in the system in terms of, 
for instance, information flow and learning relationships. 
The main idea or hypothesis behind most system approaches, although 
often not explicitly formulated, is that there is a positive relationship between 
internal and external performance. For instance, it may be assumed, that a 
high level of innovative activity will have a positive effect on the total long 
term value creation of the system. However, relationships between internal 
and external system performance are often very complicated or unclear. The 
extent to which firms located inside a system perform better than other firms 
is subject to debate as well as interesting research activity. 
When conducting research in this field, it is very important to specify 
whether performance is related to internal or external processes, and which 
part of the system performance criteria are related to. It is also important to 
be aware of the main focus of different system approaches, whether it be 
competition, productivity, technological change, innovation, learning, 
commercialisations, start-ups, entrepreneurial activity etc, as each concept 
focuses on different aspects of a system and its ‘performance’. 
The main focus of Porter’s cluster concept continues to be on competi-
tion. This is true of his previous works on the ‘Competitive advantage of 
nations’ (Porter 1990), and still holds in his recent works on clusters as 
geographic concentrations of interconnected companies. According to Porter, 
the key to competition is productivity, and ‘productivity rests on how 
companies compete, not on the particular fields they compete in’ (Porter 
1998a). The purpose of focusing on locations, then, is that the quality of the 
local business environment strongly influences the way businesses compete. 
According to Porter, clusters affect competition in three ways: 
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1. by increasing the productivity of companies based in the area 
2. by driving the direction and pace of innovation 
3. by stimulating the formation of new businesses, which expands and 
strengthens the cluster itself. 
The advantage of organising industries in clusters is that each member 
benefits as if it had a greater scale or as if it had joined with others formally, 
without requiring it to sacrifice its flexibility (Porter 1998a:80). 
A recent Norwegian analysis of clusters (Reve and Jakobsen 2001), 
distinguishes between internal and external performance. Table 2.4 summa-
rises the set of indicators applied to internal performance, referred to as 
cluster ‘strength’. Table 2.5 summarises the set of indicators applied to 
external performance. 
While the main idea of clusters is to identify a system of industrial organi-
sation which facilitates competition and economic growth, it may be 
questioned whether there is a clear relationship between cluster organisation 
and high (external) performance. In order to test this, clusters first have to be 
identified by criteria related to the physical formation of firms, i.e. the 
structure of agglomeration and relationships between firms and other actors 
which integrate this structure into a system. Obviously, to test the hypothesis 
of a positive relationship between cluster formation and external perfor-
mance, criteria related to external performance cannot be used to identify 
clusters. 
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Table 2.4: Indicators for evaluating cluster strength as applied by the Norwegian 
Cluster Project (Reve and Jakobsen 2001:54-55) 
Indicators for Cluster 
Strength 
Definition 
Competition  The firms’ own evaluation of competition in the home 
market 
Collaboration Collaboration with competing firms on R&D 
Collaboration with competing firms on competence 
development 
Incentives The extent to which companies apply incentives like 
bonus programs, share option programs etc. 
Market Conditions Demanding customer: 
- innovation as strategy to improving market position 
Internationalisation: 
- export relative to total sales 
- internationalisation strategy 
Networks and 
Linkages 
R&D: 
- share of companies without contacts with R&D 
institutions 
Cluster composition: 
- companies’ evaluation of access to qualified suppliers 
- outsourcing and strategy focus on core competence 
Factor Conditions Factor quality: 
- supply factors – labour, capital, infrastructure and 
R&D-results 
Competence development: 
- exploitation of international competence 
- competence strategy based on recruitment, further 
education, R&D collaboration and on-the-job-training  
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Table 2.5: Criteria for measuring performance as applied by the Norwegian 
Cluster Project (Reve and Jakobsen 2001:56-59) 
Performance indicator Explanation 
Growth of industry Relative growth (of turnover and value added) compared 
to other industries  
Factor return Return on capital, labour, public infrastructure and 
services 
Productivity growth Growth of value added per employee  
International competi-
tiveness 
Change of international market shares 
 
However, in some cases it seems to be the case that successful external 
performance is the main criterion for the identification of clusters. This is 
clear in a Danish study on ‘competence clusters’, in which clusters are de-
fined in the following way: ‘A group of firms that via interrelationships 
creates common competencies that make them able to produce at a high 
performance in terms of sales, profits and employment’ (Ervhervsfremme 
Styrelsen 2001:39).2 The three components of this definition are cluster 
structure, common competencies and performance measured as sales, profits 
and employment. 
While the ultimate interest in clusters and their performance is related to 
criteria mentioned above, the focus of much of the cluster and innovation 
literature is on factors that can explain development and internal per-
formance. The focus is more on the existence and quality of inherent pro-
cesses in clusters than on the actual final output. 
The point of departure for our research project was a ranking, published 
by Wired Magazine in 2000, of the internationally leading high-tech hot 
spots. As this ranking is of interest regarding the assessment of dynamic mi-
lieus, the details are worth considering. The ranking was based on the fol-
lowing criteria: 
1. the ability of area universities and research facilities to train skilled 
workers or develop new technologies 
2. the presence of established companies and multinationals to provide 
expertise and economic stability 
3. the population’s entrepreneurial drive to start new ventures 
4. the availability of venture capital to ensure that the ideas make it to 
market. 
                                                 
2 Our translation. The original text in Danish is: ‘En gruppe af virksomheder, som via deres 
indbyrdes relationer skaber fælles kompetencer, der gør dem i stand til at producere med 
relativt høje præstationer i form av indtjening, indkomst og beskæftigelse.’ 
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The ranking is based on scores given to each ‘participating’ city by 
observers belonging to the network of Wired Magazine. Each ‘hot spot’ was 
evaluated according to the four criteria above and graded on a scale from 1 
(low performance) to 4 (high performance). The points were added to a total 
score which was used to establish the ranking of the cluster. 
One obvious issue related to this ranking, is its reliability, as different 
observers judged different clusters, and nothing is said about how consistency 
between scores is controlled for. Furthermore, there is the issue of the valid-
ity of the four criteria chosen to assess a ‘hot spot’. One would assume that 
the concept of ‘hot spot’ would be related to high performance in terms of 
‘output’ from the system, i.e. external performance, yet the four criteria used 
are all related to what we previously have referred to as internal 
performance. It seems reasonable to hypothesise a positive relationship 
between each of the four criteria and external performance, but this has yet 
to be investigated. There is always the risk that a city may constitute a ‘hot 
spot’ in terms of having a ‘high temperature’ on all internal processes, but 
that does not deliver in the market, a feature typical of the IT hype of the late 
1990s. 
While the cluster literature focuses on external performance, this di-
mension is weaker in the other system approaches discussed previously. For 
instance, aspects of external performance and the relationship between in-
ternal and external performance are only occasionally discussed in the in-
novation system approaches.  
In his study on the performance of national systems of innovation, 
Lundvall (1992) posits that key performance criteria ‘should reflect the ef-
ficiency and effectiveness in producing, diffusing and exploiting economically 
useful knowledge.’ (p6). It is about economically useful knowledge, and to 
become useful in this sense it has to be exploited in a commercial way. 
Although most innovation research is related to technological development, it 
is not technical progress that is a goal in itself, but the economic growth that 
may be facilitated by innovation. A similar view is held by McKelvey (1997), 
who maintains that innovative activities are defined as ‘knowledge-seeking 
activities to develop novelty of economic value’, and Asheim (2001), quoting 
Lundvall and Borras (1999:35): ...’what really matters for economic 
performance is the ability to learn (and forget) and not the stock of 
knowledge’. 
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3 Evolution of high-technology clusters 
3.1 Evolution 
In the previous chapter we reviewed various definitions of the cluster con-
cept and related issues. In this chapter we are concerned with the evolution 
of clusters; i.e. how clusters emerge and evolve, and the key patterns and 
mechanisms in their evolution. 
The basic purpose of an evolutionary approach to an analysis of clusters 
and innovation systems is to explain change over time. This may be related to 
fundamental issues like the rise-and-fall pattern of clusters (Pouder and St 
John 1996) or about birth, evolution and decline (Porter 1998b). It may also 
involve a more detailed focus on the mechanisms of development at work in 
the cluster and the interaction between organisations or actors that constitute 
the cluster, and how evolution at a certain stage depends on previous patterns 
of evolution. Or, to put it in another way: an evolutionary explanation is an 
explanation of a fact of economic life by reference to previous facts as well 
as to causal links (Andersen 1994). 
An important departure for many authors in this field, is the classic work 
of Schumpeter (1934, 1943). Many books on innovation systems refer to him 
(e.g. Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993,  Edquist 1997, Braczyk, Cooke and 
Heienreich 1998, Simmie 2001, OECD 2001). In his theory of economic 
development, Schumpeter introduces the concept of the entrepreneur as an 
agent of change, and he defines entrepreneurial innovation as the introduction 
of a new combination. He also points to the role of entrepreneurship as 
‘breaking the circular flow’ and disturbing current equilibrium. Furthermore, 
Schumpeter characterises the capitalist economic system as a system or 
method of organising change. One of the most well-known of his concepts, is 
the concept of creative destruction, i.e. that evolution takes place through the 
destruction, either direct or indirect, of the current industrial structure, and 
resources are reallocated from old to new modes of production. 
In the literature, basic principles or mechanisms of evolution in a system 
are commonly referred to using the concepts 1) reproduction or preservation, 
2) variation and 3) selection. Andersen puts it this way (1994:14):  
(1) a mechanism of preservation and transmission 
(2) a mechanism of variety-creation 
(3) a mechanism of selection. 
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Similarly, Edquist, in his analysis of approaches to innovation systems, 
maintains that an evolutionary theory of technical change often contains the 
following components (1997:6): 
1. The point of departure is the existence of reproduction of entities like 
genotypes in biology or a certain set-up of technologies and or-
ganisational forms in innovation studies. 
2. There are mechanisms that introduce novelties in the system (i.e. 
mechanisms that create diversity). These include significant random 
elements, but may also produce predictable novelties (e.g. purpose-
oriented development work). In biology novelties are mutations; in 
our context they are innovations. 
3. There are mechanisms that select among the entities present in the 
system. This increases the relative importance of some and dimi-
nishes that of others. The selection process reduces diversity, and the 
mechanisms operation may be the ‘natural selection’ of biology or 
the ‘market selection’ of competition as regards technical change. 
Together the selection mechanisms constitute a filtering system that 
functions in several stages and leads to a new set-up of, for example 
technologies and organisational forms. There might also be feedback 
from the selection to the generation of new innovations. 
Similar approaches have been suggested, among others, by Nelson 
(1995), McKelvey (1997) and Aldrich (1999). According to McKelvey 
(1997), the three principles should not be seen as three different phases but 
instead as continuing processes which interact. In some definitions, selection 
is further assumed to occur in relation to an environment, leading to the 
proposition of local rather than universal optimality. 
In line with this, evolutionary approaches are careful about analysing 
economic activity in a systemic context in which history and routines are 
important, and in which influences of environments and institutions are em-
phasised (Cooke 1998). Furthermore, emphasis on system approaches natu-
rally leads to the understanding of processes of evolution as having an im-
portant collective dimension, i.e. to some extent processes in a cluster are the 
result of some form of collective action. For instance, the concept of 
collective learning is commonly focused on in the literature (e.g. Capello 
1999, Longhi 1999, Keeble and Wilkinson 1999).  Firms belonging to a cluster 
may also be regarded as part of a collective organisation (Cooke 1998). 
Evolutionary processes are characterised, to some extent, by their unpre-
dictability.  Chance effects occur (Cooke 1998). Lundwall (1992) argues that 
processes of innovation are neither totally accidental nor totally predeter-
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mined by the economic structure and the institutional set-up, but a strong 
element of randomness will always remain (Lundwall 1992:12).  
There is no theory that can explain why a cluster or system develops in a 
particular area (Pouder and StJohn 1996), but when the system has started to 
evolve, its different stages of development may be analysed in a retrospective 
approach, and a rise-and fall pattern may be identified. 
In her analysis of high-tech milieus, Garnsey (1998) says that the most 
common way of explaining why high-tech districts arise in certain places, has 
been based on a simple 'growth formula' designed to help promote the 
expansion of such systems. Factors commonly identified as providing con-
ditions for a growing high-technology locality are (Garnsey 1998:3): 
· ‘A leading scientific university and associated research complex 
· A prestigious industrial or science park 
· A desirable social environment to attract and retain high calibre per-
sonnel 
· Provision of venture capital 
· Public support for innovative technology 
· A facilitating labour market providing the requisite skills.’ 
Furthermore, Garnsey (1998), in her analysis of high-tech milieu, argues 
that the milieu is something more than just a clustering of specialised industry. 
It is a system with emergent properties. The system is animated by key 
agents, i.e. entrepreneurs, who form enterprises which develop in interaction 
with other actors in the system. She points out that the system evolves 
through the following processes (1998:9): 
· ‘resource exchange occurs across permeable boundaries 
· coordination is through information flows, through which learning oc-
curs 
· there are linkages between key components, the agents and units of 
the system.’ 
Important processes of evolution are related to technology, the diffusion 
of knowledge and processes of learning organised around this. Eliasson 
(2000) suggests that diffusion of new technology may occur along five dis-
tinct channels, i.e. (1) when people with competence move over the labour 
market; (2) through the entry of new firms when people with competence 
leave established firms; (3) through mutual learning among subcontractors 
and the systems of coordinators; (4) when a firm strategically acquires other 
firms to integrate their particular knowledge with its own competence base; 
(5) when competitors imitate the products of successful and leading firms; 
and (6) through organic growth of, and learning in incumbent firms (Eliasson 
2000:16). 
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The concept of collective learning is related to similar processes. Keeble 
et al (1999) point to three processes of collective learning: i.e. spin-off of 
(embodied) technological and managerial expertise in the form of entre-
preneurs; inter-firm networking and interaction; and finally, the flow of 
professional and research staff between firms in the milieu. 
Given that unpredictability and processes of chance represent important 
aspects of the evolutionary mechanism, it is necessary to include this di-
mension clearly in the system analysis. For instance, Metcalfe (2000) char-
acterises the capitalist system as restless, and the economy as experimental.  
He regards the economy as a system for testing out new technologies and 
new business ideas, in which the market represents an important mechanism 
of selection. 
The concept of the experimental economy has also been discussed by 
other authors, like Eliasson (2000) and Bahrami and Evans (1995).  In their 
analysis of Silicon Valley, Bahrami and Evans point to the ‘recycling’ of 
business ideas and other resources as an important mechanism of evolution. 
Another aspect of this may be termed ‘re-starts’, i.e. a new business that 
started out based on one business idea may turn out not to work, and will thus 
have to ‘re-calibrate’ the business model, for instance, by organising a new 
management team (p71). Bahrami and Evans go on to describe how different 
resources, in particular human capital, ‘float’ around in the system 
continuously forming new constellations and new business units, and in this 
way contribute to a continuous process of re-cycling. 
In analyses of cluster evolution, and in particular in formulating strategies 
for stimulating the further development of such systems, awareness of these 
effects are of great importance. 
In the following sections we will analyse some of these aspects in three 
different cases, i.e. Cambridge, Dublin and Sophia Antipolis. 
 
3.2 Cambridge and the Cambridge Phenomenon 
Introduction3 
The evolution and performance of the high-technology cluster in Cambridge 
is widely recognised as one of the most interesting in Europe. Often 
characterised as the Cambridge Phenomenon, the high-tech cluster in Cam-
bridge has been given substantial attention over the last 20 years. 
                                                 
3 This section is an edited summary of Steinsli, J. 2003: The Cambridge Phenomenon. 
Norwegian School of Management, working paper. 
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Cambridge is often used as an example of successful university-led 
industrial development. This has resulted in several reports and articles. Segal 
Quince Wicksteed undertook the first study in 1985, which they followed up 
in 2000, and several researchers at Cambridge have published articles and 
books on high-tech businesses in the area.4 
Cambridge’s main strength is its world-renowned University. Since 1904, 
Cambridge University scientists have received 60 Nobel Prizes for their 
scientific discoveries. The high quality of the university, and its interest in 
interacting with companies, has been a main driving force. Development 
started during the late 1960s.  From 1974 to 1984 the number of high-tech 
firms increased from around 100 to more than 300 (Garnsey and Lawton-
Smith 1998). In 1999 more than 40 000 people were employed in high-tech 
firms in the Cambridge region. 
Evolution of the Cambridge high-technology cluster 
Although the basis for the evolution of high-tech industries in Cambridge may 
be traced back to previous centuries, the history of the Cambridge Phe-
nomenon often starts with the situation during the 1960s, when the city was 
characterised by strict planning policies which aimed at restricting industrial 
development in the area around the city.  
This resulted in considerable local controversy, the most famous of which 
was the refusal of IBM to establish its European research and development 
laboratories in Cambridge. At the same time, however, new companies were 
formed. Cambridge Consultants was established in 1960, and several new 
research institutes were established later on. The strength of computing at 
the University was also the background for the central government’s decision 
to set up a new national CAD-centre (Computer Aided Design centre) in 
Cambridge in the late 1960s. 
During this period, there was growing awareness within Cambridge 
University of the potential benefits to itself if the city became a prosperous 
regional centre. At the national level there was increasing awareness of the 
importance of industry-university links, and the Government urged universities 
to increase contacts with high-technology industry. As a result, Cambridge 
University set up the Mott Committee5 in 1967. 
It took the Committee two years to complete the report, which involved a 
long process of consultations, as well as many rounds of debate and lobbying, 
                                                 
4 See for instance Garnsey 1993, 1994 and 1998, Keeble 1989, Keeble et al 1999, Keeble and 
Wilkinson 2001. 
5 Sir Nevil Mott was head of the prestigious Cavendish Laboratory (physics department). 
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both inside and outside the University, with the result that a degree of 
consensus was reached between representatives from the University and 
local planning authorities. The Mott Report is widely regarded as constituting 
a significant shift in the University’s official attitude to industrial development 
and collaboration with local authorities (Segal Quince Wicksteed 1985). 
When the Mott Report was completed in 1969, it recommended a mo-
derate expansion of ‘science-based industry’ close to the city, in mutual 
benefit to industry and university. One of its main recommendations was to 
establish a science park. 
Cambridge Science Park was established in 1975 by Trinity College, 
which is wealthy due to its role as owner of huge land areas close to Cam-
bridge city centre. No public funding was involved in the development of the 
park. The park was regarded as a commercial investment, but the College 
has been lenient towards firms with financial difficulties and did not earn a 
profit the first ten years. The first tenant moved in already in 1973, 
Cambridge Consultants, and they are still situated in the park.  
In 1987, St. Johns College decided to build an innovation centre on the 
college’s property north of Cambridge. Parallel to this, other events contri-
buted to development in the area. In the late 1970s Barclays Bank became 
aware of the possibilities of high-tech ventures, and enabled a number of 
start-ups, including Acorn Computers. In 1978, the bank decided to work with 
spinouts from the University. In addition to providing loans, they helped 
businesses with advisory services, like assistance in writing business plans 
and help with budgets.6 
To give the group of business managers a sense of identity, a club was 
formed and key speakers invited to improve business knowledge. The pur-
pose of the club was also to encourage networking and learning among the 
firms, and to encourage sharing of expensive resources such as photocopiers 
(which were very expensive in the 1970s). In effect, Barclays set up a virtual 
incubator.  
In order to make individuals feel important and to encourage others, the 
local paper was persuaded to write a business column on a weekly basis fo-
cusing on the sector. These initial conditions were the bases of a series of 
interdependent and reinforcing processes. 
The importance of Cambridge University 
The positive attitude of Cambridge University towards industrial development 
played an important role in developing a high-tech cluster, and a number of 
                                                 
6 St Johns Innovation Centre strategy 2001 
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firms in the region originate from the University. The first report on the 
Cambridge Phenomenon (Segal Quince Wicksteed 1985) indicated that the 
University either directly or indirectly gave birth to nearly all the high-tech 
firms in the area at that time. This is in part due to spin-offs either directly 
from the University, or from companies that were previously University spin-
offs. Many leading companies have also been attracted to the area because 
of the reputation of the University and opportunities for interacting with 
University staff or taking advantage of the high quality labour market in the 
area (Segal Quince Wicksteed 1985). A survey undertaken by 
Cambridgeshire County Council points to the fact that one third of companies 
reported recruitment of graduates from the University as an important 
consideration in their decision to settle in the area.  
The University’s liberal attitude towards staff members who develop 
new products and earn extra income from their scientific research, seems to 
be another important reason for the region’s success. An additional factor is 
the high average age of first appointment in permanent positions at 
Cambridge University. This has given experienced researchers on temporary 
contracts extra incentive to experiment with entrepreneurship (Keeble 1989). 
Many Cambridge researchers are only employed on three-month contracts, 
and therefore do not have much to lose if they do not succeed in starting a 
new venture. Finally, the University’s scientific credibility, reputation and 
prestige provide clout to companies in the region which are seeking global 
markets.  
High-tech industries in Cambridge 
High-tech industries in Cambridge now account for about 40 000 employees 
(Table 3.1). What characterises the structure of these industries, is the strong 
position of the R&D sector with around 22 per cent of total high-tech 
employment. Obviously, this reflects the strong position of R&D activities at 
the University, and the influence of these activities on industrial development 
in the area. 
A second characteristic of the Cambridge Phenomenon is the fairly low 
share of ICT-related activities.  In total these sectors do not account for 
more than one third of all activity, which is considerably below other the cities 
referred to in this analysis. A third characteristic is the fairly strong role of 
high-tech based manufacturing industries, which accounted for about 42 per 
cent of activity in 1999, and even 50 per cent back in 1991. 
There was also significant growth in employment during the 1990s; the 
numbers employed in high-tech grew by around 13 000 from 1991 to 1999, 
i.e. about 50 per cent. In terms of absolute employment growth, the most 
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significant contributions have come from R&D-activities, telecommunications 
and technical consultancy. 
The data referred to here, summarise the industries in the whole of the 
Cambridgeshire region. As shown in Table 3.2, different areas of the region 
have their local specialisations, with for instance R&D activities concentrated 
in Cambridge City and South Cambridgeshire. 
There has been a high rate of new firm formation in Cambridge and 
South Cambridgeshire. In the period 1997-99, 225 new firms were identified 
(Table 3.3). Cambridge City was home to 61 start-ups while South 
Cambridgeshire had 42. In Cambridge City, this was accompanied by a large 
number of businesses moving elsewhere. South Cambridgeshire attracted 
more firms that relocated within the county; 22 compared with Cambridge 
city’s five. Lack of areas for new business development within Cambridge 
City and soaring property prices have forced start-ups to locate outside the 
city.  
Table 3.1 High-tech employment in Cambridge 
  1991 1999 Change 
     %  % 91-99 
24 Chemicals incl. Pharmaceuticals  2 970 11.3 2 600 6.5 -12.5 
30 Data and office machines 1 850 7.0 2 210 5.5 19.5 
31 Electro technical 0 0.0 1 300 3.3 - 
32 Radio, tv and other comm. equipment 5 410 20.5 5 730 14.3 5.9 
33 Medical and optical instruments 3 100 11.7 2 890 7.2 -6.8 
35 Aircraft and spacecraft 0 0.0 2 130 5.3 - 
51 
Wholesale of PCs, data and telecom 
equipment 940 3.6 1 670 4.2 77.7 
52 
Retailing of PCs, data and telecom 
equipment 200 0.8 560 1.4 180.0 
64 Telecommunication 1 250 4.7 2 610 6.5 108.8 
72 
Data processing, data bases, software 
development 3 680 13.9 6 340 15.9 72.3 
73 Technical, science based R&D 5 820 22.1 8 720 21.8 49.8 
74 Other technical consultancy work 1 170 4.4 3 240 8.1 176.9 
  Total 26 390 100.0 40 000 100.0 51.6 
 ICT 7 920 30.0 13 390 33.5 69.1 
  Other high-tech 18 470 70.0 26 610 66.5 44.1 
Source: Research Group, Cambridgeshire County Council. Data are regrouped in accordance 
with the nace-standard as applied elsewhere in this report. Some data included in the original 
statistics, are omitted here for reasons of comparison. 
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Table 3.2 Top high-tech sectors in Cambridgeshire districts, 1999 
District Top sector Second sector Third sector 
Cambridge 
City 
R&D 3870 jobs, 
22% of all 
Computer services, 
2800 jobs, 22% of all 
Electronic engineer-
ing, 1760 jobs, 14% of 
all 
East Cam-
bridgeshire 
Electronic Engi-
neering 430 jobs, 
30% of all 
Specialist mechanical 
engineering, 200 jobs, 
14% of all 
R&D 170 jobs, 12% of 
all 
Fenland Specialist 
wholesale 200 
jobs 32% of all 
Specialist mechanical 
engineering, 160 jobs, 
25% of all 
Technical services, 90 
jobs, 14% of all 
Huntingdon-
shire 
Electronic Engi-
neering 1840 
jobs, 29% of all 
R&D, 960 jobs, 15% 
of all 
Computer services, 
840 jobs, 13% of all 
South Cam-
bridgeshire 
R&D 3700 jobs, 
22% of all 
Chemicals manufac-
ture, 2250 jobs, 22% 
of all 
Aero engineering, 
2060 jobs, 12% of all 
Peterborough Computer 
services, 1040 
jobs, 34% of all 
Electronic engineer-
ing 470 jobs, 15% of 
all 
Specialist mechanical 
engineering 410 jobs, 
13% of all 
Cambridge-
shire 
R&D 8720 jobs, 
21% of all 
Computer services, 
6340 jobs, 16% of all 
Electronic engi-
neering 5730 jobs, 
14% of all 
Source: Cambridgeshire County Council 
Table 3.3 New firms and closures 1997- 1999, Cambridgeshire Districts 
 New firms Lost firms  
District New Spin-
offs 
Buy-
out 
etc. 
Moved 
in 
Total 
new 
Closed/ 
moved 
out 
Take 
overs, 
mergers, 
internal 
movers 
Total 
lost 
Cambridge City 61 6 8 75 49 24 73 
East Cambridgeshire 9 1 6 16 16 3 19 
Fenland 6 0 4 10 7 2 9 
Huntingdonshire 26 5 11 42 29 6 35 
Peterborough City 16 3 8 27 22 0 22 
South Cambridgeshire 42 6 27 75 45 22 77 
Cambridgeshire 160 21 64 245 168 57 225 
Source: Cambridgeshire County Council 
The high-tech industries of Cambridgeshire are characterised by a large 
number of small firms. 41 per cent of the firms employ between 1 and 5 peo-
ple, and 19 per cent employ between 6 and 10. Only 2.5 per cent of high-tech 
38 
businesses employ 200 people or more, yet these employ 39 per cent of the 
total work force. Industries with high concentrations of small companies 
include computer services and technical services. Manufacturing sectors tend 
to have medium-sized and larger firms, and the same applies to the service 
sectors, including research and development and telecommunications. 
In spite of the large number of small firms, the share of small firms is 
considerably below the national size distribution. Figures from 1996 show that 
the share of firms with less than 10 employees was 95 per cent for the whole 
of the UK (as compared to 60 per cent for high-tech in Cambridge), and 
these firms employed 31 per cent of the workforce (European Observatory 
for SMEs 1997). 
The main characteristics of the high-tech community in Cambridgeshire 
are: 
· High share of businesses within research and development. This 
sector employs over 8700, or more than 21 per cent of the total. The 
growing computer services sector provides over 6300 jobs (almost 
16 per cent) and electronics engineering over 5700, or 14 per cent. 
· Geographical concentration of high-tech businesses. High-tech 
employment is concentrated in two neighbouring districts–South 
Cambridgeshire (including Cambridge Science Park) and Cambridge 
City. In total 29 350 jobs, or near 75 per cent of all high-tech 
employment in Cambridgeshire is concentrated in these two districts.  
· High growth rates. The longer term analysis of employment 
changes since 1991 shows that high-tech businesses have been very 
successful and have generally increased employment at rates well 
above those of the economy overall. 
· A large number of very small firms. 60 per cent of all firms employ 
less than ten people, only 2.5 per cent employ more than 200 people. 
Institutional factors 
There are two universities in Cambridge, i.e. the Cambridge University and 
the Anglia Polytechnic University (APU). The latter was founded in 1992, 
and is a merger of two major colleges, the Cambridge College of Arts and 
Technology and the Essex Institute of Higher Education. There are ap-
proximately 23 000 students at APU. Cambridge University consists in total 
of 31 colleges.7  The oldest, Peterhouse College, was established in the 12th 
                                                 
7 The colleges are privately endowed autonomous institutions, which provide accommodation 
and teaching to groups of about 300 students from all faculties, and are administered by their 
fellows. In Cambridge college academic fellowships are not salaried for university employees.  
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century.  At present, the University has more than 16 500 full-time students 
and a staff of around 7 000. 
About 17 per cent of the students at Cambridge University are from 
overseas. Because of its excellent academic reputation,  admission is highly 
competitive. Only about a third of applicants are admitted. The student body 
is fairly evenly split between arts and science subjects. Cambridge University 
consists of 62 different faculties and departments, among which 29 are 
science based and 33 are arts based. The university is struggling to keep the 
art:science ratio on a 50:50 balance to maintain the university’s stronghold in 
science. In comparison, the University of Oxford has an art:science ratio of 
1:4. This reflects a long-standing contrast of emphasis in the two places 
(Garnsey and Lawton Smith 1998). Each college forms a community with 
people from different disciplines. The collegiate structure of the university 
creates networks of researchers supple mentary to those of the departments 
and facilitates interaction of knowledge between academics from different 
disciplines.  
Cambridge University has an open and non-bureaucratic approach to the 
exploitation of research. Collaborative research programmes with industry 
are encouraged, and companies get easy access to skills and expertise. The 
University ensures companies’ rights to exploit any result from research they 
sponsor, on terms that reflect the contributions made from both parts. Some 
increased formalisation of ground rules on the sharing of financial returns 
from successful commercialisations has recently been adopted by the uni-
versity, but without fundamentally altering its traditionally benign attitude to 
entrepreneurial and collaborative initia tives by its own researchers. 
The University's Industrial Liaison and Technology Office (ILTO) exists 
to promote and reinforce contacts between the University and industry. 
ILTO fulfils a number of tasks; it acts as a central clearing house for external 
enquires; it provides advice on research contracts, consultancy agreements 
and other forms of collaborative activities. In this way ILTO acts as a portal 
to promote contacts between the University and industry. They also operate 
CUTS, the University’s technology exploitation company. Cambridge 
Research and Innovation LTD and Quantum Fund, in both of which the 
University is involved, are small local investment funds for university 
scientists seeking to commercialise their research. 
In 1989 the Cambridge Foundation was established with an aim of raising 
£250 million over 10 years to research and development. Furthermore, new 
initiatives to encourage entrepreneurship and commercial exploitation by 
university staff, students and local firms have been initiated; 
40 
· Cambridge Entrepreneurship Centre, funded by central government 
as a part of a national investment competition 
· Cambridge University for Manufacturing 
· The Cambridge-MIT Institute to promote joint US-British research 
and innovation 
· Business outreach programmes such as Government Challenge Fund 
(university spin-offs) and HEROBAC (Higher Education Reach Out 
to Business and the Community) funding. 
Total research and development (R&D) activity in the UK is slightly be-
low the EU average; 1.79 per cent of GDP was spent on R&D in 1999, 
while the EU average was 1.85 per cent. UK Government spending on R&D 
is below the EU average, while business expenditure is on the average level. 
According to the EU, the UK is falling behind compared to the development 
of most other European countries (European Commission 2001). 
In the Cambridge region, however, R&D activities are way ahead of all 
other regions in the UK. In 1999, with 0.56 per cent of the UK’s popula tion, 
the region had 5 per cent of the national industrial research budget (Garnsey 
and Cannon Brookes 1993). A large portion of the firms in the area have 
undertaken some form of innovative activity over the last few years, and a 
significant share of firms have research links with Cambridge region uni-
versities or regional government research bodies (Keeble and Moore 1997). 
 
Box 3.1 Institutions in Cambridge 
Programs in Advanced Technology (PAT) 
High-technology business-led initiative to raise global profile through increased 
local networking by Cambridge IT Companies. 
Greater Cambridge Partnership 
· Operating since 1998 to develop consensus between local businesses, 
government (county and district) and university on future economic 
strategy for Cambridge region. 
Cambridge Futures 
· Academic and business alliance investigating, alternative 50-year 
scenarios for accommodating anticipated growth. Report was published 
May 1999; work on local transport problems and infrastructure provision 
ongoing. Private sector funding. 
Science parks and innovation centres 
· There are four science parks: 
· Cambridge Science Park 
· St Johns’s Innovation Park 
· Melbourne Science Park 
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· Granta Park. 
A new biotechnology park is being planned, total area 26,000 m2. 
Innovation centres:  
· St John’s Innovation Centre, established 1987 to house new high-
technology start-ups, 50 current firms plus 100 ‘graduates’ who have 
moved to larger premises. 
· a new Bioscience Innovation Centre is planned. 
Private Venture Capital Funds  
· Prelude Technology Investments 
· Amadeus Capital (includes Microsoft venture capital fund) 
· Cambridge Research and Innovation (CRIL) 
· Gateway Fund 
· Avlar bioscience seed fund 
· QTP high-technology seed fund 
· 3i plc Cambridge Office 
New Cambridge University Initiatives 
· Establishment of new Cambridge Entrepreneurship Centre 
· Cambridge University Institute for Manufacturing 
· Cambridge-MIT Institute (CMI) 
· New business outreach programmes with government Challenge Fund 
(university spin-offs) 
· HEROBAC (Higher Education Reach Out to Business and the 
Community) 
All initiatives have been taken since 1999. 
New Cambridge based Eastern Region and European Initiatives 
Two major new government-funded regional development organisations, the East 
of England Investment Agency and the East of England Development Agency, 
have established their headquarters in Cambridge since 1998. The former is 
promoting inward foreign investment to the region, while the latter is developing a 
new Regional Innovation and Technology Transfer Strategy, with co-funding from 
the European Commission. The latter has also established a European Innovation 
Relay Centre in Cambridge, based at St John’s Innovation Centre.  
Source: Keeble 2001.  
 
Many different institutions have been set up in Cambridge in order to 
facilitate high-technology development and industry-university contacts (Box 
3.1). Mainly, these are located in or in the vicinity of Cambridge City. There 
are four science parks, among which Cambridge Science Park and St John’s 
Innovation Park are the most important. They host 10 per cent of the area 's 
high-tech businesses. Cambridge Science Park is a prestigious address, 
which creates important legitimacy to risky and innovative ventures. Tenants 
are, however, frustrated by difficulties of expansion within the Science Park 
and also the costs of being located there (Segal Quince Wicksteed 1998).  
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St John’s Innovation Centre is the home of several start-ups, and its 
managing director, Walter Herriot, is highly valued as a source of advice, 
inspiration and business contacts (Segal Quince Wicksteed 1998). 
The UK venture capital market is one of the most well developed in 
Europe. UK scores highest among the European Union countries in high-tech 
venture capital investments measured as percentage of GDP (European 
Commission 2001). Venture capital and the seed capital industry in Cam-
bridge have increased over the last few years, and are attracted to the area 
by the growth of companies in the region.  
The increasing scale and visibility of the seed and venture community in 
Cambridge will, according to Segal Quince Wicksteed (2000), have a number 
of important spillover effects; 
· The venture capital community is publicity hungry and will help 
sustain the Cambridge image as a high-tech community. 
· With co-location the potential for syndication of investments is en-
hanced. 
· Competition among venture capitalists may improve offers to the 
companies. 
· An active community of external investors forces companies to focus 
on management.  
· They add a further dimension to national and international network-
ing, since most of the funds are both active outside Cambridge and 
have shareholders from the US and the rest of Europe. 
In addition to these formal sources of finance, there has been growth in 
direct investments by corporate bodies as well as individuals. Previous en-
trepreneurs have played a role as financiers of start-ups. For instance, a pre-
vious Cambridge entrepreneur, Herman Hauser, started the venture capital 
fund Amadeus. However, Saxenian (1989) argues that development in 
Cambridge has been hindered due to venture capitalists’ lack of knowledge 
of high-tech industries. Since institutional investors largely finance UK 
venture capital firms, venture capital firms tend to maintain an arm’s-length 
relationship to entrepreneurs, in contrast to Silicon Valley, where venture 
capitalists typically have business experience and can provide access to 
networks and intervene directly in the development of the firms, based on 
first hand knowledge of the kinds of difficulties young entrepreneurs face. 
Future involvement in venture capital by former Cambridge entrepreneurs 
might improve this situation. 
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The role of entrepreneurial activity and larger firms 
Evolution of an area occurs as a result of action taken by a number of dif-
ferent actors, and by the interaction between these actors. Previous sections 
of this report looked mainly at institutional actors; we will now turn to the 
primary business actors, i.e. the entrepreneurs and the firms. 
Entrepreneurial activity has been one of the main forces of economic 
growth and dynamism in Cambridge (Segal Quince Wicksteed 2000). The 
development of the high-tech cluster reflects primarily a process of creation 
and growth of new independent firms by individual entrepreneurs (Keeble 
1988). Successful entrepreneurs have encouraged others and contributed to 
the emergence of an entrepreneurial culture. The relatively high degree of 
start-ups and spinouts imply a considerable diffusion of knowledge from the 
‘incubating’ firms or institutions. 70 per cent of new firms have been founded 
by entrepreneurs formerly working for another company, while 25 per cent of 
the chief founders were employed either by a university or a research 
institution prior to start-up (Keeble et al 1998). 
As commented on earlier, there are a large number of small firms in the 
region. The question why many high-tech firms have failed to grow, is often 
raised. According to Garnsey and Lawton Smith (1998) there are many 
causes at work, but in their view the main explanation can be attributed to the 
lack of managerial or business experience among the bulk of scientific 
entrepreneurs. 
Cambridge has several serial entrepreneurs. Gordon Edge, for example, 
left Cambridge Consultants in 1972 to set up PA Technology, and then in 
1986 established Scientific Generics. A number of firms have since spun out 
of Generics. Generic has access to risk funds, and through its senior directors 
and major clients, the company has excellent links to potential development 
partners. As leading individuals have made money, they have demonstrated 
their confidence in Cambridge by investing locally in new opportunities. One 
example is Herman Hauser, the Acorn entrepreneur, who started the venture 
capital company Amadeus. 
A study undertaken by Segal Quince Wicksteed (2000) of the entrepre-
neurial culture among students at the two universities of Cambridge showed 
that mostly, opportunities for starting their own businesses after their studies 
were perceived as very low8. The entrepreneurial culture at Cambridge Uni-
versity was lower than at Anglia Polytechnic University (APU). At APU the 
entrepreneurial intent is higher than in any of the other universities compared, 
                                                 
8 The results are based on a survey among 168 Cambridge University students and 148 Anglia 
Polytechnic University students. 
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including Stanford University, California. It is also important to be aware that 
Cambridge University primarily recruits students interested in research, and a 
significant share are recruited from all over the world. One would not expect 
to find influence from the entrepreneurial culture present in the area in the 
students' attitudes; on the other hand, it is possible that the high share of 
potential future entrepreneurs at APU reflects the entrepreneurial culture in 
the region. Still, the large size of the Cambridge University makes it an 
important engine of entrepreneurial spin-offs, even if this engine appears to 
be running at low intensity (Segal Quince Wicksteed 2000).  
Several initiatives have been taken to support the entrepreneurial culture 
of the area, like the Cambridge Europe and Technology Club, Cambridge 
High-Tech Association and Cambridge Network. 
The small size of the city seems to enable the development of a close 
network of informal linkages and to strengthen synergy within a high-tech-
nology complex, significantly more than in large cities (Keeble 1988). Key 
entrepreneurial role models are far more visible in cities like Cambridge than 
for instance in London. 
According to Segal Quince Wicksteed (2000), large firms played an 
important role in the early days of the Cambridge Phenomenon. Companies 
such as Cambridge Instruments and the Pye Group served as seedbeds for 
spin-offs. Later, large R&D consultancies, notably Cambridge Consultants, 
PA Technology, Scientific Generics and the Technology partnership, played a 
very significant role in generating and fostering local research-intensive spin-
offs. 
Large R&D consultancies have also been important in creating a re-
gional culture for trust and collaborative research. Being mainly spinouts from 
the university and employing University graduates, their internal or-
ganisational cultures were shaped by university research values. In 1998, 
Segal Quince Wicksteed estimated that Cambridge-based technology con-
sultancy firms employed approximately 1500 people. 
Cambridge Consultants have exerted a distinctive influence on the de-
velopment. They have been important not only through spinouts, but also 
through enhancing Cambridge’s international visibility. On average, 60 per 
cent of the company's revenue is generated outside the UK, and only a lim-
ited share of their customers are located in Cambridge.  
Large firms have also played a significant role in providing trained staff 
to growing SMEs. Segal Quince Wicksteed showed that as many as 23 per 
cent of technical support staff had previously worked for one of the tradi-
tional large firms; in addition, nine per cent of administrators, consultants or 
researchers previously had done so. Large firms often run training programs 
for technical support staff and have therefore been very important in pro-
viding qualified staff to SMEs.  
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The role of public policy 
Unlike the other two cases analysed in this chapter, public policy has not 
been a major driving force in the development of high-technology industry in 
Cambridge. However, public policy has been important as a ‘background’ 
factor, especially during particular stages of development. 
The most important policy influence, is through financing of the Uni-
versity, even though it may be argued that it was the reduction in government 
funding that actually forced the University to take a more active approach to 
increasing their links with industry. The Government also played a role 
through location of the CAD centre in Cambridge. 
Furthermore, regional government has also played a role in Cambridge by 
actively using planning regulations to shield the city’s historic architectural 
environment, which has contributed to a high quality residential environment. 
Cambridge is an attractive place to live and work. Segal Quince Wicksteed 
(1985) have emphasised the importance of a strict planning regime which has 
prevented any large-scale  development from taking place, which would have 
put enormous pressure on the labour market and on the area’s physical 
capacity. This made it easier for small firms to establish and grow, and 
allowed the region to take advantage of new opportunities. 
There are few financial schemes available for high-tech firms in Cam-
bridge. However, government policies towards university-business technology 
transfer and links are far more supportive than in the past, although these 
policy initiatives are too recent to assess their effectiveness (Keeble 2001) or 
impact development. 
UK firms invest less in R&D than firms in many other major industrial 
countries, and UK government R&D expenditure is historically heavily biased 
towards the defence industry. During the 1980s and 1990s UK science and 
technology policies were weak, and government expenditure on R&D and on 
university research was significantly reduced (Keeble 2001). This put, 
however, considerable pressure on universities to increase their links with 
industry, by seeking research funding, providing consultancy and promoting 
university-owned technology spin-offs and science parks. Private sector 
venture capital provision has also grown substantially in line with government 
encouragement.  
The present Labour government has launched several initiatives to up-
grade innovation, science and technology policies in the UK. Over the last 
few years three Government White Papers have introduced policy initia tives 
of relevance; 
· Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Econo-
my, Department of Trade and Industry 1998. 
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· Excellence and Opportunity: A Science and Innovation Policy 
for the 21st Century, Department of Trade and Industry, 2000. 
· Opportunity for All in a World of Change: a White Paper on 
Enterprise, Skills and Innovation, Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2001. 
The policy emphasis is now on; 
· Strengthening and enhancing university basic science infrastructure 
and research capacity, for example by a £1 billion partnership with 
the Welcome Trust to renew university science buildings and 
equipment. 
· Further encouraging and stimulating university-business links and 
collaboration, for example via a new Higher Education Innovation 
Fund to strengthen university links with especially small firms, and 
the establishment of a new national network of ‘university innovation 
centres’. 
· Supporting development of local clusters of small technology based 
firms, for example via a new £50 million national ‘innovative’ cluster 
fund and new Regional Innovation Funds of £50 million a year to 
enable Regional Development agencies to support clusters and 
incubators and new clubs of scientists, entrepreneurs, managers and 
financiers.  
· Supporting business formation and growth, for example by a £75 mil-
lion incubator fund. 
Summary 
The high-tech cluster in Cambridgeshire has shown rapid growth since the 
first high-tech companies were established there in the early 1970s.  More 
than 40 000 people are currently employed in high-tech firms. In this devel-
opment, Cambridge has enjoyed a unique combination of advantageous 
conditions for growth. These include among others; the outstanding scientific 
achievements and reputation of Cambridge University, an attractive living 
environment and successful entrepreneurs. 
It is widely acknowledged that Cambridge University has played a pivotal 
role in this development, although the role of the University has changed over 
the years. The Cambridge region has built an entrepreneurial culture in a 
‘self-ignited’ way, i.e. processes of spin-offs and growth of technology based 
new firms started without policy intervention. The region’s stronghold in 
science made Cambridge capable of utilising macroeconomic and 
technological changes, which have created new markets and product 
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opportunities in many areas, such as microcomputers, software and 
microelectronic appliances.  
Despite a large number of local firms, it is not possible to argue that 
proximity to customers or competitors are central driving forces. Most com-
panies serve worldwide markets.  The same applies to their main competi-
tors; most of their competitors are located abroad or elsewhere in the UK. 
Still, businesses in the region have a mutual interest in being located in the 
same area, even if they operate within different sectors. In fact, the wish to 
locate close to other high-tech businesses and not least be identified as part 
of the 'Cambridge Phenomenon', has been important to location decisions.  
There is evidence of mechanisms of regional collective learning in the 
region; it seems like a common set of rules of behaviour and collaboration 
have been established, which has enabled development of the trust essential 
to innovative collaboration. There are two key agents for developing such 
regional codes of behaviour, namely the University of Cambridge and a small 
group of large local R&D consultancies. The University’s liberal attitude 
towards research collaboration has spread to the businesses community 
through spin-offs, recruitment of researchers and direct research col-
laboration (Keeble  et al 1998). 
The growth of institutions in Cambridge has been striking, and, according 
to Keeble 2001), helped to ‘thicken’ the local institutional environment and to 
encourage the continued growth of the high-technology cluster.  
High-tech enterprise in Cambridge has also become a showpiece, re-
ceiving disproportionate media attention. The vast publicity about the Cam-
bridge Phenomenon has been among the most important initiatives attracting 
further businesses to the area (Lawton Smith and Garnsey 1998).  
Industrial policy seems to have played a marginal role, even if it seems 
like governmental policies have had some influence on the University and 
also through the location of the CAD centre to Cambridge. 
Venture Capital has followed rather than led development in Cambridge. 
Creative local financiers were, however, identified as an important element in 
stimulating high-tech growth in the first report on the 'Cambridge 
Phenomenon' (Segal Quince Wicksteed 1985). In the late 1970s and the early 
1980s Barclays Bank played an important role in financing and supporting 
new high-tech companies. Today successful entrepreneurs operate as 
venture capitalists or business angels. 
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3.4 Dublin – the software capital of Europe 
Introduction9 
Economic development in Ireland has been remarkable. Over the last few 
decades, Ireland has experienced one of the highest growth rates in Europe. 
A number of factors have contributed to the strong performance of the 
economy, among the most important are favourable tax incentives and the 
supply of a young and well-educated labour force which have attracted 
multinational companies (MNCs). Macroeconomic policies have generated 
confidence, and combined with high levels of public investment in physical 
and human capital based on substantial EU funding, business activities and 
productivity have escalated. 
Ireland is now widely recognised as one of the leading European coun-
tries in the field of ICT. With its small population of 3.6 million people, and 
with about a third of this population concentrated in Dublin and its conur-
bation, the city has served as a main centre and driving force in this devel-
opment. Although regional strategies have been implemented to support other 
areas of the country, Dublin plays a dominant role. In fact, the share of urban 
residents has risen from 46 per cent in 1991 to 58 per cent in 1996, and 
continues to rise. 
Dublin is regarded as the software capital of Europe. Global IT giants 
such as Intel, Microsoft, IBM and Gateway 2000 are located in Dublin, and 
there has also been a significant expansion in the internationally traded ser-
vice sector, which includes software production, financial services and other 
customer services linked to ICT. Of critical importance has been the provi-
sion of dedicated space for business development in the inner city landscape 
(Dublin City Development Board 2001). 
Evolution of the Dublin high-tech cluster 
Ireland first gained independence in 1922.  Compared to other European 
countries Irish industrial policy has a relatively short history. The focus of 
Ireland’s economic policy after 1922 was to build a strong agriculture sector 
and to secure a self-provided economy. High unemployment and emigration 
rates in the 1950s led to the development of a more outward looking policy, 
with an increased focus on industrialisation. 
                                                 
9 This section is a summary of Steinsli J. (2003): Dublin – Rise of the Celtic Tiger. Working 
paper. Norwegian School of Management. 
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The Irish Government developed a strategy based on attracting multina-
tional companies (MNCs) to Ireland. The objective was to generate cash and 
employment through export-led development. This policy of ‘industrialisation 
by invitation’ included substantial incentives to MNCs to locate in the 
country. The Industrial Development Authority (IDA) was established in 
1969 to help attract MNCs as well as develop Irish-owned industry.  
The first major companies arrived in the late 1960s. The first was Digital, 
followed by companies such as Microsoft, Oracle and Dell. These companies 
received generous grants and financial support; the most attractive was a 15-
year full tax exemption on export sales which applied to companies moving in 
between 1960 and 1981. In 1981 this was replaced by a 10 per cent 
corporation tax, guaranteed until 2010, for all manufacturing companies and 
many export oriented service companies (O'Riain 1997a). However, the EU 
Commission has decided that the tax scheme was not in compliance with 
EEA legislation, and the Irish Government now has determined that all 
companies must pay 12.5 per cent tax from 2003. 
In addition to low tax rates, companies were offered other financial in-
centives such as rent subsidies and offsets against capital investments. The 
Irish entry into the European Economic Community in 1973, further 
strengthened Ireland’s position as an attractive location, in particular for US 
companies. Low wage rates, a young, well-educated and English-speaking 
workforce also made Ireland attractive. Later, social partnership agreements, 
which were instituted in 1987, helped stimulate growth by keeping wage 
levels down, contributing to a stable macroeconomic environment and 
reducing the number of labour market conflicts. 
A survey among senior executives in ten US firms identified Ireland’s 
low rate of corporation tax as the key factor influencing the location decisions 
of inward investments (Gunnigle and McGuire 2001). 
In the late 1970s, the Government identified the electronics industry as an 
industry with major growth potential (Grimes 1999, Travers 1999), and a 
number of initiatives were taken: 
· IDA (The Industrial Development Authority) established a world-
wide intelligence gathering system on key developments in the 
electronics industry.  
· A systematic, consistent and professional promotional programme 
was organised and continually updated in response to the changing 
needs of businesses to attract investments from the best and most 
advanced electronics companies in the world. 
· The capacity to provide graduates in electronic engineering and com-
puter science was increased in third level education institutions. 
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· New research programmes in electronics were organised at the third 
level education institutions. 
· The telecommunications system was radically upgraded in the early 
1980s, and Ireland was among the first countries in Europe to 
achieve a largely digitalised telecommunication system.  
 
By 1980, Ireland had attracted a number of producers of mainframe 
minicomputers, integrated circuit makers and data processing bureaus. 
MNCs also had positive impacts on other industrial sectors in Ireland, such as 
the printing industry, since few of the software companies printed their 
manuals in-house. 
However, the success of this policy was questioned. The multinationals 
mainly created low-skilled jobs, they developed few linkages to the local 
economy, and often companies left once their tax breaks ended. On this 
background, the influential Telesis report10 in 1982 pointed to the need of a 
more strategic approach to industrial policy. The report recommended at-
tracting companies that to a larger extent would be positive for Irish industry. 
As a result, industrial policy was changed to attract MNCs of importance for 
Irish firms, combined with an increased focus on developing indigenous 
industry. Efforts were made to improve linkages between multinationals and 
local companies and to stimulate the growth of indigenous firms through 
several policy initiatives. However, attracting foreign investments remains the 
most important objective of industrial policy. 
The recession during the early 1990s hit Ireland particularly hard. In 
1992, 280 000 people were registered as unemployed, and Ireland had a 
public debt/GDP ratio of more than 90 per cent. Although conditions im-
proved again, the vulnerability of Ireland's strategy of industrialisation 'by 
invitation' and the dependencies of multinationals became more and more 
evident (Grimes 1999, O'Riain 1997a). Public authorities started to show 
increasing concern for the limited contribution MNCs had to the local eco-
nomy. When the Culliten report was published in 1992 (Industrial Policy 
Review Group 1992), the main recommendations from the Telesis report 
were repeated. The report pointed to the need for further strengthening in-
digenous industries, and new approaches to industrial policy were suggested. 
As a result, focus was directed towards foreign direct investment pro-
jects which required a high-skilled workforce, which would in turn generate 
supply activities from indigenous firms. This strategy was combined with 
                                                 
10 A Review of Industrial policy, by the Telesis Consulting group at the request of the 
National Economic and Social Council 
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public support to firms’ training and education costs. Various initiatives were 
taken to encourage cooperation between firms and between firms and R&D 
institutions, and indigenous start-ups were stimulated through the provision of 
business parks and incubators (see discussion below). 
These policy changes implied a shift from sector and firm specific sub-
sidies towards a broader cluster or system oriented approach, in which the 
main focus was on developing synergies between industries, firms and other 
actors within wide resource areas. The Industrial Development Agency Ire-
land (IDA) was established in 1994 and given the sole responsibility for 
attracting inward investments. Enterprise Ireland was established in 1998 in 
order to provide support to indigenous industry. 
High-tech industries 
High-tech industries in Ireland comprised some 6800 firms and employed 
almost 123 000 people in 1999.  Total turnover was estimated at around 47 
billion IR£.11 It has not been possible to obtain region data, but based on the 
dominant role of Dublin in the Irish economy, it is estimated that about 70 per 
cent of all high-technology activity is located in the city. (O’Gorman 2001, 
Dublin City Development Board 2001, Grimes 1999), i.e. high-tech 
employment in the Dublin area should be around 86 000 people, accounting 
for 16 per cent of the total workforce in the region. 
                                                 
11 It has been very difficult to obtain good data for high-tech industries in Ireland. The best 
data we could get access to, was Eurostat, but some data were confidential. 
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Table 3.4: High-technology industries in Ireland 1999. 
  Firms Employment Turnover Empl
nace Industry % mIR£ %
per 
firm
24 
 
Chemical industries incl 
pharmaceuticals  99 13 718 11.2 16 709 35.4 139
30 Office machinery and computers 83 20 154 16.4 14 628 31.0 243
31 
 
Electric control apparatus and 
equipment 89 7 091 5.8 822 1.7 80
32 Telecommunication equipment 23 13 388 10.9 5 221 11.1 582
33 Medical and optical instruments 117 13 441 10.9 2 180 4.6 115
35 Aircraft and spacecraft 12 na na
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Wholesale office machinery and 
equipment 306 7 490 6.1 1 884 4.0 24
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Retail sale computers, telecom 
equipm 3 959 16 631 13.5 1 609 3.4 4
64 Telecommunications 53 13 229 10.8 1 989 4.2 250
72 Computer and related activities 1 785 16 850 13.7 2 136 4.5 9
73 
Technical and science based 
R&D 108 374 0.3 40 0.1 3
74 
 
Technical testing, technical 
consultancy 37 394 0.3 28 0.1 11
 Total 6 671 122 760 100.0 47 247 100.0 18
 ICT 6 209 87 742 71.5 27 468 58.1 14
 Other high-tech 462 35 018 28.5 19 779 41.9 76
Source: Eurostat, confidential data not included. 
 
Generally, ICT-industries are the most important high-technology in-
dustries in Ireland, with more than 70 per cent of total employment and al-
most 60 per cent of turnover. Within the ICT-industries, the most important 
sectors are the production of office machinery and computers, accounting for 
approximately 16 per cent, while the second and third largest sectors in terms 
of employment are wholesale of office machinery and equipment and 
computer and related activities (Nace 72). This reflects the importance of the 
software sector.12 
                                                 
12 The software sector includes the electronics and hardware industry, computer software 
industry, teleservice or call centre industry associated with PCs and software. These sectors 
can be found in NACE 30-32, NACE 72 and NACE 64 (OECD, 2001).  
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However, within high-technology industries chemicals are also important, 
with more than 16 000 employees and turnover exceeding 16 billion IR£ in 
1999. 
Growth in high-tech industries was particularly high in the second half of 
the 1990s. In fact, from 1995 to 1999 total employment increased by 44 per 
cent. Industries like office machinery and computers and computer and 
related activities contributed most to this development. Generally the growth 
of high-technology industries was significantly above the growth rate of the 
rest of the economy.  
The role of MNCs in the local economy 
As follows from the previous discussion, foreign-owned companies have 
played an important role in the economic development of Ireland. In 1987 
foreign-owned manufacturing companies accounted for 42 per cent of all 
employment and 52 per cent of gross outputs. Twelve years later these 
shares increased to 49 per cent and 76 per cent respectively, indicating that 
the role of foreign-owned companies is even more important today than 
previously. 
With 49 per cent of manufacturing employment and 76 per cent of gross 
output, the foreign-owned sector had a much higher output per employee than 
the Irish-owned sector. The figures for net output are even more striking, in 
particular when taking into consideration that wages are higher in the foreign-
owned sector than in Irish-owned industry. In 1996, the average wage in the 
foreign-owned high-tech manufacturing industry was IR£ 18 800 per year, 
while the similar figure for Irish-owned industry was IR£ 15 100 per year.  
Foreign-owned companies dominate high-tech sectors, such as chemicals 
and metals and engineering, while Irish-owned companies dominate sectors 
such as food, wood and paper. Therefore, a dual manufacturing structure has 
emerged; high-tech, high value added industries are owned by foreign 
interests, while low-tech, low productivity industries, to a large extent, are 
owned by Irish owners (Ministry of Finance 1999). The high output figures in 
the foreign-owned sector can be misleading, since the sector is dominated by 
US transnational corporations with low-end software development and 
language translation. 
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Table 3.5: Distribution of activities between Irish and foreign firms in manu-
facturing.  
 1987 1996 1999 
Irish firms:  
Firms 3 935 3 871 4 105 
Employees (000s) 106.6 120.2 1268 
Gross outputs (m IR£) 7 364 12 188 14 152 
Exports (m IR£) 31.9 34 na 
Foreign firms  
Firms 795 728 689 
Employees (000s) 78.4 106.4 122.1 
Gross outputs (m IR£) 8 028 24 108 44 641 
Exports (m IR£) 84.7 89.3 na 
Foreign firms in per cent of total  
Firms 16.8 15.8 14.4 
Employees 42.4 47.0 49.1 
Gross outputs  52.2 66.4 75.9 
Exports 72.6 72.4  
Source: National development plan 
 
Large firms dominate the enterprise structure in Ireland. On average, 
each enterprise employs 11 people, but the majority of employees are em-
ployed by large scale enterprises (European Observatory for SMEs 1997). In 
comparison, the average number employed per enterprise in Europe is 6.  
However, in Europe as a whole the majority of people are also employed by 
large-scale enterprises. As Table 3.5 shows, on average foreign-owned firms 
employed 177 people, while the similar figure for Irish-owned firms was 31 
(FORFAS 1999). 
In the past, the dominance of foreign companies generated few linkages 
to the local economy. They were important for generating employment and 
added value, but had less impact on economic development beyond that.  
Today, there is evidence of an increasing interdependency between the 
multinationals and the local economy, as the multinationals have contributed 
to the development of an indigenous software industry.  
According to a survey of software firms,13 a majority of the founding en-
trepreneurs worked in a MNC either immediately, or at some stage, prior to 
                                                 
13 Interview with 36 managers or owners of indigenous companies in the software sector, 
summer 1996. The results from the survey are presented in a report by L Stevensson (pending 
publication).  
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the start-up. About half of them had also worked abroad in software firms, or 
in a related sector, at some time before starting their company. About half of 
the group had at some time worked in a sector which now constitutes a major 
customer for their company. The pool of labour with working experience 
from MNCs represents a valuable resource for the indigenous software 
industry. On the other hand, higher wages in the foreign-owned sector has 
made it increasingly difficult for Irish-owned firms to attract qualified labour, 
in particular in periods with low unemployment rates.  
MNCs also play a role through business relationship with indigenous 
firms. In some cases business relationships with MNCs lead to referrals to 
customers abroad (Stevensson, pending publication). Still, it is more likely that 
Irish firms are in dialogue with Microsoft in Seattle than in contact with 
Microsoft's company in Dublin. 
MNCs contributed to the development of an Irish supplier base, even if 
this effect did not occur before the software manufacturing and localisation 
investments of the 1980s and 1990s. It seems like this was mainly due to two 
reasons:  One mechanism was stimulated by changes in organisational 
structures within companies, with outsourcing as a strategy for taking advan-
tage of external economies of scale. This led to opportunities for a number of 
spin-offs, which based their business development on the basis of MNC con-
tracts. Second, government policy strengthened the development of an in-
digenous industry through several initiatives supporting development of an 
indigenous suppliers base (see next section). Support to R&D, marketing 
consultancy, management development and business networking were given 
priority. Today, networks of local suppliers have emerged around the multi-
nationals. 
Institutional factors 
As a strategy for developing into the knowledge economy, education has 
been the focus of investments by successive governments over many years. 
According to the European 2001 Innovation Scoreboard (European Com-
mission 2001), the share of people with third level qualifications was 22 per 
cent in 2000. Compared to other Northern European countries, this is not a 
particularly high share, but it is slightly above the average figure of 21 per 
cent for the European Union as a whole. In countries like Sweden and Fin-
land 32 per cent of the population have third level qualifications, compared to 
28 per cent in the UK.  
There are three universities located in the Dublin area, Trinity College, 
University College Dublin and Dublin City University. These, along with the 
Dublin Institute of Technology and a number of other state and privately run 
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third level colleges, make Dublin City the main centre of Ireland’s third level 
education system. In total, there were 42 000 students enrolled in higher 
education institutes in Dublin in 1999/2000, 5000 more than in 1996.  
These institutions have produced graduates from a wide range of disci-
plines. Their IT graduates are among the most qualified in the world, and are 
perceived to be one of the reasons for Ireland's growth in the ICT industry 
(Dublin City Enterprise Board 1996, Travers 1999). Also in terms of having 
an education system that meets the needs of a competitive economy, Ireland 
scores high. In a survey conducted by IMD, Ireland is ranked one of the top 
three countries in the world, along with Finland and Singapore.14 According 
to Travers (1999), there is a strong tradition of collaboration between higher 
education institutions and companies in Ireland. 
Another aspect of the knowledge economy, is resources allocated for 
R&D activities. In this respect, Irish performance is significantly below the 
OECD average. While total R&D spending accounted for 1.38 per cent of 
GDP in 1999, the similar figure for OECD was 1.69. In particular, public 
spending on R&D is low. 
Given Ireland’s relatively high share of high-tech industries, one would 
expect that the share of expenditure measured as a percentage of GDP 
would have been higher. One reasonable explanation may be that a large 
share of the high-tech industries are integrated in multinationals with their 
R&D and headquarter functions located outside Ireland, emphasising the role 
of foreign affiliates and international sourcing. 
Although Ireland is on the low end of European R&D expenditure, the 
situation improved considerably in the 1990s with a growth rate of 30-50 per 
cent in the period 1989 to 1997. This was primarily due to increased efforts 
by the business sector (Waagø et al. 2001), however, R&D expenditure has 
also become a priority for the Irish authorities. 
According to Waagø et al., Dublin gets 60–70 per cent of all the 
competitive funding for research in Ireland. Investments in R&D are directed 
towards areas supposed to be driving forces of future economic and industrial 
development. A Technology Foresight Fund was recently established in order 
to support research, technological development and innovation in the fields of 
biotechnology, information and communications technology and associated 
areas. In total, EURO 711 million will be invested in basic research in the 
period 2001 to 2007. Other initiatives have also been taken in order to 
stimulate R&D (Box 3.2). 
 
                                                 
14 According to World Competitiveness Yearbook 2001. 
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Box 3.2 Examples of measures to increase private sector R&D  
Programs in Advanced Technology (PAT) 
Developed to fill the gap between state of the art research and the universities and 
applied consultancy work. The program is organised as a partnership between 
Enterprise Ireland, industry and third level colleges, and helps industry to: 
- Access new technology 
- Improve competitiveness and existing production 
- Move into new higher value areas 
- Provide and train people for industry 
PAT assists industry in attracting overseas and domestic investment in high-
technology areas that may lead to the establishment of new technology based 
start-up companies. There are seven PATs which consists of more than thirty 
centres located at Ireland’s Universities and Institutes of Technology. The seven 
programs are: Advanced manufacturing expertise and technology, bio-research, 
material technology, power electronics, optronics, software, and 
telecommunication. Each of the seven PATs has a core management group located 
at Enterprise Ireland which deals with IP-rights, marketing, business development 
etc. The total budget is roughly EUR 25 million a year with 2/3 from industry and 
1/3 from public sources.  
Technology Foresight Fund 
Establis hed in order to support research, technological development and 
innovation, funded by the Irish council for Science. The fund finances projects in 
key technologies strategic to long-term sectoral and national development. The 
objectives of these projects will be to provide internationally competitive RTDI, 
and to promote Ireland as an attractive location in which to perform RTDI. Projects 
are implemented on a public/private partnership basis. Funding: EURO 711 million 
over a period of seven years.  
University Industry Programs  
Started to promote co-operation between universities and industry to facilitate 
innovation, technology transfer, enterprise development, continuing professional 
development and all other forms of university/industry co-operation. There are 
such activities at all the Universities in the Dublin region. Actors such as Regional 
Authorities, Enterprise Ireland, Universities and industry, finance the various 
activities. 
 
Several industrial parks and innovation centres have been developed in 
and around Dublin city, such as the Financial Services Centre in the former 
docklands, The National Digital Park at City West, Dublin Business Inno-
vation centre, the Guinness Enterprise centre and the more recently proposed 
Digital District in the vicinity of the Guinness Brewery (Dublin City 
Enterprise Board 2001). Of critical importance for these centres has been an 
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attractive and central location and provision of telecommunications 
infrastructure. Some of them also provide various services to businesses 
located within their vicinity. In addition to these developments, a number of 
organisations provide incubation units and workspace for new start-ups. 
Community Enterprise Centres seem to be the most important provider of 
incubation units in Dublin. They are controlled by the local community and 
are 'not for profit' organisations. In addition to cheap rent, they offer a wide 
range of support facilities at a reasonable cost. In total there are more than 
30 such units in the Dublin region15. Despite an extensive range of organisa-
tions providing incubation space, lack of space for further industrial expansion 
is a critical factor for future growth in Dublin (Fitzpatrick Associates 1999).   
 
Box 3.3. Examples of technology parks, industrial parks and innovation centres 
Docklands Innovation Park 
Docklands Innovation Park is an enterprise hub housing a range of SMEs in a 
former dockland area now undergoing major regeneration. Docklands Innovation 
Park is under the joint direction of The Bolton Trust (an enterprise Trust owned 
and managed by DIT Staff) and the Project Development Centre (PDC). PDC is the 
largest incubator centre in Ireland for start-ups and fast growth technology 
companies. The Centre concentrates on knowledge-based and innovative firms. 
National Digital Park at Citywest 
The National Digital Park which covers an area of 40 hectares, is a joint venture 
between IDA Ireland and Citywest Business Campus, opened in 1999. The Park 
has been specifically designed to meet the needs of companies with broadband 
telecommunications requirements. There are now more than 50 companies 
employing 1700 people 
Ireland’s International Financial Service Centre  
Ireland’s International Financial Service Centre (IFSC) is located in the centre of 
Dublin, and is the most concentrated cluster of ICT-dependent companies in 
Ireland. In 1999 approximately 6500 people were employed directly in the IFSC. The 
primary objective of the IFSC was to promote the development of a well-regulated, 
financial services industry that would provide quality, sustainable jobs. A 
secondary objective was to assist the urban renewal programme at the Custom 
House Docks side. Half of the new FDI projects in recent years are located in the 
IFSC in Dublin (Grimes, 1999).  
Leopardstown Business Park 
Located in Clonskeagh, in proximity to major universities and the south city 
service sector. There are a number of large indigenous and overseas companies 
                                                 
15 According to the Dublin Enterprise support directory 
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located in Clonskeagh and in the nearby Leopardstown Business Park. 
Arklow Technology Park Wicklow 
A 30-hectare services, business and technology park, and hosts a major ceramics 
industry. 
The Dublin Business Innovation Centre (Dublin BIC) 
Established in 1987 with the support of the EU, private and public sectors.  Has 
assisted the creation of a development and enterprise culture in the Dublin region. 
Its main purpose is to increase the level of entrepreneurial activity and improve 
survival rates and growth prospects.  
The Centre is a joint initiative with the University Campus Programme, which 
aims to provide a mix of practical training and consultancy support in assisting 
participants in developing their business ideas. It is a link between the University 
and the business community in Ireland and overseas. 
The Guinness-enterprise Centre 
A Public Private Partnership providing incubator space to new and established 
small businesses primarily in software and international & technological services. 
Media Lab Europe, a subsidiary of MIT's Media Lab, is already in place on the 
Guinness site as part of the new Digital District designed to help speed Ireland's 
economy into the Internet age. The Digital District will comprise state of the art 
museums, leading edge telecommunications infrastructure and hundreds of high-
tech start-ups. It also facilitates a wide range of Enterprise development related 
support services. 
 
Source www.startingabusinessinireland.com 
 
Venture capital provision has developed over the recent years, and is 
now one of the largest in Europe on a per capita basis, but still below the EU 
average when measured as percent of GDP. 
The rapid increase in venture capital funding is shown in Table 3.6. In 
1997, total VC funding was IR£ 30 million, while in 1999 this had increased to 
IR£ 140 million. This increase can be identified as an indicator of the recent 
growth in high-tech industries in Ireland. It is also interesting to note that the 
share of funding to early stage projects has increased. In 1999, 41 per cent of 
venture capital investment was in early stage projects.  
Irish Venture Capital funds invest almost three times as much in com-
puter related technology and biotechnology as the rest of Europe (Malinen 
2001). Substantial funding from the EU’s structural fund has been of impor-
tance in the expansion of the Venture Capital market. EURO 90 million was 
allocated to Venture Capital funds in the Operational Programme 1994-99.  
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Table 3.6 Venture Capital Investments in Ireland 
 1997 1998 1999 
Total amount invested (IR£m) 31 41 140 
Number of companies financed 58 72 128 
 
Financing stage 
Early stage (incl start-ups) 
Share of total  
16 
28% 
27 
38% 
52 
41% 
Expansion 
Share of total 
39 
67% 
38 
53% 
66 
52% 
Other  
Share of total 
3 
5% 
7 
10% 
10 
8% 
Source Report on Venture Capital Investment activity 1999, IVCA 
Approximately 73 per cent of venture capital invested has been invested 
in the Leinster region (Dublin and Mid East region).  Approximately 70 per 
cent of these investments have been in the software sector. The most im-
portant sources were pension funds and banks which represented two thirds 
of total funds raised in 1999. Corporate investors raised 24 per cent of total 
funds in 1999. Approximately 60 per cent of these investors were Irish.  
In order to increase the number of start-ups and stimulate investment in 
venture capital, the Government initiated two tax deduction schemes; the 
Business Expansion Scheme, and the Seed Capital Scheme (Box 3.4). 
Enterprise Ireland (EI) and Enterprise Boards provide grants and loans to 
companies. EI provides support for larger companies and companies with 
high potential for growth, while Enterprise Boards provides support to com-
panies with less than 10 employees. There are in total four Enterprise Boards 
in Dublin. In addition to its main offices, EI has a regional office located in 
Dublin. Dublin has the status of regional aid region. Since 2000 it has been 
possible to support investments in companies with up to 17.5 per cent in 
Dublin. Business angels are hard to find. Enterprise Ireland and Dublin 
Business Innovation centre have developed registers of such investors, and 
can, after evaluating projects, arrange access to potential investors. 
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Box 3. 4: Tax Deduction Schemes 
Business Expansion Scheme 
The Business expansion scheme gives income tax relief to those who invest 
capital in qualifying Irish companies. Fund-raising companies must be 
incorporated and resident in Ireland, must not be quoted on the Stock Exchange 
(except for the new Developing Companies Market), and must be engaged in a 
‘qualifying trade’. It is up to the business to find potential investors and, when it 
does, to obtain approval of the arrangement from the Revenue Commissioners. 
The scheme has been in operation since 1984. The scheme has been important for 
small companies or start-ups to provide early stage development capital.  
Seed Capital Scheme 
The Seed Capital Scheme repays income tax to people leaving employment to start 
their own businesses (only companies qualify, not sole traders or partnerships). In 
the year of starting their business, qualifying individuals may claim back the tax 
paid in respect of up to IR£ 25 000 of income in each of the previous five tax years. 
This scheme has been in operation since 1993.  
The role of Public policy 
The Dublin case illustrates that government can play a significant role in the 
development of high-tech industries, even in the case of a small and peri-
pheral country. The main strategy has been based on attracting foreign direct 
investment, and although the sustainability of the current Irish economy may 
be questioned, there is no doubt that the strategy has been successful. Ireland 
has the largest market of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Europe, with 55 
per cent of the total, more than twice the share of the second most 
successful country, France, which has 21 per cent (OECD 2001). Further-
more, Ireland has attracted 23 per cent of all new US investments in Europe.  
The Irish government has in four distinct ways contributed to the growth 
of high-tech industry: 
· By offering favourable conditions for multinational companies 
· By investment in education and infrastructure 
· By contributing to the development of an industrial cluster by ‘strate-
gic’ invitation  
· By strengthening innovation and entrepreneurship. 
IDA identified the potential of the ICT sector at an early stage (Travers 
1999). In the early years focus was on companies in electronics, later focus 
was shifted to personal computer manufacturers and finally call centres 
(Grimes 1999). While the main focus for a long time has been on attracting 
multinational companies, during the 1990s there was a shift towards indige-
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nous development with an emphasis on setting up institutions to support this 
development. The main reason for growth in the indigenous software industry 
seems to be the structure of the software industry. The software industry 
had, in general, lower entry barriers and offered opportunities for new or 
small Irish firms to develop. This was in contrast to the electronics industry’s 
large-scale production plants, with high barriers to entry that offered few 
opportunities to start-up companies.  
Irish industrial policy and enterprise support is largely based on an ef-
fective organisation at the ministry and agency level. At the highest political 
level, the Ministry of Enterprise, Trade and Employment has a leading role 
and a wide mandate in industrial development matters. FORFAS, the high-
level policy advisory and coordination board, provides strategic level 
recommendations to the Ministry. The Irish system is rather centralised, 
which provides effective decision making at the policy and implementation 
level. Such capability coupled with sufficient resources provides a basis for a 
well functioning industrial policy (Kuusisto 2000). National policy has been 
formulated to make effective use of EU programmes, and EU funding has 
played a crucial role for Ireland. IR£ 3.3 billion has been invested in road 
infrastructure by EU funds, and EU contributed to 40 per cent of Enterprise 
Ireland funding in the period 1994-99. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The attraction of FDI has been a key element of Irish industrial policy for 
more than 40 years, but there is now evidence that the Government has suc-
ceeded in their attempts to strengthen indigenous industrial development, and 
has made the Irish economy less dependent on the multinationals. The growth 
in the indigenous software sector is one promising development, along with 
the increased 'embeddedness' of multinationals. Most of the new economic 
development has taken place within the greater Dublin region, and Dublin has 
increasingly strengthened its position as a favourable city to establish 
businesses. 
However, the ICT industry in Ireland is concentrated at a relatively low 
point in the value chain, and deals with relatively mature technology that has 
been developed elsewhere (Grimes 1999). In accordance with globalisation 
theorists the ‘footloose’ character of these investments, implies that MNCs 
will soon move to cheaper locations. Therefore, the success of Ireland’s 
strategy of 'industrialisation by invitation' is vulnerable to changes in Irelands 
attractiveness relative to for instance emerging economies in Eastern Europe.  
In recent years Irish public policies have been redefined in line with an 
increased focus on the importance of knowledge as a major factor for 
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stimulating innovation capabilities. Dynamic local networks seem important 
and are often the basis for self-reinforcing growth in regions (Porter 1998, 
Lundvall 1992, Camagni and Capello 2000, OECD 2001). The fact that 
MNCs in Ireland have developed tighter links to the regional economy sup-
ports this theory, and may indicate companies will choose to stay in a location 
even if they can find cheaper locations elsewhere. However, the Irish case 
shows that global penetration of local networks is inevitable (O'Riain, 1997b). 
While networks formed by corporate organisations do offer opportunities to 
developing countries, the developmental impact of local networks is severely 
constrained unless specific policies exists to guide the evolution of networks.  
Further development of a world-class competitive software industry in 
Ireland depends on the firms’ ability to remain competitive despite their loca-
tion far from their main markets. Also, because of their scale and limited 
market size, Irish indigenous companies can succeed only by addressing 
specific market niches in which they have specialised knowledge (Grimes 
1999).  
In order to succeed, many Irish firms have been forced to set up offices 
abroad, and the success of the Irish software industry has attracted in-
ternational capital. Growth of venture capital interests in Irish firms would 
mean an influx of resources combined with a loss of autonomy, as venture 
capital firms tend to manage their investment closely (O'Riain 1997b). The 
provision of venture capital is therefore important for future development, as 
well as continued investments in telecommunications infrastructure in par-
ticular. The low level of R&D in higher education has precluded any sig-
nificant technology transfer from this source. Current investment in science 
and technology is designed to rectify this situation. 
 
3.3 Sophia Antipolis – evolution of a Greenfield Cluster 
Introduction16 
Sophia Antipolis, located on the Côte d’Azur close to Nice in Southern 
France, represents an interesting case of the evolution of a high-technology 
                                                 
16 Mostly, the information presented in this chapter is based on two sources: 1) 
presentations, working documents by Michel Bernasconi, CERAM, and 2) Strategic 
Management Institute (2001) ‘Sophia Antipolis – Creation of a Greenfield Cluster.’. 
The evolution of high-tech industries in Sophia Antipolis has also been discussed by Mønsted 
(2000), Longhi (2001), Tamasy and Sternberg (2002), Longhi and Keeble (2002) and Keeble 
(2002). 
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cluster. Starting from an area of ‘virtually nothing’, this cluster may be re-
garded as a greenfield cluster (Strategic Management Institute 2001). In the 
beginning of the 1960s an area which today is a flourishing industrial park 
with a number of dynamic actors present, was hills with undeveloped land – a 
piece of ‘vacant space’ (Longhi1999). The region definitely had no industry 
and university tradition (Longhi and Keeble 2000). 
Much of the development in the area is often attributed to one person, 
Pierre Laffitte, regarded as a community entrepreneur who has played a 
pivotal role as initiator, facilitator and organiser of the development. As early 
as 1960 Laffitte, who is from the area, wrote an article in which he raised the 
idea of decentralising R&D and engineering activities to green places outside 
Paris in order to establish alternatives to the ‘the grey matter in Paris’ 
(Strategic Management Institute 2001:7). Arguing that Parisian life was not 
conducive to research and ‘cross fertilisation’ between scientists working in 
different fields, he suggested decentralisation to areas like Fontainebleau and 
Orléans.  He also indicated the area around Nice as a suitable place for 
developing this activity. 
In 1962, the two companies IBM and Texas Instruments happened to 
establish activities in the area, largely owing to attractive living conditions on 
the French Riviera. IBM set up a research centre, and Texas Instruments 
established its European centre, demonstrating the potential for developing 
high-technology activities in the area. In 1964, a plan was launched to 
industrialise the Alpes Maritimes17 by allocating 120 hectares of land for an 
industrial park. Five years later, in 1969, Laffitte presented his vision of 
creating a city of 20 000 researchers, and gave the city the name Sophia 
Antipolis.18 
This marked the beginning of a dynamic pattern of development, which 
according to Bernasconi (2002) may be divided in three stages (Figure 3.1). 
At the turn of the millennium the region included somewhere between 25 000 
and 30 000 high-tech employees, among these around 14 000 in the science 
park of Sophia Antipolis. 
                                                 
17 Alpes Maritimes is the region in which Nice is the main city, Sophia Antipolis is located 
approximately 15 km west of Nice. 
18 Pierre Laffitte explained in a speech on September 2002 that Sophia means wisdom, and 
Antipolis is Greek for Antibes (a small city close to Sophia Antipolis). Sophia is also the 
name of Pierre Laffitte’s first wife. 
65 
The start-up period 
It took about a decade to develop the vision of Sophia Antipolis and to pre-
pare and implement the plans that would open up for development. A very 
important stimulating factor was Texas Instruments and IBM’s decision to 
locate in the region.  The presence of these companies signalled and demon-
strated opportunities related to high-technology development. 
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Figure 3.1: Steps of development of Sophia Antipolis. (Source: Bernasconi 2002) 
 
In the beginning, it was the persistent promotion of the area by Lafitte 
and his team that convinced companies to establish in the new science park 
(SMI 2001). The area has the advantage of being located in a very attractive 
region with a good climate and living conditions, and with infrastructures 
linked to the tourism industry. In addition to this, the specific planning of the 
science park is extraordinary, and unlike many other science parks. The park 
is located in an area with many small hills and valleys. Of the total area of 
2300 hectares, 800 hectares are allocated for industrial facilities, and 150 
hectares for housing, sports and recreation. The remaining land  is kept as 
‘green’ areas. Furthermore, the road system as well as the buildings fit in 
nicely with the landscape. When in the park, one hardly gets the impression 
of being in such a large science park. Furthermore, design and architecture 
have been given high priority, with agreeable results. 
66 
The start-up period was characterised by entries to the science park by, 
mostly, R&D centres of international groups and national public research 
institutes. Towards the late 1980s large numbers of new companies followed, 
on an annual basis more than a hundred companies were started. Many 
belonged to the telecom and IT sectors.  The association to ‘Telecom Valley’ 
was made during this period (SMI 2001:9). 
Development during this period may be characterised as exogenous. 
Mostly, expansion came about because international and national companies 
and institutions set up their divisions or departments in the area and in this 
way implanted their own resources. In spite of dynamics at the local level, 
these dynamics were based on resources and actors from outside the region. 
The system that evolved was directed from outside, with a lot of external 
contact, but with fewer local linkages. There were also problems of 
developing local processes of collective learning (Longhi 1999). 
An important mechanism in the evolution of high-technology clusters, is 
spin-off from existing larger firms (Dahlstrand 2000). However, in the case 
of Sophia Antipolis, this mechanism was lacking for a long time. In fact, a 
reverse spin-off effect could be detected; highly qualified personnel employed 
by small and medium-sized firms established in the park, were absorbed into 
larger firms (Longhi 1999). 
The mechanisms of evolution were different in other ways as well. In 
other cases we have seen that universities have been important for early 
stage development, this was not the case in Sophia Antipolis. The University 
of Nice did not established activities, i.e. engineering school, research 
institutes and doctoral training programs, in Sophia until 1986.  These in-
stitutions are now of great importance. 
Longhi (1999:337) characterises the general pattern of development in 
the area as ‘exactly the reverse image of the established model’. While the 
established model implies that development is based on local resources, for 
example, knowledge resources in a high quality university, Sophia started with 
‘empty space. Two large international companies moved in because of the 
attractiveness of the region, then more large companies and R&D activities 
followed, and finally, services and SMEs. Eventually, the university also 
established a presence. While reverse spin-off effects may be observed in 
the first stages of development, they were succeeded by ordinary spin-off 
effects, and processes of indigenous development started. 
Consolidation and new growth 
While there had been steady growth in high-tech industries up to 1990, this 
pattern suddenly changed in the early 1990s. There are different reasons for 
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this. Multinationals stopped establishing subsidiaries in Sophia Antipolis due to 
the recession in the US, and many companies were forced to downsize their 
activities due to the recession in Europe in 1992. 
On the other hand, these developments represented change. Spin-off 
activities from larger firms resulted in start-ups of a number of new small 
firms, often based on subcontracting.  Nevertheless, this was an important 
impetus to indigenous development. Later, there was a steady number of 
indigenous start-ups. Typically, the number of indigenous start-ups was 
around 40 during the second half of the 1990s, but by the end of the decade 
start-ups reached a level of more than 80 per year (cf. Figure 3.2). As shown 
in the figure, there have also been exits, but during the entire period there has 
been net growth, i.e. a positive number of new firms. In terms of employment 
growth, contributions from the new firms have been significant. 
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Figure 3.2: Start-ups of technology-based firms in Sophia Antipolis 1995-2000. 
Source: Bernasconi 2002 
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Figure 3.3: Employment growth in Sophia Antipolis 1975-1998. Source: Longhi 
1999. 
The current situation 
There may be some confusion about the total extent of high-tech activity in 
Sophia Antipolis. Partly, one can look at the activities located inside the 
science park, i.e. the area designed to host high-tech development. In 2000 
there were a total of 325 firms with some 13 000 employees in the park. 
However, there are significant high-tech activities outside the park, in-
cluding the two companies that originally triggered development. In com-
parison to Cambridge, for example, it suffices to include activities of the 
whole region, as the whole region is included in cases commented upon in the 
literature. Thus, when we include data for all relevant activities of the region 
of Côte d’Azur, there in total are 881 firms with more than 27 000 employees 
and a turnover of 41 billion Franc (Table 3.7, data for 2000).  
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Table 3.7: High-tech industries in Sophia Antipolis and Côte d'Azur 2000. 
 Sophia Antipolis  Rest of region Total Côte d'Azur 
 Firms Empl. 
Turn- 
over 
Bill. Fr Firms Empl. 
Turn- 
over 
Bill. Fr Firms Empl. 
Turn- 
over 
Bill. Fr 
Information 
technology and 
related 282 11 120 11.6 353 7 355 16.8 635 18 475 28.4
 
Life/health 
science related 43 1 995 3.8 203 7 185 8.8 246 9 180 12.6
 
Total 325 13 115 15.4 556 14 540 25.6 881 27 655 41.0
Source: Sirius-Chambre de Commerce et d’lndustrie Nice Côte d’Azur: Observatoire des Poles 
de Compétences Technologiques. 
 
Information technology firms account for around two thirds of all activity. As 
seen from the table, IT industry is found in Sophia Antipolis, while life and 
health science related industries predominate in the rest of the region. 
The industries present in the area are characterised by a mixture of small 
and large firms. In terms of number, smaller firms account for the majority; 
around 70 per cent have less than ten employees. There are only around 40 
companies with more than 100 employees (SMI 2001). However, these large 
firms account for a significant share of total employment. 
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Figure 3.4: The innovation system of Sophia Antipolis. Source: Bernasconi 2002. 
A large number of multinational companies are present in the area, ap-
proximately 110; it is claimed that 63 different nationalities are represented 
among their staff. 
An important aspect of high-technology clusters is that they constitute a 
number of different types of actors who partly compete against and partly 
supplement each other. Together they constitute a kind of critical mass that 
creates synergies. According to Longhi (1999), Sophia Antipolis has now 
reached a stage of development which can be said to comply with the re-
quirements of an innovative milieu. However, as Longhi as well as others 
point out, important cluster elements and mechanisms fell into place just 
recently. There are still significant challenges to be met for the future de-
velopment of the area. 
The system of innovation of Sophia Antipolis may be described in 
different ways; see, for instance, Bernasconi’s illustration (2002, cf. Figure 
3.4). 
Research centres and higher education now play important roles in 
Sophia Antipolis. There are about 4000 people in public-sector R&D insti-
tutions, and different engineering and business schools are now established in 
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the area (See Box 3.5). It is estimated that R&D activities account for about 
40 per cent of all activities provided by high-tech related firms and institutions 
(SMI 2001:26). 
 
Box 3.5: R&D and Higher Education Institutions in Sophia Antipolis.  
Most important teaching institutes: 
· Ceram Group – CERAM Sophia Antipolis (graduate studies in 
management, finance and high-tech entrepreneurship) and EAI TECH 
(undergraduate studies)  
· UNSA – University of Nice – Sophia Antipolis  
· ESINSA – School of Engineering of Nice Sophia Antipolis  
· ESSI – School of Computer Engineering  
· ENSMP – The National School of Mines  
· Eurécom Institute – Higher studies in communication systems 
(Corporate/ multimedia/ mobile communication)  
· Theseus Institute – Management studies  
 
Most important research institutions 
· INRIA – National Institute for Research in Computer Science and Control 
· CNRS – National Scientific Research Centre 
· NRA – National Institute for Agronomic Research 
· INSERM – National Institute for Health and Medical Research 
· France Télécom R&D – European Telecommunications R&D Centre 
 
Source: SMI 2001 
 
 
Box 3.6: Incubators in Sophia Antipolis 
· INRIA-Transfert, established in 1998 with support from the French 
Research Ministry. It is a subsidiary of the national research institute 
INRIA, and holds a capital of 86.5 million FF (approx. 15 mill Euro ??) 
· Institute Eurécom, one of the leading European centres in advanced 
communications and networking research, also works as an incubator 
· Incubator CERAM, started in 2000 as part of the High-Tech 
Entrepreneurship Chair 
· PACA Est, started in 2001 
· Incubator CICOM (Centre for International de Communication). 
 
Source: SMI 2001 
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Recently, high-tech start-ups have become important for the evolution of 
the area, and incubators have been established to facilitate such start-ups, see 
Box 3.6 . 
The organisation of venture capital activities at the regional level is a 
fairly recent phenomenon, and there are still just three funds organised locally 
(Box 3.7). In addition to these three, there are four national funds that are 
operating in the region. 
According to an analysis performed at CERAM, 35 start-ups were 
funded by venture capital during the five years 1996-2001. Total funding was 
more than a billion FF.  Most companies had only been through a first round 
of investment, but some had also been through the second and third rounds. 
VC funding has had a significant international profile, approximately fifty per 
cent was French capital, the rest was divided among ten countries, among 
them the most important were US capital with about 20 per cent of the 
funding, and UK capital with 6 per cent (Bernasconi 2002). 
 
Box 3.7: Venture Capital Funds in Sophia Antipolis 
Regional funds: 
· Sophia Euro Lab, started 2000, is a mix between an incubator and fund for 
seed-money. 
· I-Source Gestion, started 1999, main owner is INRIA-Transfert. Three funds 
with a total of 83 million Euro. 
· FCPR Sud Capital No 1, started 2000, administered funds of 150 mill FF (23 mill 
Euro) in 2000. 
 
National funds: 
· CDC PME, owned by Caisse des Dépots et Consignations (CDC), holds a 
capital of 1500 million FF (229 million Euro). 
· FPCR, created in 2001, manages a fund of 150 million Euros. 
· Sofinnova Partners, created in 1972, and is the oldest in France, manages 535 
million Euros through four different funds. 
· CDC – Innovation Partners, manages two different funds; CDC Innovation 
1996 with 400 million FF (60 million Euro) and CDC-Innovation 2000 with 1 
billion FF (150 million Euro). 
 
Source: SMI 2001 
 
To stimulate the role of venture capital, the first International Venture 
Capital Summit was organised in Sophia Antipolis in 1997 by the regional 
authorities and the Chamber of Commerce. Since then the event has been 
organised annually. Each year, a selection committee decides on 40 high 
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potential companies to participate. Participation is open to companies from all 
over the country, but the number from Sophia Antipolis has been around 30 
per cent. 
Another aspect of developing the innovative milieu, is to develop network 
mechanisms and organise professional organisations. In 1991, Telecom 
Valley was established as a non-profit organisation to gather actors important 
to the telecommunications and information technology sector. With around 60 
members, this organisation aims at developing a unique pool of competencies 
based on members’ expertise.  
Other associations are also active, and to promote the development of the 
area, different governmental support institutions have been organised, see 
Box 3.8 
 
Box 3.8: Government Support Institutions 
· SYMISA, the Syndicate of Sophia Antipolis, is responsible for the general 
management, financial policy, international relations, promotion of and 
services to corporations in Sophia Antipolis. 
· SAEM SACA, Société Anonyme d’Economie Mixte Sophia Antipolis Cote 
d’Azur, is in charge of planning, development and commercialisation of the 
Science Park under the auspices of SYMISA. 
· CCl NCA, Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie Nice Cote d’Azur, supports 
economic development in the region in various ways. 
· Maison de l’Entreprise de Sophia Antipolis, is a department of the Chambre 
de Commerce in charge of stimulating economic environment in Sophia 
Antipolis. 
· CAD, Cote d’Azur Dévelopement, the official regional economic promotion 
and development agency. 
· CICA, International Centre for Advanced Communications, provides the 
communication infrastructure of the region. 
 
Source: SMI 2001 
Summary 
The story of Sophia Antipolis is extraordinary in the sense that the evolution 
of the area started with vacant space, a vision and plans for implementation. 
The result today is Europe’s leading science park, at least according to local 
actors,19 with 13 000 high-tech employees in the park, and another 14 000 in 
the Côte d’Azur region. 
Development has been carefully planned and administrated. One indi-
vidual, Pierre Lafitte, has played a crucial role in the process of developing 
                                                 
19 ‘Sophia Antipolis – Where Businesses and People Flourish’. Promotion brochure. 
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visions and coordinating different actions. He is still actively involved in the 
park. 
Initially industrial development at Sophia was characterised by large 
international companies and national research institutions which established 
research units in the area. Development was mainly exogenously driven. In 
contrast to other areas, institutions of higher education were absent. In later 
stages of development, various university colleges and schools were set up, 
internal mechanisms started to work, and there was a significant shift to-
wards more endogenously driven development. 
However, important cluster factors did not fall into place until recently, 
including venture capital, business clubs, incubators and other institutions of 
importance to the facilitation of cluster evolution. Longhi (1999) claims that 
an innovative milieu in which processes of collective learning are at work 
clearly exists in Sophia, but that cluster dynamics created around the value-
chains of the present industries are still missing, most likely due to their early 
stage development. Activities related to research and centres of excellence 
predominate, which so far has resulted in less manufacturing activity (SMI 
2001). 
Due to the early stage of local start-ups, Sophia strongly depends on a 
supply of venture capital from outside the area. As local firms grow larger 
and some go public, this will probably contribute to the financial dynamics of 
the area. 
3.5 Diversity and similarity of cluster evolution 
The cases discussed above clearly demonstrate the diversity of cluster 
evolution. Each story of evolution is unique and strongly dependent on the 
specific prerequisites of the region and the characteristics of its actors. 
However, there are similar groups of actors involved, and similar mechanisms 
at work. What varies, is the mix of factors and the extent to which the differ-
ent mechanisms are at work. So it seems feasible to suggest a framework for 
analysing cluster evolution. In Table 3.7 we have summarised the factors we 
think are the most interesting for the three cases. 
The initial conditions and prerequisites that characterise the three areas 
vary significantly. While a primary asset of Cambridge is its excellent univer-
sity, which played a key role in facilitating development, the situation in 
Dublin and Sophia Antipolis was quite the opposite, with no local university 
tradition of importance in the early stages of development. While the 
university sector has been a primary driving force in the case of Cambridge, 
both by taking a number of initiatives to stimulate high-tech development and 
by attracting international companies, this has not been the role of the 
university sector in either Dublin or Sophia Antipolis. In Ireland, the 
universities have recently become involved in developing strategies which will 
support indigenous development. In the case of Sophia Antipolis, the uni-
versity first moved into the science park recently, and is just now beginning to 
take an active role. 
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Table 3.7 Summary of factors of importance to cluster evolution in the cases of Cambridge, Dublin and Sophia Antipolis. 
Factor Cambridge Dublin Sophia Antipolis 
Initial conditions Strong university traditions 
Attractive living conditions 
Less developed, agriculture dominance, cheap, 
qualified labour, EU membership, English 
speaking population 
Attractive living conditions 
‘Vacant space’ 
Triggering factors Cambridge University – the Mott 
Committee 
local planning 
National policy for attracting multinational 
companies, tax incentives 
Dedicated space for industrial development 
IBM and Texas Instruments established activity in 
the region, 
Pierre Laffitte – community entrepreneur, 
planning of Sophia Antipolis science park 
Role of university Cambridge University: scientific credi-
bility, good industry contacts, spin-
offs, attracting firms to the area 
Not important in early stages, emphasised 
during the 1990s 
Not present during the early stages, established in 
the area during the 1990s 
R&D Institutions Cambridge University 
R&D consultants and large companies 
with R&D departments located in 
Cambridge 
Less developed R&D centres of national research institutes and 
international groups important as driving factor 
Science parks and 
innovation centres 
Cambridge Science Park; St John Inno-
vation Centre 
Not important in early stages, important 
mechanism for development during the 1990s 
Sophia Antipolis science park a key factor for de-
velopment 
Large firms, mul-
tinationals 
Cambridge Consultants, PA Techno-
logy, Scientific Generics  
Multinationals have dominated development, 
mostly US companies like Intel, IBM, Micro-
soft, Gateway 2000 
Multinationals have dominated development 
Local entrepre-
neurs 
Strong entrepreneurial culture, many 
local entrepreneurs 
Weak entrepreneurial culture Weak entrepreneurial culture, improved during the 
1990s 
Small firms Large number of small, indigenous firms Weak indigenous and small firm sector Weak indigenous sector, improved during the 1990s 
Venture capital Barclays Bank in the 1970s, fairly well 
developed VC sector, special funds for 
commercialising R&D results 
Not present during the early stages, signifi-
cant growth during the late 1990s 
Not present during the early stages, improved sig-
nificantly during the 1990s 
Local policy Restrictive local planning Important in developing urban infrastructure Important for developing the science park, collabo-
ration between several local municipalities 
National policy Generally of less importance, mainly 
working indirectly through university 
funding, R&D policy etc. 
Main driving force through tax incentives and 
programs for attracting foreign direct invest-
ments (FDI), recently more emphasis on indi-
genous development 
National technopole strategy very important 
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Attractive living conditions have been important in both 
Cambridge and, in particular, Sophia Antipolis. The attraction of the 
French Riviera was the basis for Texas Instruments and IBM’s 
decision to locate in Sophia Antipolis; large numbers of companies 
and people from many parts of the world followed. In the case of 
Cambridge, nice residential areas and the historic centre of the city, 
combined with its proximity to London, have made it an attractive 
place to live. 
In the case of Dublin, attractive living conditions have not been a 
driving force, although the city has become an attractive place to live 
and visit in recent years. Nor have academic traditions and 
excellence been important. However, EU membership in 
combination with access to a qualified English speaking labour force 
at a low cost made Ireland attractive to, in particular, US 
multinational ICT companies. Based on these conditions, the Irish 
government developed a strategy for attracting multinational 
companies, and implemented different policy instruments to realise 
this development. 
The role of research institutes has been strikingly different in the 
three cases. In Cambridge, research institutes have been an 
integrated part of Cambridge University, while in the case of Sophia 
Antipolis, national research institutes have set up departments in the 
area. In the case of Dublin, these kinds of institutions have been of 
less importance. 
Science parks and innovation centres are generally regarded as 
important instruments for facilitating the development of high-tech 
industries. In the case of Sophia Antipolis, planning the science park 
was the key instrument for development, and the science park has 
played an extraordinary role. Unlike other regions, as many as half 
of all high-tech activities are concentrated inside the park. Innovation 
centres were established at a later stage. In the case of Cambridge, 
science parks have also been of great importance. The first science 
park was established during the early 1970s, and later, another three 
parks were opened. In Cambridge, the start of St. John’s Innovation 
Centre is also regarded as significant to the dynamism in the area. 
Dublin stands in contrast to Sophia Antipolis and Cambridge in 
that science parks and innovation centres were not important in the 
early stages. The Irish strategy has focused on other types of 
measures, and multinationals attracted to the country have been less 
R&D based. During the late 1990s, however, strategies changed 
significantly. Innovation centres opened, and the National Digital 
Park, which may be regarded as a science park, was opened in 
1999. 
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One key mechanism in cluster evolution, is the local 
entrepreneurial culture and the propensity of local entrepreneurs to 
start new firms and in this way contribute to indigenous 
development. While  Cambridge has had a strong entrepreneurial 
culture for a long time, and a number of companies have developed 
due to the role of local entrepreneurs, the situation in Sophia 
Antipolis and Dublin has been much more dependent on multinational 
companies and foreign direct investment. Particularly so in the case 
of Dublin, while in Sophia Antipolis national companies and national 
R&D institutions have also been important. So far neither Sophia 
Antipolis nor Dublin have succeeded in developing a strong entrepre-
neurial culture; in particular this seems to be a weak point in Dublin. 
The role of venture capital has followed a similar pattern as the 
development of an entrepreneurial culture. The sector is fairly well 
developed in Cambridge, where it has played an active role since the 
late 1970s. In the case of Sophia Antipolis, the venture capital 
market first became active during the 1990s, and still has a way to 
go before a fully developed VC function is in place. Similarly, the 
venture capital market in Dublin saw significant expansion during the 
late 1990s. 
The role of national and local policy has also varied between the 
three areas. In the case of Cambridge, national policy has been of 
less importance in terms of directly influencing development. In 
contrast, national planning may be regarded as the main driving force 
in the case of Dublin. Likewise, the national technopole strategy has 
been of great importance in Sophia Antipolis, although local 
authorities have also been important in the process of organising 
collaboration at the local level in order to open up for the science 
park. 
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4 Evolution of high-technology clusters in 
Oslo and Trondheim 
4.1 High-tech industries in Norway  
Having outlined the theoretical framework for analysing clusters, 
their structure and evolution in the earlier chapters of this report, we 
will now turn to empirical evidence for analysing high-technology 
industries in Oslo and Trondheim and their roles in the national 
context. 
The main data analysed in this chapter is obtained from Statistics 
Norway. The data provide a comprehensive overview of all high-
technology industrial activities in Norway and their distribution on the 
main urban areas. This gives an opportunity to reflect on the roles of 
Oslo and Trondheim in a national context. The data are 
supplemented by qualitative data on important institutions and firms, 
to further illustrate aspects of development and the current situation 
in the two cities. 
Based on our definitions of high-technology (cf. chapter 2.4), 
data on high-technology industries in Norway in 1999 are 
summarized in Table 4.1. In total there were almost 18 000 firms 
with their most important activity in high-technology sectors.  There 
were about 19 000 establishments, and total high-technology 
employment was about 106 000. Employment data are based on 
registrations at the establishment level, as this level is most appro-
priate for capturing relevant activity.20 
The most important sector, based on employment data, is the 
data processing industry with around 31 000 employees. Two sectors 
follow, i.e. technical testing and consultancy, and wholesale and 
retail sale of ICT products and software, both with almost 16 000 
employees. Telecommunications ranks fourth, with slightly less than 
11 000 employees. 
A significant chare of all high-tech activities belong to the ICT 
sectors. As shown in Table 4.1, about 60 per cent of all high-tech 
employment and two thirds of total turnover are in the ICT sectors. 
                                                 
20 Statistics Norway collects data on firms as well as establishments. While a firm 
is a legal unit which may comprise several establishments with activities in different 
sectors, an establishment is a more homogenous unit which includes functional 
activity within a specific area. In the statistics, firms as well as establishments are 
classified by industrial sector. While firms are classified according to the sector 
which is most important for the company, establishments are classified according to 
the specific sector in which activities are organized. Thus, data on firms and 
establishments may differ. As the data on firms represent the lowest level, these 
data are the most reliable when analysing activities in different industrial sectors. 
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Table 4.1: High-technology sectors in Norway, 1999. 
    Estab- Employment Turnover 
Industrial sectors*) Firms lishm. %  mNOK %
24 Chemical industries 90 136 8 241 7.8 24 043 11.6
30 Office machinery and computers 63 67 701 0.7 1 679 0.8
31 Electric control app. and equipm. 420 453 4 725 4.4 6 329 3.1
32 Telecommunication equipment 184 191 4 732 4.5 8 211 4.0
33 Medical and optical instruments 606 654 4 594 4.3 6 406 3.1
35 Aircraft and spacecraft  27 31 1 451 1.4 1 715 0.8
51 Wholesale office machinery and 
equipment 2 129 2 466 15 898 15.0 49 054 23.7
52 Retail sale computers, telecom 
equipment 1 063 1 114 1 912 1.8 2 624 1.3
64 Telecommunications 392 596 10 942 10.3 48 185 23.3
72 Computer and related activities 7 963 8 284 31 269 29.4 35 323 17.1
73 Technical and science based R&D 171 230 5 837 5.5 4 370 2.1
74 Technical testing, tech. consultancy 4 885 5 086 15 955 15.0 18 961 9.2
Total 17 993 19 308 106 257 100.0 206 900 100.0
ICT  11 794 12 718 65 454 61.6 145 076 70.1
Other high-tech 6 199 6 590 40 803 38.4 61 824 29.9
Source: Statistics Norway, data from the Central Register for Firms and Establishments, 
own  
calculations. Data for employment and turnover are related to establishments.  
*) The industries included in each sector are the following (cf. also Table 2.3): 
Nace Detailed classification 
24 24.13 Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals 
24.14 Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals 
24.16 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms 
24.4 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products 
30 30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers (whole group) 
31 31.2 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 
31.6 Manufacture of electrical equipment n.e.c. 
32 32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
33 33.1 Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances 
33.2 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking etc 
33.4 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 
35 35.3 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft  
51 51.64 Wholesale of office machinery and equipment 
52 52.485 Retail sale of computers, office equipment and telecommunication equipment 
64 64.2 Telecommunications, except 64.201 ‘chat lines’  
72 72 Computer and related activities (whole group) 
73 73.1 Research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering 
74 74.209 Other technical consultancy work 
74.3 Technical testing and analysis 
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Table 4.2. Size structure and employment distribution of high-technology firms by industrial sectors in Norway 1999. Firms as statistical unit. 
Industrial   Firms in size groups (%)  Total Employment in size groups (%) 
sector Firms 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-499 500+  employm. 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-499 500+
24 Chemical industries 57 28.1 1.8 10.5 22.8 7.0 17.5 12.3  8 848 0.3 0,1 0.9 4.1 3.2 20.1 71.3
30 Office machinery and computers 51 80.4 11.8 3.9 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0  629 8.7 6.2 4.8 6.4 0.0 73.9 0.0
31 Electric control apparatus and equipment 307 71.3 12.7 6.8 5.9 2.6 0.7 0.0  2 311 15.2 11.4 11.5 23.4 21.9 16.6 0.0
32 Telecommunication equipment 127 64.6 9.4 3.9 11.0 7.1 3.1 0.8  3 330 3.9 2.4 2.5 14.3 19.2 25.8 31.9
33 Medical and optical instrument 217 59.0 9.7 14.7 8.8 3.2 4.1 0.5  3 995 5.5 3.6 10.7 13.9 11.8 41.7 12.8
35 Aircraft and spacecraft 21 71.4 9.5 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8  579 4.0 1.9 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 87.4
51 Wholesale office machinery and equipment 1 533 64.2 17.5 10.6 4.9 1.6 1.0 0.1  14 095 12.5 12.7 15.4 15.4 11.0 20.7 12.3
52 Retail sale computers, telecom equipment 625 87.8 10.2 1.6 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0  1 870 49.1 20.6 6.9 1.3 0.0 22.1 0.0
64 Telecommunications 240 69.2 10.8 5.4 4.6 2.9 4.6 2.5  10 871 2.4 1.5 1.6 3.6 4.3 20.7 65.9
72 Computer and related activities 4 332 83.5 6.9 4.8 2.8 1.0 0.8 0.2  30 324 16.7 6.3 9.2 11.8 10.1 24.7 21.2
73 Technical and science based R&D 113 49.6 8.8 9.7 10.6 9.7 9.7 1.8  5 176 1.7 1.4 2.8 7.6 15.2 35.7 35.5
74 Technical testing, technical consultancy 2 917 73.6 8.8 8.8 4.9 2.7 0.7 0.4  14 511 17.4 6.1 11.3 13.1 15.8 10.1 26.3
Total 10 540 67.9 10.6 9.5 5.9 3.5 1.3 1.3  96 539 8.7 4.0 6.7 8.5 11.2 9.6 51,2
Table 4.3. Size structure and employment distribution of high-technology firms by industrial sectors in Norway 1999. Establishments as statistical 
unit. 
Industrial Est. Establishments in size groups (%)  Total Employment in size groups (%) 
sector ments 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-499 500+  employm 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-499 500+
24 Chemical industries 100 20.0 4.0 12.0 20.0 11.0 32.0 1.0  8 241 0.4 0.4 2.0 7.4 9.0 73.3 7.6
30 Office machinery and computers 54 77.8 11.1 3.7 3.7 1.9 1.9 0.0  701 8.3 5.6 3.9 8.8 7.1 66.3 0.0
31 Electric control apparatus and equipment 345 66.1 12.8 7.5 7.2 2.9 3.5 0.0  4 725 7.9 6.2 7.1 16.4 13.7 48.7 0.0
32 Telecommunication equipment 139 59.0 10.1 4.3 12.2 5.0 8.6 0.7  4 732 2.7 2.0 2.0 11.5 10.7 58.0 13.0
33 Medical and optical instrument 264 54.9 11.0 15.9 11.7 3.0 3.0 0.4  4 594 5.4 4.2 12.2 19.5 11.2 36.4 11.1
35 Aircraft and spacecraft 24 62.5 8.3 12.5 4.2 4.2 0.0 8.3  1 451 1.6 0.8 2.7 2.5 5.5 0.0 87.0
51 Wholesale office machinery and equipment 1 830 59.3 20.1 11.8 6.2 1.6 0.9 0.0  15 898 12.6 15.5 18.0 21.1 12.2 20.6 0.0
52 Retail sale computers, telecom equipment 665 83.6 12.0 3.3 0.9 0.2 0.0 0.0  1 912 48.9 25.2 14.2 8.9 2.8 0.0 0.0
64 Telecommunications 347 53.9 13.5 8.9 11.8 4.9 6.1 0.9  10 942 2.9 2.9 3.9 13.3 11.2 40.9 25.0
72 Computer and related activities 4 568 79.8 8.1 6.3 3.7 1.2 0.8 0.1  31 269 16.6 7.6 12.2 16.8 12.2 22.2 12.5
73 Technical and science based R&D 156 41.0 10.3 11.5 14.7 9.6 12.8 0.0  5 837 1.9 1.9 4.2 12.1 19.4 60.5 0.0
74 Technical testing, technical consultancy 3 040 71.7 8.8 9.1 5.8 3.3 0.9 0.4  15 955 16.0 5.7 11.1 14.8 17.9 12.6 21.8
Total 11 532 63.2 10.7 10.9 7.3 4.8 1.6 1.6  106 257 8.1 4.0 7.7 10.6 15.7 12.0 41.9
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This means that there is very little high-technology activity outside the 
ICT sectors. Most important outside the ICT sector we find other technical 
consultancy services with around 12 000 employees, and chemical industries, 
which employ around 8000. In the latter case pharmaceuticals are important. 
There is also some activity organised in sectors like electronics, radio- and 
communication equipment, and medical and optical instruments, but in total 
these sectors are fairly modest. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present statistics on the size structure; the first table is 
based on firms as statistical unit, the other on establishments.21 There is a 
general perception that high-tech firms are dominated by small firms more 
than other industries (Keeble 1989), but our data indicate that high-technology 
industries on average exceed the national average; 1.3 per cent of companies 
with a minimum of one employee have more than 100 employees. These 
firms employ more than 50 per cent of all employees in the high-tech sector. 
Comparable figures for all industries in Norway show that 0.7 per cent of all 
firms have more than 100 employees, accounting for 37.6 per cent of all 
employment (Spilling 2000:77, data for 1996). 
Based on these statistics, high-technology industries may be character-
ised as large firm dominated. Although there are as many as 10 000 firms, a 
small share of them, i.e. 130 firms, account for more than fifty per cent of 
total employment. However, significant variation is found between sectors. 
While there is a strong concentration of activities in larger firms and estab-
lishments in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries as well as in elec-
tronics, telecommunications and R&D, the size structure tends towards the 
small business end in electro-technical, computer and software retailing, and 
particularly in technical consultancy services. 
 
4.2 Oslo and Trondheim in the national context 
The point of departure for our analysis was the assumption that Oslo and 
Trondheim are the two most important high-tech cities in Norway: Oslo due 
to its role as Norway’s capital, where many of the leading companies and 
research institutes are located; Trondheim due to its role as the ‘capital of 
technology’ in Norway, with the University of Science and Technology as a 
key institution. 
In Tables 4.4 and 4.5 data on the distribution of high-tech industries on 
the main urban areas are presented and provide a picture of the role of Oslo 
                                                 
21 See previous comments on the implications of using firms or establishments as statistical 
units. 
82 
and Trondheim in the national context. The data reveal a fairly clear hierar-
chical pattern with Oslo in first place; Bergen, Stavanger and Trondheim 
sharing second; and Tromsø trailing behind in third. This pattern is somewhat 
different from what one might expect. 
Oslo is by far the most important city in terms of high-technology in-
dustries. Close to fifty per cent of all employment and more than sixty per 
cent of total turnover is located in the Oslo area. For ICT, the dominance of 
Oslo is even higher with 60 per cent of total employment. The cities of Ber-
gen, Stavanger and Trondheim each have between 6 000 and 7 000 employ-
ees, each accounting for about 6 per cent of total high-tech employment. 
Of primary interest is the significant difference between Oslo, on the one 
hand, and the three other cities, on the other. In fact, Oslo has more than 
twice the employment of the other three cities together. 
Table 4.4: Total employment in high-technology industries in Norway1999. 
  ICT Other high-tech All high-tech
  Employm % Employm % Employm %
Oslo 38 567 58.9 12 229 30.0 50 796 47.8
Bergen 4 063 6.2 2 068 5.1 6 131 5.8
Trondheim 3 007 4.6 3 565 8.7 6 572 6.2
Stavanger 2 796 4.3 3 994 9.8 6 790 6.4
Tromsø 641 1.0 473 1.2 1 114 1.0
Rest of Norway 16 359 25.0 18 473 45.3 34 832 32.8
Norway 65 433 100.0 40 802 100.0 106 235 100.0
Source: Statistics Norway, the Central Register for Firms and Establishments, own calcula-
tions. 
Table 4.5: Total turnover in high-technology industries in Norway 1999 (million 
NOK). 
  ICT Other high-tech All high-tech 
  Turnover % Turnover % Turnover % 
Oslo 92 523 63.8 19 131 30.9 111 654 54.0 
Bergen 7 999 5.5 2 051 3.3 10 050 4.9 
Trondheim 6 149 4.2 3 259 5.3 9 408 4.5 
Stavanger 4 467 3.1 3 944 6.4 8 411 4.1 
Tromsø 1 014 0.7 318 0.5 1 332 0.6 
Rest of Norway 32 812 22.6 33 120 53.6 65 932 31.9 
Norway 136 865 100.0 70 035 100.0 206 787 100.0 
Source: Statistics Norway, the Central Register for Firms and Establishments, own calcula-
tions. 
 
83 
Second, one would expect the ‘capital of technology’ Trondheim to have 
a more significant position in the field of high-technology, given its role as 
provider of higher technical education at the former Institute of Technology, 
now the University of Science and Technology. We would at least expect 
Trondheim to be closer to Oslo and significantly ahead of the competing cities 
Bergen and Stavanger. A poorer industrial environment in the Trondheim 
area, which has not provided synergies to the same extent as in the other 
cities may explain why this is not the case. We will discuss this in more detail 
later in the report. 
When the data are split between ICT and other high-tech sectors, it is 
revealed that the hierarchical structure is even clearer in the case of ICT, 
while it is not so pronounced for the rest of the high-tech industries, which 
are more decentralized, with around fifty per cent of all activity located out-
side the main urban areas. In the ICT sector, Oslo plays a dominant role with 
about 60 per cent of all employment and two thirds of all turnover, leaving 
small shares for the other cities. The second level cities have in the range of 
3-6 per cent of total national activity. 
Out of curiosity, we have included the city of Tromsø in the list. Although 
the city is marginal in many regards, it is the fourth largest university city in 
Norway, and plays an important role as the ‘capital’ of  Northern Norway. 
High-technology has been an important policy area, in particular related to 
ICT, medicine and marine biotechnology, so it is of interest to see the 
industrial impacts of these efforts. In spite of these efforts, only a small 
industrial high-tech sector has developed in Tromsø, accounting for about 
1100 employees and one per cent of total high-tech employment. So, the data 
show that it is not easy to build new industries. 
The data referred to above do not provide a complete picture of the re-
gional distribution of high-technology industries. There are other interesting 
high-tech environments outside the main urban areas. A more comprehensive 
picture of the regional distribution of high-tech activities is obtained in Figure 
4.1, which shows data for all counties. 
Here, the same hierarchical picture is given, with the Oslo-region (in-
cluding Akershus) far ahead of all other regions, and with the three regions of 
Stavanger (Rogaland), Bergen (Hordaland) and Trondheim (Sør-Trøndelag) 
occupying a clear second-level position. No other city or county challenges 
the position of these three cities. 
At the next level follow the four most industrialised counties of Eastern 
Norway, i.e. Vestfold, Østfold, Buskerud and Telemark. Interestingly, we 
find Aust-Agder following close behind these four. Traditionally, Aust-Agder 
has ranked among the most peripheral counties, but in this case it seems to 
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have performed well over recent years, mostly due to developments in the 
ICT-sector.22  
As shown above, the position of Troms (with the city of Tromsø) is far 
down on the ranking. The county does not perform better than the tradition-
ally peripheral counties of Hedmark and Oppland. 
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Figure 4.1: High-tech employment by counties, 1999. Source: Statistics Norway, 
own calculations. 
 
                                                 
22 An important actor in this development has been the Swedish company Ericsson. 
However, recently the company has experienced significant problems, and during 2002 it 
closed down significant parts of its activities in the area. 
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4.3 Evolution of high-tech industries in Oslo23 
The early stages 
Oslo has always been important to industrial and technology-based devel-
opment in Norway. Although Trondheim was formally ascribed the role as 
the ‘capital of technology’ after the National Institute of Technology (NTH) 
was established there in 1910, technology-based industrial activity in Oslo has 
been equally as important. As shown in the previous statistical overview, 
high-tech industries in the Oslo region outnumber those of Trondheim, and 
Oslo now accounts for close to fifty per cent of all high-tech activity in 
Norway. 
When this development started historically, may be a question of defi-
nition. The University of Oslo was established in 1811 as the first university 
in Norway. In 1923, the University and the Government agreed to develop a 
new campus just outside the city centre. However, due to an economic re-
cession, plans were delayed, and the first departments did not move to the 
new campus until 1931. Today, with nearly 36 000 students and 2300 
scientific faculty, the University of Oslo is central to Norway’s most 
important national knowledge community, located in the small area of Gau-
stadbekkdalen (see map in Figure 4.2). 
After the Second World War, there was growing awareness of the im-
portance of research for industrial development and economic growth in 
Norway. There was general political agreement on a program to stimulate 
R&D activities in order to develop technology based industries which would 
act as a motor for economic development. As a part of this program, the 
National Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (NTNF) was estab-
lished in Oslo in 1946, and several state funded research centres were set up. 
The Norwegian Defence Research Institute (FFI) was established in 1946 at 
Kjeller, a few kilometres north of Oslo, and later The Central Institute for 
Research (SI) and the National Computing Centre were established close to 
the University campus in Gaustadbekkdalen. The new research institutes 
were intended to act as an interface between industry and academia. 
The localisation of research institutions close to the university campus 
was deliberate. Politicians and industrialists saw possibilities for positive spill-
over effects between the different institutions. Similar considerations underlie 
the decision to locate the new National Hospital (Rikshospitalet) in the same 
                                                 
23 This section is a edited and restructured summary of Steinsli, J. 2003: Evolution of high-
technology industries in Oslo. Working paper, Norwegian School of Management BI. 
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area. Although this was not realised until nearly 60 years later, it illustrates 
the strategic thinking at that time. Furthermore, the decision to locate the 
Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) at Marienlyst in 1933, close to 
the University campus, was partly made because of the proximity to the 
university. Additional land close to the University was also reserved for 
future knowledge-based activities. 
Industrial development 
In the early 1970s, the Oslo region hosted most of the electronics industry in 
Norway. Companies like Tandberg and EB, and later Norsk Data, were all 
located in the region. At that time there were promising prospects for the 
development of a Norwegian electronics industry. However, none of the 
companies survived. Over a period of 12 years they all went bankrupt 
(Sogner 2002). According to Sogner, a combination of several factors con-
tributed to their demise. First, growth in the oil sector created new opportu-
nities for many businesses, but it also put very strong pressure on the Nor-
wegian economy which resulted in high cost levels, and make many busi-
nesses less competitive in the international market. 
Second, also due to growth in the oil sector, significant parts of the re-
search community were focused on the oil industry, and consequently less 
attention was given towards other fields of interest, for instance electronics. 
Third, there was a lack of private strategic investors interested in the elec-
tronics sector, and the public sector was not able to establish financial sys-
tems to support long term and strategic investments. An oft-referred to 
example illustrates this situation, i.e. the development of the GSM system in 
Norway. The technology was developed during the 1980s in a collaboration 
between SINTEF and the R&D department of the Norwegian Telecom 
Company. Attempts were made to commercialise the technology, but the 
research departments did not succeed in finding investors. In 1986 the GSM 
standard was chosen as the European mobile communication standard. This 
technology was later the basic reason for Nokia's successful development 
(Moen 2002).  
In Table 4.6 statistics are presented which show the development in high-
tech sectors in Oslo from 1970 to 1999. In total, high-tech manufacturing 
remained stable until the mid 1980s, and has since declined considerably. 
During the second half of the 1990s, it stabilised on a level approximately fifty 
per cent of the previous level. 
However, there has been significant growth in high-technology services, 
mainly related to ICT. Although our data do not reveal exactly when this 
expansion happened, there are important indications that significant growth 
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occurred during the 1990s. In particular, data processing and software has 
been an important sector of expansion. 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 4.1 Time series data 1970-1999 
The data in Table 4.6 are a combination of two different time series. The first 
series, 1970-94, is based on the previous system for industrial classification, while 
data from 1995 and later are based on the new NACE standard (SN94). This means 
that the two data set are not fully comparable. There are two implications of this: 1) 
the industrial classifications of the two series do not match. Although we have 
been careful in selecting industrial sectors based on the old classification that are 
as close as possible to the new classification, there may be some differences 
which imply that firms included in one series are not included in the other; 2) 
registrations by Statistics Norway have been through considerably expansion 
during the 1990s, and from 1995 the statistics include many sectors within the 
services that where not included in previous statistics, like telecommunications 
and technical, science based R&D. Thus the data from 1995 include more sectors 
than the first data set. However, coverage of some of the ‘new’ sectors was not 
complete until 1996 or 1997, so data earlier than 1998 should be handled with care, 
cf. in particular data for telecommunications. 
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Table 4.6: Evolution of high-tech industries in Oslo 1970–1999. Employment data based on establishments as statistical unit.  
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Chemicals incl. Pharmaceuticals  1527 1489 1874 1835 2170 2521 x 1616 2253 2131 2277 2061
Data and office machines 203 322 1001 2463 818 377 x 194 574 536 561 578
Electro technical 6579 5218 4647 4580 2040 1383 x 818 735 812 1006 767
Radio, tv and other comm. equipm. 6030 7164 5544 4744 2370 1675 x 1371 1323 1440 1295 1640
Medical and optical instruments 365 304 339 444 388 586 x 660 673 692 855 725
Aircraft and spacecraft 830 781 789 921 1161 996 x 998 1462 983 12 11
Wholesale of PCs, data and telecom equipment 2627 2949 3930 7330 8079 6468 x 7488 8301 8836 7827 8692
Retailing of PCs, data and telecom equipment    x 671 795 962 773 554
Telecommunication       x 143 2052 5838 4688 6971
Data processing, data bases, software development 702 1793 2630 4753 4817 7499 x 7592 9456 12178 16631 20132
Technical, science based R&D x 1549 1426 2022 1810 2381
Other technical consultancy work 120 3172 4104 6675 5373 5987 x 5256 7837 7321 7620 6284
Total 18983 23192 24858 33745 27216 27492 x 28356 36887 43751 45355 50796
Manufacturing 15534 15278 14194 14987 8947 7538 x 5657 7020 6594 6006 5782
Services 3449 7914 10664 18758 18269 19954 x 22699 29867 37157 39349 45014
ICT 9562 12228 13105 19290 16084 16019 x 17459 22501 29790 31775 38567
Other high-tech 9421 10964 11753 14455 11132 11473 x 10897 14386 13961 13580 12229
Data source: Statistics Norway, Central Register for Firms and Establishments, own calculations. 
See comments to data in Box 4.1.  
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There has been a high rate of start-ups in data-processing and software. 
This sector grew faster in the Oslo region than in the rest of the country 
(RITTS 2000). The high growth in business related services in the region is 
explained by the advantages of being located close to the headquarters of 
larger firms. Other important factors include well developed infrastructure, 
access to qualified labour and proximity to the central administration (Eike-
land and Johansen 2000). 
Institutions for higher education and R&D 
Due to Oslo’s role as capital, the region is well endowed with key institutions. 
Most major policy and technology transfer institutions have their headquarters 
in Oslo. Furthermore, the largest university is located in Oslo, as well as a 
number of other research institutions and institutions of higher education. 
Over the last decade, a number of institutions have been set up to support 
processes of commercialisation. 
Ås
Gaustadbekk
dalen
Kjeller
 
Figure 4.2: The three main locations of institutions for R&D and higher education 
in the Oslo region. 
 
The institutional structure is concentrated in three different locations in 
the area; Gaustadbekkdalen, Ås and Kjeller. The University of Oslo campus 
is located at Gaustadbekkdalen, close to the city centre. The University of 
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Agriculture and related research facilities are found in Ås, 40 km south of 
Oslo, Kjeller, situated approximately 20 km north of Oslo, includes research 
institutes related to fields like mathematics, energy, the environment and 
information technology directed towards manufacturing and defence. In 
addition, the R&D department of Telenor was located at Kjeller until recently 
(2001). The research institutes at Ås are mainly centred on food, forestry, 
land and animal research, while the institutes close to the University are more 
technology and science oriented. For an overview of universities and 
research institutes, see Box 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
 
Box 4.2: Universities and colleges in the Oslo region 
University of Oslo 
Employees: 4500, among  them academic staff 2300 
Students:  36 000; Arts 21%, Medicine, Mathematics and Natural Sciences  
                         23%, Social Sciences 17 % 
R&D:        Medicine, mathematics and natural science get in total 63% of the  
                       total  R&D budget, of total R&D budget in 1999, only 3% was  
                       funded by the business sector 
Business development strategies: 
· Main shareholder of Oslo Science Park 
· Initiated Gründerskolen (entrepreneurship training program) in 1999 
· Participates in Venture Cup and other entrepreneurship   
       competitions 
Oslo College 
Employees: 570, 
Students:        8 000, education of professional workers (teaching, nursing,  
                       engineering and economics/finance 
Business development strategies: 
                       Some research collaboration with industry, especially in computer   
                       science and biotechnology; student placements in industry 
Norwegian School for Veterinary Science 
Employees: 350, students: 320 
Akershus College 
Employees:    240, students: 2 000 
Norwegian School of Management BI 
Private business school, 19 500 students, staff 830  
Business development strategies: 
· Entrepreneurship programs  
· Incubator on campus 
· Participation in Venture Cup and Gründerskolen 
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Agricultural University of Norway 
Students: 2500, staff 850 among them academic staff 400 
Business development strategies: 
· Entrepreneurship programs  
· Ownership in Bioparken 
Unik (Stiftelsen Universitetsstudiene på Kjeller)  
Students 80. Courses within sciences and engineering. Doctoral and post- 
                    qualifying education 
 
The University of Oslo is the largest University in Norway with more 
than 36 000 students. The university has a strong science base. Natural Sci-
ences, with 23 per cent of the student population, receives 63 per cent of the 
budget. University faculty have won four Nobel prizes24 in economics, phy-
sics and chemistry. 
A large institute sector is characteristic of the Norwegian research sys-
tem. Norway has developed an extensive network of institutes that constitute 
a source of knowledge for both industry and public administration. A large 
number are technical, industrial institutes, whose primary functions are to 
serve industry needs for research. This structure of separate research 
institutes is unique for Norway. These institutes provide R&D services which 
are taken care of by the private sector in most other nations. 
 
Box 4.3: R&D institutions in the Oslo region 
Location: Gaustadbekkdalen 
SINTEF  
Established in 1950, headquarters and main activities in Trondheim, employees in  
                     Oslo: 350. 
Services:     Applied research and consultancy. 
Departments in Oslo: Applied mathematics, electronics and cybernetics, applied  
                     chemistry, materials technology, telecommunications and  
                     informatics, Sintef Unimed 
Norwegian Computing Centre  
Established in 1950. Private, independent, non-profit foundation. Employees: 50. 
Services:    Contract research and development in the areas of computing and 
                    quantitative methods for a broad range of industrial, commercial and     
                                                 
24 In 1969, Ragnar Frisch and Odd Hassel were the first Norwegian researchers to receive the 
Nobel Prize. Frisch was awarded the very first Nobel Prize in economics, while Hassel 
received the prize in chemistry. Ivar Giæver won the Nobel Prize in physics in 1973. In 1989, 
Frisch’s former student Trygve Haavelmo won the Nobel Prize in economics. 
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                   public service organisations in the national as well as the international  
                  market. 
Norwegian Building Research Institute (NBI)  
Established in 1953. Private foundation. Employees 172 
Services : Leading national centre of technical and sociological research and  
                development relating to buildings and the built environment.  
Norwegian Geotechnical Institute (NGI) 
Established in 1953 Private foundation. Employees 140 
Services research and consulting in the geo-sciences, including soil, rock and 
snow. Center of excellence 
Norwegian Institute of Wood technology (NTI)  
Established in 1949. Private foundation. Employees 37 
Services R&D centre for the sawmill and timber industry in Norway 
Location: Kjeller 
Norwegian Defence Research Institute (FFI) 
Established in 1946, employees: 550, 100% funded by Government 
Services: Competence within natural sciences and social sciences. Performs 
strategic-, operational- and cost analyses related to information 
systems, land and sea based weapons, and other issues related to 
long-term defence planning.  
Institute of Energy Technology (IFE) 
Established in 1948, employees 300, 60% funded by Norwegian Defence  
                    Research Institute, 40% by the Norwegian Research Council 
Services:    Nuclear physics, biochemistry and metallurgy 
                   Long track record for spin-offs 
Business development strategies: 
Norwegian Institute of Air Research (NILU)  
Established 1969, employees 140, from 1986 a private foundation. Funding: 12%  
                    from the Ministry of Environment and the Norwegian Research   
                    Council, the rest from national and international client based research 
Services:  Technical, economic, hygienic and other environmental issues related 
to air pollution and cleaning of polluted air. 
                    Established NILU Products Ltd in 1996 to manage strategic owner  
                    interests in products and systems developed by NILU 
Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) 
Established in 1970 as a part of a US/Norwegian agreement. Employees: 30, main 
                   funding from the Norwegian Research Council, also some US   
                   funding. 
Services:  Seismology and applied geophysics, including seismological problems  
                   relevant to the detection and identification of earthquakes and  
                   underground nuclear explosions. 
Telenor Research 
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Established in 1967, 240 employees were located at Kjeller until the activity  
               moved to Fornebu in 2001 together with the Telenor headquarters in  
               order to contribute to the development of IT Fornebu. 
 
 
Location: Ås 
Norwegian Institute of forest research (NISK) 
Established 1916, employees: 107 set up as an administrative institution under the  
                Minis try of Agriculture. 
Services:  Provider of information for government, industry and the general 
public  
                related to sustainable management of forest resources. Working fields:  
                forest resource management, wealth creation based on the forest and  
                environmental initiatives in the forest 
Institute of Aquaculture Research (Akvaforsk) 
Established. 1971, employees 91. Funding by the Norwegian Research Council  
                (30%), the rest from projects and industry. 
Services:  Research institutions for aquaculture, specialised in breeding and  
                genetics, product quality and marine species. 
Norwegian Food Research Institute (Matforsk) 
Established 1971, employees: 151. 
Services:  Food research and development. 
Business development strategies: 
Centre for Soil and Environmental Research (Jordforsk) 
Established in 1989, employees: 80 
Services:  Applied research and consulting on for solving soil-related 
problems.  
                Services are provided to industry, municipalities, national regulatory  
                agencies, universities and homeowners. 
The Norwegian Crop Research Institute 
Established in 1995 as a tool for commercialisation of research. Employees: 100.  
                50% funding from public sources, the rest is client based R&D 
Services:  Applied plant science research 
Institutions for commercialisation 
During the early 1980s there was growing concern over insufficient 
commercial benefits obtained from the knowledge base in the region, and 
three schemes were launched (Hodgson and Lacave 1995): 
· An Innovation Centre (ISAS - Innovasjonssenteret AS) was foun-
ded in 1984, with the objective to improve the commercial exploi-
tation of research resources. The Centre was also responsible for 
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the industry liaison programme of the University. The main share-
holders were the University of Oslo and the Municipality of Oslo, 
while companies and research institutes located in the region parti-
cipated with smaller shares. 
· In 1985 the research association FOSFOR (Forskningsstiftelsen i 
Oslo regionen) was established in order to improve links between 
industry and the University and the research institutes. 
· An incubator project sponsored by the Municipality of Oslo was 
started in 1984. 
These three initiatives were originally independent of each other, until 
they were merged into one organisation in 1990, and the Oslo Research Park 
was established. The Park was organised as a public company with the Uni-
versity of Oslo as the main shareholder with 34 per cent of stock. However, 
responsibility for industrial liaison activities was transferred back to the 
University (Hodgson and Lacave 1995). In addition to the University, a 
number of private companies and public agencies, including the Municipality 
of Oslo, are also shareholders. 
The objective of the Oslo Research Park was to link the research re-
sources at the research institutes in the area with the needs of the industry. 
In total, some 200 companies and institutions have been hosted in the office 
facilities of the Science Park. The number of resident firms is now about 100, 
among which 85 have been supported by the park’s incubation and innovation 
services. In 2001 they started to use the name Oslo Innovation Centre. 
Ås BioScience Park was established in 1991 and is situated in Ås near 
the site of the Agricultural University of Norway and the other research in-
stitutes located there (cf. Box 4.4). Approximately 10 new spin-off compa-
nies have been established annually since its inception, and 15 successful 
commercialisations have taken place. 
Campus Kjeller was established in 1995, and is situated north of Oslo 
close to the research community at Kjeller. The park was set up in order to 
stimulate commercialisation based on activity at the research institutes in the 
area. During the period 1995-2001, the park boasted 37 commercialisations.  
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Box 4.4: Science Parks in the Oslo region 
Oslo Innovation Centre 
Established in 1990 based on a merger of three previously independent 
organisations, i.e. an innovation centre, a research foundation and an incubator. 
Main shareholder is the University of Oslo (34%), Oslo Municipality (13%) and 
SIVA (22%).  
 Characteristics: Total office space: 38,000 m2. More than 100 companies with 
around 2000 employees are tenants, among which 85 companies have been 
supported by the incubation and innovation centre services.  
 Services: Rental of office space, rental at market price; incubator/innovation 
centre, support for new companies. Ideas from University of Oslo and research 
institutes (60%), from private sector (40%). Some 5-10 new businesses are started 
annually, and some 3-5 projects are commercialised through licensing. 
Campus Kjeller 
Established in 1995 by local and regional authorities and the research institutes 
located at Kjeller.   
       Objective: Commercialisation of research and technology from the Kjeller re-
search institutes, and accommodating new technology based firms.  
Services: Business incubator providing all types of support for business  
development. 37 commercialisations during the period 1995-2001. 
Bioparken AS 
Established at Ås in 1991. Shareholders are Akershus County Council, NLH, SIVA 
and 41 smaller shareholders. Main fields: Life science, aquaculture, nutrition and 
food science, environmental science. 
Services: Short and long term rental contracts of office premises and  
laboratory facilities at market prices; technology transfer through patents and 
licensing, training, support to new businesses, licensing and patent protection 
activities, administrative services. 
So far 15 commercialisations. 
The current situation 
In total, the high-tech sector of Oslo employs more than 50 000 people; the 
ICT sector is the most important with more than 38 000 people. Among 
these, the data processing and software industry employ the largest share,  
about 20 000 employees. Other large sectors include specialised wholesale, 
telecommunications and technical consultancy work. 
In general, the high-tech services sector is the most important. High-tech 
manufacturing accounts for a minor part of all activity, and includes 
chemicals (including pharmaceuticals) and communication equipment with 
about 2 000 and 1 600 employees respectively. The relatively weak position 
of the manufacturing sector is further illustrated by turnover data. Of total 
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high-tech based turnover in the Oslo region, just about ten per cent is in the 
manufacture of high-tech products. This is an important consideration in our 
analysis of the high-tech structure discussed later in this report. 
In the national context, the Oslo region has a significant role. As shown 
in the tables, approximately half of all high-tech activity in Norway is located 
in the region, slightly more in terms of turnover, slightly less when 
employment is considered. However, this varies by sectors. The situation of 
Oslo is generally rather strong in the ICT sectors, as on average 60 per cent 
of all national activity is concentrated in the region (Table 4.3), for some 
sectors the share in Oslo is even higher with more than 80 per cent of manu-
facturing of communication equipment, and more than 60 per cent for tele -
communications and data processing and software. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Location of ICT-firms in Oslo 
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Figure 4.4: Location of other high-tech firms  
On the other hand, Oslo has a smaller share of the national activity in 
R&D and retailing, and other manufacturing industries. If we look at figures 
for establishments the picture is more or less the same. There are (naturally) 
more establishments but with less employment, due to the location of the 
firm's headquarters in Oslo. This applies in particular to sectors such as 
chemicals and telecommunications.  
Table 4.8 lists the larger high-tech firms based in Oslo. Out of expedi-
ency, only companies with more than 200 employees are included.25 
                                                 
25 Total employment listed for these firms adds up to more than 50 000, but may be cor-
rected for activities located outside the Oslo region as well as non high-tech activities. As the 
data are on the firm level, they include all activities organised by the companies. This applies 
in particular to nace 24 and nace 64. Sources: Statistics Norway, Central Register for Firms 
and Establishments and CreditInform. In some cases also Amadeus. For some of the 
companies, data are obtained via their home pages. Mostly, data are from 1999 or 2000.  
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Table 4.7: High-tech industries in the Oslo-region 
         Establishments in size groups               Employment in size groups
  Total 1-4 5-19 20-99 100+ Total 1-4 5-19 20-99 100+
Chemicals incl. Pharmaceuticals  23 3 2 8 10 2 061 3 12 138 1 908
Data and office machines 22 16 2 2 2 578 17 8 38 515
Electro technical 77 48 18 8 3 767 56 90 196 425
Radio, tv and other comm. equipment 39 17 7 9 6 1 640 23 33 243 1 341
Medical and optical instruments 68 33 15 17 3 725 42 85 320 278
Aircraft and spacecraft 7 6 1 0 0 11 7 4 0 0
Wholesale of PCs, data and telecom equipment 699 315 211 139 34 8 692 399 1 122 2 906 4 265
Retailing of PCs, data and telecom equipment 163 93 63 6 1 554 112 288 101 53
Telecommunication 123 56 25 20 22 6 971 67 131 525 6 248
Data processing, data bases, software development 1 993 1 325 367 233 68 20 132 1 543 1 802 4 873 11 914
Technical, science based R&D 50 15 7 13 15 2 381 18 44 364 1 955
Other technical consultancy work 853 608 147 79 19 6 284 716 731 1 473 3 364
 Total 4 117 2 535 865 534 183 50 796 3 003 4 350 11 177 32 266
Total (%) 100.0 61.6 21.0 13.0 4.4 100.0 5.9 8.6 22.0 63.5
ICT 3 039 1 822 675 409 133 38 567 2 161 3 384 8 686 24 336
Other high-tech 1 078 713 190 125 50 12 229 842 966 2 491 7 930
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Table 4.8: High-tech companies with more than 200 employees, based in Oslo 1999/2000. 
Industrial sector/Company name Turn-
over 
(mNOK) 
Employ
ment 
Comments Foreign 
owner-
ship? 
24139: Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals  
Elkem ASA 9 703 4 025  No 
24160: Manufacture of plastics in primary forms  
Dyno ASA (Now registered as Dynea 
ASA) 
  Previous part of Dyno acquired by Neste (SF), and 
operates now under the name DyneaASA. 
Yes 
24410: Manufacture of pharmaceutical products 
Amersham Health AS 4 406 950 Previously Nycomed Imaging AS, acquired in 2000. Yes 
24420: Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations 
Nycomed Pharma AS 1 236 691  Yes 
Alpharam AS 904 544  Yes 
30020: Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
Tandberg Data ASA 1 071 465  No 
31200: Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 
Elektrokontakt AS 350 229  No 
32200: Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment 
Ericsson AS 2 183 1 061  Yes 
33200: Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments 
Air Park System 327 202 The previous Navia Aviation AS was acquired by 
Northrop Grumman Corp and is now registered as Air Park 
System 
Yes 
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51640: Wholesale of office machinery and equipment 
Merkantildata ASA  8 153 4 337  No 
Getronics Norge (Now registered as 
Eterra AS) 
1 675 1 084 Merkantildata established a strategic alliance with 
Getronics and integrated the Nordic part in 2000.  
No 
Wittusen & Jensen AS 519 283  No 
Compaq Computer Norway AS 2 295 261  Yes 
Canon Norge AS 860 254  Yes 
Thrane Gruppen ASA 710 249  No 
Hewlett-Packard Norge AS 155 240  Yes 
EMO AS 550 204  No 
52485: Retail sale office equipment and telecom equipment 
Telenor Telehuset AS 881 413  No 
64200: Telecommunications 
Netcom AS 2 914 502  No 
United Pan-Europe Communicat Nor 
AS 
376 340  Yes 
Eltele Øst AS 182 217  No 
Telenor ASA 37 644 20 150 Figures cover the whole corporation, incl.the daughters 
below. 
No 
Telenor Eiendom Holding AS  1 248 519  No 
Telenor Nett AS 10 951 2 585  No 
Telenor Mobil AS 6 706 1 294  No 
Telenor Privat AS 8 399 1 202  No 
Telenor Bedrift AS 6 994 1 065  No 
Telenor Nextel AS 803 380 Previously Nextra No 
Telenor Satellite Services AS 1 727 276  No 
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Telenor Avidi AS 379 150  No 
Telenor Multicom AS 578 118 From 2001 integrated in Telenor Business Solutions No 
72200: Software consultancy and supply 
Accenture AS 980 900 Previously Anderson Consulting Yes 
Cap Gemini Norge AS 604 625  Yes 
Alcatel Norway AS 1 093 609  Yes 
Tietoenator Consulting AS 328 425  No 
Ementor Financial Systems AS (Previ-
ously Provida ASA) 
224 259 Acquired by Merkantildata in 2000, changed name before it 
was acquired by Tieto Enator, February 2002 
No 
Ementor Norway AS (Prev. Avenir AS) 349 390 Avenir was acquired by Merkantildata in 2000 No 
International Business Machines AS  3 427 1 520  Yes 
Oracle Norge AS 294 293  Yes 
Thomson-CSF Norcom AS (Now Hales 
Communications as) 
339 271 Changed name in 2000. Yes 
IFS Norge AS 297 251  Yes 
Hands AS  343 225 Previously Merkantildata applikasjon as which was 
separated from Merkantildata applikasjon AS 
No 
Bull AS (Now Steria as) 580 223 Bull AS changed name into Integris AS before it was 
acquired by Steria in 2001 
Yes 
CSC Computer Sciences Norge AS  207 210 Previously Computer Sciences International AS. Yes 
Ecosoft Norge AS 185 209  Yes 
Siemens Business Services AS 402 202  Yes 
WM Data Consulting AS 192 199  Yes 
EDB Business Partner ASA 4 493 3 020  No 
EDB Teamco 1 916 783 Telenor Dataservice AS and EDB’s operating division was 
merged into EDB Teamco in 1999 
No 
EDB Fundator AS 253 313  No 
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72300: Data processing 
Posten SDS AS 1 236 865 Changed name and was restructured in 2001 No 
Fellesdata AS 72 300 1 178 Part of EDB Business partners bank  finans from February 
2000. 
No 
72400: Data base activities 
Bankenes Betalingssentral BBS AS 754 634  No 
72500: Maintenance and repair of office, accounting and computing machinery 
NCR Norge AS 754 168  Yes 
73100: Research and experimental development on natural sciences and humanities 
Institutt for energiteknikk 321 532  No 
74209: Other Technical consultancy activities 
Aker Engineering AS 512 631  No 
Techpower AS 89 215  Yes 
74300: Technical testing and analysis 
Det Norske Veritas AS 2 256 2 600 Figures cover the whole business, including the daughter below. No 
Det Norske Veritas Certification AS 350 264  No 
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A significant share of the larger firms are controlled by foreign owners. 
In total, these companies employ more than 10 000 people. The share of 
foreign-owned companies is particularly high in sectors such as chemicals 
(nace 24) and the production of communication equipment (nace 32). Like-
wise, the share of foreign-owned companies is high in computers and related 
activities, representing more than 50 per cent of employment in foreign-
owned companies.  
In contrast, research sectors within the natural sciences and engineering 
(nace 73) and technical testing and analysing (nace 74), all relatively large 
institutions, are owned by Norwegian interests. 
The largest Norwegian-owned company on the list is Telenor, the Nor-
wegian Telecom Company, which is a telecommunications group with ex-
tensive and fast growing business operations in a number of countries in 
Europe and Southeast Asia. The company is Norway's leading distributor of 
voice, information, knowledge and entertainment through a broad range of 
modern communications services. Telenor was listed on the Oslo stock ex-
change in December 2000. 
Another large Norwegian high-tech company is Merkantildata. It was 
founded in 1968, and listed on the Oslo stock exchange in 1985. In 2001 the 
company had 4 300 employees. With offices in all the Nordic countries, 
Merkantildata aims to be a leading consultant and integrator in the field of 
information and communication technology (ICT). However, Merkantildata 
does not provide technology or competence which is unique (Sogner 2002). 
The ICT sector was one of the sectors included in a large cluster study in 
Norway in 1999/2000 (Fjeldstad, Andersen and Viken 2000). An important 
conclusion made in this study is that the ICT sector in Norway competes 
negligibly on international markets. Almost two thirds of the companies 
studied had activities directed towards international markets, but this activity 
accounted for less than 25 per cent of output. Sales offices for international 
companies and a few large companies dominate the Norwegian market. Out 
of 21 000 employed in computers and related activities in 1999, approximately 
14 000 were employed by large companies, of which 16 of a total of 23 were 
foreign-owned or had a majority of foreign owners. 
The high-tech industry in Oslo is dominated by companies which are 
located in the region due to Oslo’s role as capital of Norway. Many of them 
are multinationals like IBM, Microsoft and Philips with only distributive 
functions. Both the distribution of cell phones and computer equipment are 
high in Norway compared to other countries. Thus, it is attractive for foreign 
companies to establish sales functions in Norway. The computer sector is 
dominated by imported technology, and Norwegian customers have little 
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impact on innovation and growth in these companies (Fjeldstad, Andersen 
and Viken 2000). 
Venture Capital  
Several venture capital companies are located in Oslo. Although they do not 
limit their activity to Oslo companies, information from the Norwegian 
Venture Capital Association (NVCA) indicates that a significant share of  
total venture capital investment is in companies located in the Oslo region. 
In total, members of NVCA have invested about 2 billion NOK in 214 
different companies (data for 2001). 84 per cent was invested in Norway, of 
which 57 per cent was invested in projects in the expansion phase while only 
one per cent was invested as seed capital (NVCA 2001).  
According to a study of seed capital in the Nordic countries, the Norwe-
gian venture capital industry is considered immature, with a majority of pri-
vate investors concentrating on later stage venture capital and restructuring 
investments. Similarly, a relatively large share of investments targets tradi-
tional industries and primary sectors. A majority of both private and public 
based investors have historically been involved with investments in a broad 
spectrum of industries, including more conventional and less technology 
intensive industries. The characteristics of later stage investments and 
investments in conventional industries are in the literature symptomatic of an 
immature venture capital market (CEBR 2001). 
Summary 
The main explanation for the relatively good ‘performance’ of Oslo in the 
field of high-technology, at least in a national context, is its role as the national 
capital. This role may explain many aspects of the development of the region. 
First, the region is well endowed with institutions of  higher education and 
R&D. The oldest and largest Norwegian university is located there. The 
University of Oslo is supplemented with a number of other institutions of 
higher education, and a fairly large number of research institutes. A sig-
nificant share of all national R&D resources are located in the Oslo-region, 
i.e. approximately 50 per cent, the bulk of which are concentrated in what is 
called the Oslo Science City, including Gaustad, Majorstuen, Lovisenberg. No 
less than one third of all national R&D resources are located within a few 
square kilometres, with the University of Oslo and Gaustadbekkdalen at the 
centre (Johnstad 2003). 
Second, many companies locate their headquarters in the capital due to 
the advantages this location gives for accessing national markets. Being at 
the centre of the most populated part of the country, the location advantages 
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of Oslo are significant related to consumer markets. Similarly, Oslo is ad-
vantageous in relation to business markets, as many of the larger companies 
have their headquarters in the city. 
Third, based on the same mechanisms, international high-tech companies 
present in Norway are located in Oslo. These companies account for a 
significant share of total high-tech employment. 
Fourth, the high-tech service sector dominates in Oslo. Within this sector 
data processing and software dominate, while manufacturing plays a 
secondary role, with some activity in chemicals and pharmaceuticals. In ICT 
manufacturing only a couple of larger companies are present (Ericsson, 
Tandberg). 
Fifth, in line with this, few companies provide unique products or ser-
vices. To a significant extent companies are service providers with their main 
roles related to reproduction and distribution, while an emphasis on R&D 
based activities is weak in significant parts of the industry. 
The venture capital market has started to evolve, but is mostly concen-
trated on later stages of firm development, and less oriented towards the 
early stages. In addition, venture capital actors are largely oriented towards 
traditional sectors, and less towards high-technology. 
 
4.4 Evolution of high-tech industries in Trondheim 
The early stages26 
Traditionally, Trondheim has been recognized as the capital of technology of 
Norway, and plays an important role in the national context mainly due to two 
institutions; the University of Science and Technology (NTNU) and the 
technological research centre SINTEF. These two institutions, which are 
closely related, have been of great importance to the technology-based de-
velopment in the region as well as nationally, and may be regarded as im-
portant generators of the high-technology industries located in the city today. 
However, as the data on high-technology industries in Norway shows 
(Table 4.4), Trondheim, with around 6500 high-tech employees, is far behind 
Oslo, and approximately on the same level as the cities of Bergen and 
Stavanger. Based on this, the reputation of Trondheim as the ‘capital of 
technology’ may be challenged. We will return to this issue later. 
                                                 
26 The first part of this presentation is based on Bakkevig et al 2002, chapter 3.5.1. 
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The history of Trondheim’s development in the field of technology, 
started during the early part of the twentieth century with the establishment 
of the Norwegian Institute of Technology (NTH) in 1910. The Institute, 
which at that time was organised as a college of engineering, offered degree 
programs in the fields of physics, chemistry, electro, construction and me-
chanical engineering, and also organised research activities in these disci-
plines. In addition to educating engineers primarily for the manufacturing and 
construction industries, the mission of the Institute was to be directly involved 
in industrial development by collaborating with companies. The professors 
had roles as consultants. 
In 1946, after the Second World War, the National Research Council for 
Technology and Science was established (in Oslo). It had a strong influence 
on research policy and funding. When the Central Institute for Industrial 
Research (SI) was established in Oslo in 1949, it triggered a lot of activity in 
Trondheim. Due to Trondheim’s peripheral location in the national industrial 
context, the threat of being trapped ‘on the side-track’ of national industrial 
development was very significant. Thanks to local mobilisation and 
collaboration between local industries, local authorities and NTH, the 
research organisation SINTEF was established in 1950. 
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Figure 4.5: Evolution of High-technology Milieu in Trondheim (based on Bakkevig 
et al 2002:130). 
 
The purpose of establishing SINTEF was to organise market-oriented re-
search activities and support industrial development by linking academic 
resources to the business sector. SINTEF was organised as part of NTH, 
with the Professor Council as its highest body, but with an administration of 
its own. Later, SINTEF was organised as an independent company, but re-
mained closely linked with the University. Its different departments are co-
located on campus together with related university departments and with 
offices and laboratories in the same buildings. 
The interaction between NTH and SINTEF has been instrumental to the 
development of high technology in Trondheim, and these two institutions may 
be regarded as motivating forces. One of the most successful developments 
was the establishment of Elab, the electronics based research laboratory, 
which was started in 1962 and operated in close collaboration with the 
National Research Council (NTNF), the national telecom company (at that 
time Telegrafverket, now Telenor) and some of the major national electronics 
companies, like EB, STK and Nera. 
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Vitalisation – the first stage 
Until the early 1980s, the electronics-based industrial environment outside 
NTH and SINTEF was restricted to a few companies. NTH/SINTEF was 
not successful in creating spin-offs. In order to improve this situation a seed 
capital company called ASEV (AS Etablerings- og Virksomhetsutvikling) 
was started in 1984. The company was initiated by NTH and SINTEF, and 
supported by the local authorities, banks and some of the leading national 
manufacturing companies. The investment capital of the company was about 
12 mNOK, and significant subsidies for operating the company were obtained 
from central government (i.e. Industrifondet). 
The establishment of ASEV marks the implementation of a new strategy 
for stimulating the development of new technology-based firms. The first 
incubator in Norway was established the following year, in a collaboration 
between ASEV and the local authorities. From the mid- to late 1980s a 
number of new start-ups followed. Several gave rise to successful and 
leading companies in the national context. 
During this period, an important mechanism at work was the expanding 
Norwegian economy, thanks to a growing oil sector and significant in-
volvements from SINTEF in developing new technology for the oil industry. 
As a result of a coordinated national strategy for developing offshore 
activities, oil companies were obliged to organise significant parts of their 
R&D activity in Norway. SINTEF reaped the benefits. At this time SINTEF 
also developed a strategy towards more emphasis on research and less on 
commercialisation. Some of SINTEF’s more commercially oriented groups 
left and started new companies, in total 40-45 over the span of a few years’. 
This development was also stimulated by an upturn in the economy during the 
mid- and late 1980s. 
The establishment of the seed capital company ASEV and the incubator 
in 1984/85 may be regarded as a new type of infrastructure for supporting 
start-ups and technology-based firms in Norway. Further initiatives were 
taken in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s to organise different ‘cen-
tres’ and set up new facilities to host technology-based firms and stimulate 
spin-offs and start-ups. To a large extent, this progress at the local level was 
supported by national programs like the FORNY-program27, the national 
industrial development agencies SND28 and SIVA29. Today, a diversified 
                                                 
27 FORNY: Research based commercialisation, in Norwegian: Forskningsbasert nyskaping. 
28 SND: The national and regional development agency, in Norwegian: Statens nærings- og 
distriktsutviklingsfond. 
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array of institutions and programs are at work to facilitate technology-based 
firms (see Box 4.5). 
Vitalisation – the second stage 
In spite of efforts to stimulate high-tech development, the overall perform-
ance of the Trondheim area in terms of spin-offs and start-ups has been 
fairly modest. During the 1990s, the number of technology-based new firms 
was typically just a few per year, cf. Figure 4.6, and significantly below the 
level of start-ups during the mid 1980s. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Start-ups from NTNU and SINTEF 1981-2002. Source: SINTEF. 
                                                                                                                   
29 SIVA: Traditionally, this agencies has organised industrial parks, building and office 
facilities, more recently, there has been a shift towards innovation centres and incubators. 
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Box 4.4: Main institutions and networks facilitating technology-based 
start-ups and commercialisation in Trondheim 
Leiv Eiriksson Nyfotek 
Established in 1998 to facilitate commercialisation of research based ideas by 
providing: 
· assistance throughout the process of developing a business idea 
· financing through the regional seed fund 
· incubators the first critical years  
Funding is provided via Seed Funding Middle Norway (Såkorninvest Midt-Norge) 
with funds of more than 100 mNOK. 
Shareholders: 12, among which SINTEF and NTNU are the largest. 
Gløshaugen Innovation Center 
Established 2001, the first on-campus incubator in Norway, a joint initiative taken by 
NTNU, SINTEF and SIVA. 
START NTNU 
Students’ organisation started in 2000 to facilitate innovation and entrepreneurship 
among students and employees. Activities: Organising courses, competitions and 
meetings with a focus on setting up businesses. This organisation has served as 
model for starting similar organisations at other universities. A national network is 
underway. 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Group (GREI) 
Based at the Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management at 
NTNU, the Group has offered courses in innovation and entrepreneurship since 
1978, and is responsible for teaching, research and business development programs 
within the field of innovation and entrepreneurship, among them a New Venture 
Acceleration Program. 
SINVENT 
Originally started in 1985 as a daughter company of SINTEF to work with 
innovations, but was mostly a non-active company until it was revitalised in 2000 
and is now working actively as a development and investment company. Total 
turnover in 2001 was 215 mNOK. 
Support and services are provided in four major areas: 
· partnership development 
· advisory services 
· business development 
· management and sales of technology. 
SG Venture 
Established in 2002 by SINTEF and SINVENT with purpose of investing in the seed 
and early venture stages of SINTEF based companies. SINVENT will be the manage-
ment organisation of SG Venture. 
Source: Reitan, B. (2002): Trondheim as a high-tech hot spot. 
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New initiatives were taken to improve the situation around the turn of the 
century. In 1998 two of the existing centres were merged into a more 
powerful unit named Leif Eiriksson Nyfotek. Nyfotek is backed by NTNU30, 
SINTEF, SND and private investors. Their business idea is based on bringing 
together capital, academia and industry in order to stimulate technology-based 
industrial development. SINTEF also started a process of strategy 
development at this time, coinciding with the dot-com boom. Since the 1980s 
SINTEF had followed a research oriented strategy. Commercialisation had 
not been among the core activities of its institutions. In order to supplement 
its commercial activities, SINTEF’s subsidiary SINVENT, which had been 
inactive for a decade, was restructured to work with innovation and the 
commercialisation of new technology. An investment fund of 100 mNOK 
was set up to fund new technology-based companies. 
At SINTEF as well as the University, significant changes have been 
taking place in terms of attitudes towards commercialisation and a clearer 
focus on this role from academia. In fact, the University has re-formulated as 
its strategy, and intends to become one of the leading European universities in 
knowledge-based innovation by the year 2005. Many of the University 
departments have a strong interest in commercialisation. Entrepreneurship 
courses have been offered for many years, and other types of activities 
supporting start-ups have been organised. Recently an innovation centre was 
established on campus, and with one thousand square meters space it 
currently (2002) hosts 16 firms. Mostly, the companies have been started by 
students, or previous students. 
Other initiatives have been taken as well, among them the students’ ini-
tiative, START NTNU, which has been an important model for similar ac-
tivities at other universities and business schools in Norway.  
In parallell with this is the growing venture capital industry in the region,  
SG Venture and the partially state-funded Såkorninvest Midt-Norge, being 
the most noteworthy (cf. Box 4.6). Private initiatives have also been taken, 
but so far the VC businesses in the region may be regarded as being at an 
early stage of development, and in general, with the exception of the two 
funds mentioned above, VC companies have been of less importance in 
developing high-tech industry in the region. 
 
                                                 
30 The previous NTH (the National Institute of Technology) was in 1996 reorganised into 
NTNU (Norges teknisk naturvitenskapelig universitet) the National University of Science and 
Technology, which also includes institutions in the social sciences and humanities.  
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Box 4.6: Venture capital in Trondheim 
The following 8 venture capital companies are active: 
Gjensidige NOR Regional Invest 
Part of the national bank- and insurance company Gjensidige NOR 
R. Kjeldsberg 
A family-owned company active in property development and operation. A total 
of 150 mNOK is managed, of which 40 million are allocated for venture 
investments. 
Reitan Invest 
A private investment company linked with the Reitan Group, have invested in four 
companies, but are currently not active in the VC market. 
SG Venture 
Recently established by SINTEF and SINVENT to invest in the early stages of 
SINTEF-based companies. Total capital of 100 mNOK, no investments so far. 
Såkorninvest Midt-Norge 
This investment fund is one of several national funds to facilitate high-risk 
investments in early stage start-ups. Total capital is 100 mNOK. The fund is 
managed by Leiv Eiriksson Nyfotek. Has taken part in developing more than 40 
companies over the last three years. 
Trondheim Næringsinvest 
Founded in 1998 by some of the leading business executives of Trondheim. The 
group focus on early stage ventures, and emphasise cooperation with other 
investors. They are involved in four companies, and are also involved in 
Såkorninvest Midt-Norge. 
Viking Venture 
Focuses on investments in various technology-based fields. The capital base is 
180 mNOK. So far the company is involved in four companies. 
VI Partners 
Founded in 2001, committed capital is aimed at 2-300 mNOK. Currently they 
manage Trøndelag Vekst which include a portfolio of some 20 companies, they 
also intend to take over the management of other portfolios. 
 
Source: Reitan, B. (2002): Trondheim as a high-tech hot spot. 
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Status 200231 
The current situation in the high-technology sector of Trondheim may be 
characterised by a relatively strong university- and R&D-sector, and rela -
tively weak private sector.  
The core actor has been the NTNU-SINTEF constellation. In total, 
these two institutions employ around five thousand people, three to four 
thousand of whom may be regarded as belonging to the high-technology 
sector (see details in Box 4.7-4.8). But given the strong position of these two 
institutions, employing nearly fifty per cent of all high-tech personnel in the 
region, the strength of this constellation also reflects the weakness of the 
region. i.e. performance outside these two institutions has not been im-
pressive, for instance in terms of spin-offs and other forms of synergies with 
the region. 
 
Box 4.7: The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)  
Established:1996 
NTNU represented a reorganisation of the University of Trondheim which included: 
· Norwegian Institute of Technology (NTH, originally established in 1910) 
· College of Arts and Sciences 
· Museum of Natural History and Archaeology. 
 
Employees: 3159 (in 1998) including: 
§ professors: 453 
§ other academic staff: 522 
 
Students: Approximately 20 000 
Students at different faculties (in 1999): 
· Architecture, Planning and Fine Art: 462 
· Civil and Environmental Engineering: 939 
· Electrical Engineering and Telecommunications; l402 
· Physics, Informatics and Mathematics; 2413 
· Applied Earth Sciences; 624 
· Arts; 2803 
· Chemistry and Biology; l724 
· Mechanical Engineering; l009 
· Marine Technology; 596 
· Medicine; 491 
· Social Sciences and Technology Management; 5167 
 
 
                                                 
31 This section is mostly based on Reitan, B. (2002): Trondheim as a high-tech hot spot. 
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Research activities 
 Strategic areas: 
· Energy and the Environment 
· Medical Technology: 
· Materials Technology 
· Marine and Maritime Technology 
· Information and Communications Technology 
 
National research laboratories in Trondheim 
There are several national research laboratories situated in Trondheim, closely 
linked to SINTEF and NTNU: 
· Marine Science Laboratories (indoor ocean basin laboratory and towing 
tank) 
· Hydrotechnical Laboratories (river hydraulics and harbour design) 
· Laboratories for Materials and Construction Engineering 
· Laboratories for Electronic Materials and Components 
· Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Laboratory 
· Ultrasound Laboratory 
· Fire Research Laboratory 
· Electrical Power Laboratory 
· Multiphase Flow Laboratory   
 
Source: Reitan, B. (2002): Trondheim as a high-tech hot spot. 
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Box 4.8: SINTEF 
Established: 1950 
SINTEF was initiated by the Norwegian Institute of Technology (NTH), and was initially 
a tool used by the professors at NTH to handle external cooperation and activities that did 
not fit into the activities of the university. Later on, SINTEF has been organised as an 
independent organisation that has grown larger than the ‘old NTH’. 
SINTEF works in close collaboration with NTNU, sharing laboratories and equipment. 
 
Total staff: 1590 (2001) 
Total turnover: 1700 mNOK 
90% of turnover is generated by industry contracts 
 
SINTEF consists of eight research institutes and four research companies: 
· SINTEF Applied Mathematics 
· SINTEF Applied Chemistry 
· SINTEF Civil and Environmental Engineering 
· SINTEF Electronics and Cybernetics 
· SINTEF Industrial Management 
· SINTEF Materials Technology  
· SINTEF Telecom and Informatics 
· SINTEF Unimed 
· SINTEF Energy Research 
· SINTEF Fisheries and Aquaculture 
· SINTEF Petroleum Research 
· MARINTEK (Norwegian Marine Technology Research Institute) 
 
Source: Reitan, B. (2002): Trondheim as a high-tech hot spot. 
 
An overview of the high-tech sectors in Trondheim is presented in Table 4.9. 
The data cohere with data presented earlier in this chapter (Table 4.3 and 
4.4), i.e. the data only include establishments, in order to exclude activities 
located outside the area. The data do not include government-based activities 
like universities and colleges, while the activities of SINTEF (those located in 
Trondheim) are included. The table only includes establishments with 
recorded employment, i.e. there are some 560 establishments with a 
minimum of one employee, and a total employment of about 6500. 
The important role of SINTEF is reflected in the data comprising tech-
nical, science-based R&D, which is by far the most important sector with 
more than 1800 employees. Technical consultancy is closely related with 950 
employees. Other sectors of great importance are wholesales of data and 
telecom equipment, telecommunications and electronics. 
Compared to Oslo, high-technology industries in Trondheim have greater 
shares of R&D-based activity and, in general, smaller shares of ICT. Size 
structure is similar, with close to 60 per cent of all employment in firms of 
more than a hundred employees. 
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Table 4.9: High-tech establishments and employment in Trondheim 
         Establishments in size groups               Employment in size groups
  Total 1-4 5-19 20-99 100+ Total 1-4 5-19 20-99 100+
Chemicals incl. pharmaceuticals  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Data and office machines 2 0 2 0 0 9 0 9 0 0
Electro technical 21 8 8 1 4 468 11 42 15 400
Radio, tv and other comm. equipment 7 3 2 1 1 111 3 6 34 68
Medical and optical instruments 14 6 5 1 2 325 7 29 17 272
Aircraft and spacecraft 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wholesale of PCs, data and telecom 
equipment 96 40 33 21 2 712 48 164 324 176
Retailing of PCs, data and telecom equipment 20 9 9 2 0 87 9 33 45 0
Telecommunication 17 5 6 2 4 560 5 33 66 456
Data processing, data bases, software 
development 222 142 41 33 6 1528 171 208 629 520
Technical, science based R&D 29 6 6 6 11 1822 7 29 162 1624
Other technical consultancy work 138 91 24 20 3 950 102 101 379 368
 Total 566 310 136 87 33 6572 363 654 1671 3884
 Total (%) 100.0 54.8 24.0 15.4 5.8 100.0 5.5 10.0 25.4 59.1
ICT 364 199 93 59 13 3007 236 453 1098 1220
Other high-tech 202 111 43 28 20 3565 127 201 573 2664
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Table 4.10: The most important high-tech firms in Trondheim*) 
Company Turnover 
(mNOK) 
Em-ploy-
ees 
Products/business International 
ownership? 
Nace 3162- Manufacture of other electrical equipment 
Autronica Fire and Security AS 307.3 155 Systems for fire detection  Yes 
Nace 3210 Manufacture of electronic valves, tubes and other components 
Nordic VLSI ASA 73.2 68 Components for wireless communi-cation, mixed signal, complex digital and 
analog integrated circuit design. 
No 
Nace 5164 Wholesale of office machines and equipment 
LindbakGruppen AS 272.2 154 Supplier of office equipment and computer systems to businesses and gov-
ernment offices 
No 
Nace 7220 Software consultancy and supply 
EDB Gruppen NORGE AS 116.2 88 Administrative systems for private and public sector No 
Q-free ASA 161.4 74 Automatic vehicle identification systems No 
Powell ASA 70.7 66 Suppliers and partners to power companies, software systems for demand 
and load forecasting etc. 
No 
Maxware International AS 72.9 55 Software system solutions  No 
Nace 7310 Research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering 
Stiftelsen for industriell of tek-
nisk forskning - SINTEF 
997.4 1.308 
 
Knowledge and related services based on research in technology, the 
natural and social sciences and medicine. 
No 
Norsk Marinteknisk 
Forskningsinstitutt  
178.2 218 Marine technology research and development services No 
SINTEF Energiforskning AS 162.3 200 R&D activities on power production energy conversion, transmission and 
distribution 
No 
SINTEF Petroleumsforskning 
AS 
63.6 92 R&D and consultancy services world wide within petroleum exploration and 
production technology. 
No 
This table only includes firms classified as high-tech firms, as defined earlier in this report, see Chapter 2.4. There may be important firms that locally are 
recognised as technology-based which are not included. 
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Summary32 
To summarise the situation, the university and research facilities are Trond-
heim’s strongest dimension, as these are not only leading institutions in 
Norway, but also internationally renowned. SINTEF, NTNU and Statoil are 
important local actors; together they represent a unique pool of researchers 
and competence. Skilled people have been trained in Trondheim for many 
years, and NTNU and SINTEF, to some extent, have a history of spinning 
off new technology-based firms. Systematic efforts to bolster high technology 
were, however, not in place before 1994, and further strengthening took place 
just recently. 
A weak dimension of the high-tech industries in Trondheim is the lack of 
dynamic, international, growth-oriented technology-based companies. 
Although there are many technology-based businesses in Trondheim, few are 
clear success stories, i.e. listed on the stock exchange or international. 
Moreover, those that have made it, experience large difficulties with 
economics and finance. In general, there are few large technology-based 
companies and multinationals in Trondheim. 
The number of fast growing medium-sized firms is also rather low. There 
are several new companies, many of which are struggling due to lack of 
access to growth capital and market networks internationally. Customers and 
partners are for the most part outside the region or nation, and access to 
markets is difficult to obtain and time-consuming.  
Another weak dimension is the availability of risk capital. Although the 
number of providers of risk capital in Trondheim has grown over the last 2-5 
years, there is still need to further develop the capital base, raise new funds, 
and build close ties to national and international co-investors. There is still too 
little risk capital available, and, moreover, growth and development capital is 
lacking.  
Few opportunities to exit may also hinder the future development of risk 
capital in Trondheim. Investors need to be able to exit from investments in 
order to have success. Exits provide new optimism, returns to investors and 
possible capital for new funds and new companies. As of today, the lack of 
good exit-opportunities has been a problem for local investors. This is also 
linked to the other weak dimension: too few large and multinational tech-
nology companies. With more large and multinational companies present in 
the region, more exit channels would exist through these companies and their 
networks. 
                                                 
32 This summary is based on Reitan, B. (2002): ‘Trondheim as a high-tech hot spot’, with 
some modifications. 
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4.5 Oslo and Trondheim in international comparison 
So far we have discussed Oslo and Trondheim in a national context, but more 
interesting is how the two cities may be assessed in an international context. 
To facilitate this comparison we have obtained data for Dublin, Cambridge 
and Sophia Antipolis, as well as the Finnish cities Helsinki and Oulu and 
Swedish cities Stockholm and Jönköping.33 This should provide a fairly 
differentiated basis of comparison. 
An overview of the data is given in Figure 4.7. At first glance the data 
may give the impression that Oslo is performing fairly well. With 50 000 
employees in high-tech sectors, Oslo matches Helsinki, and outperforms 
Cambridge. However, Oslo trails behind Stockholm, which has more than 122 
000 high-tech employees, and is also significantly behind Dublin, which has an 
estimated 86 000 employees. 
Trondheim, with 6500 employed in the high-tech sector, lags behind the 
other ‘number two’ cities, Oulu, Finland’s main high-tech city; Linköping, 
with three times as many people employed in high-tech; and Sophia Antipolis, 
with four times the high-tech employment of Trondheim. 
 
High tech employment - cities
Trondheim
Oslo
Cambridge
Dublin
Sophia 
Antipolis
Linköping
Stockholm
Helsinki
Oulu
Oslo 38 600 12 200 50 800
Trondheim 3 000 3 500 6 500
Stockholm 80 400 42 500 122 900
Linköping 8 800 8 500 17 300
Helsinki 41 100 12 200 53 300
Oulu 9 800 1 500 11 300
Cambridge 13 400 27 400 40 800
Sophia Antipolis 8 000 16 000 24 000
Dublin ? 86 000
Other 
ICT High-Tech Total
 
 
Figure 4.7: High-tech employment in European cities, 1999. 
                                                 
33 Data for Finland are obtained from Statistics Finland. Data for Sweden are obtained from 
Jönköping International Business School. 
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But is this the whole story? To answer this question, we have to go into 
more detail and analyse the underlying composition of the high-tech sectors 
of the various cities. 
Oslo in international comparison 
To get a better impression of the strength and weaknesses of the high-tech 
structure of a city, it seems reasonable to compare similar cities. As we have 
commented on before, there seems to be a ‘capital function’ at work, i.e. 
businesses tend to locate in the capital of a country because of the feasibility 
of accessing national markets. Thus the total industrial structure of a capital 
does not necessarily indicate industrial dynamism. Also, to make data 
comparable, it seems reasonable to examine data in a national context, and to 
choose countries of similar size.  
Oslo - Stockholm - Helsinki
24: Chemical/pharmaceutical
30: Office machines
31: Electro technical
32: Communication equipm
33: Med/opt. instruments
35: Aircraft /space craft
51: Wholesale
52: Retail
64: Telecom
72: Data processing
73: R&D
74: Technical cons.
Employment 1999:
Oslo 50 800 Norway  106 000
Stockholm  122 900 Sweden 330 000
Helsinki 53 300 Finland  119 000
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Figure 4.8: Oslo high-tech industrial structure compared to Stockholm and 
Helsinki 
 
In Figure 4.8 the high-tech structure of Oslo is compared with the two 
other capitals Stockholm and Helsinki. From the data, it seems that Oslo 
matches Helsinki fairly well, also at the national level. In fact, when cor-
rected for differences in size, the number of high-tech employees in per cent 
of total population is virtually the same. 
However, data on the industria l structure of Oslo and Helsinki reveal an 
important difference related to the composition of the high-tech sector. While 
Helsinki has more than 21 000 (40%) employed in the manufacture of high-
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technology products, the similar figure for Oslo is 5700 (11%). The 
manufacture of communication equipment accounts for the greatest differ-
ence in these figures, with more than 10 600 employed in this area in Hel-
sinki, while Oslo has no more than 1600. Furthermore, Helsinki has around 
5000 employed in the manufacture of technical instruments, while Oslo has 
just a few hundred. 
On the other hand, Oslo has a stronger technical consultancy sector than 
Helsinki, at least as it is reflected in the statistics. The two cities are virtually 
identical regarding data processing, telecommunications and R&D. Although 
Oslo is much stronger in sales functions, this type of activity is related to the 
distribution of products and services, and is of less importance as a basis for 
dynamic development. This situation is also reflected in the export balance of 
high-tech products. While Finland has a very significant export of ICT 
products, Norway has a significant net import of such products.   
Although a similar pattern is revealed in a comparison between Oslo and 
Stockholm, the relative share of high-tech employment in Sweden is 
significantly higher than in Norway. While the Swedish population is about 
twice that of Norway, their total high-tech employment is 2.7 times higher. 
Again, we find that the manufacturing sector is much weaker in Oslo. While 
Oslo has less than 6000 people in manufacturing, the figure for Stockholm is 
38 000, accounting for more than 30 per cent of total high-tech employment. 
The most important manufacturing sectors are communication equipment and 
chemicals/pharmaceuticals. In the service sectors, Stockholm is also stronger, 
particularly in the areas of data processing and software, and R&D. 
In Figure 4.9 Norway and Ireland are compared, as data for Ireland 
were only available on a national level. In spite of Ireland’s smaller popula tion 
(3.6 million), the country has significantly more people employed in the high-
technology sectors, i.e. close to 123 000. Once again we find the same 
structure; high-tech manufacturing in Ireland is significantly stronger than in 
Norway. While Ireland has more than 67 000 people (55%) employed in 
high-tech manufacturing, Norway has around 24 000 (24%). Virtually all 
manufacturing sectors are strong in Ireland, in particular computers with 
more than 20 000 people; Norway has less than a thousand. This may explain 
why the two countries perform so differently in terms of export. 
On the other hand, the diagram also provides an indication of the weak-
ness of the Irish industrial structure, with very little R&D activity.  
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Norway - Ireland
24: Chemical/pharmaceutical
30: Office machines
31: Electro technical
32: Communication equipment
33: Medical/optical instruments
35: Aircraft/space craft
51: Wholesale
52: Retail
64: Telecom
72: Data processing
73: R&D
74: Technical consultancy
Employment 1999:
Norway 106 000
Ireland 122 800
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Figure 4.9: Comparison Norway – Ireland: high-tech industrial structure. 
To further illustrate the important aspect of industrial structure, we in-
clude a comparison between Oslo and Cambridge. As mentioned above, Oslo 
has more people employed in the high-tech sector than Cambridge, but can in 
no way compete with the quality of the industrial structure in Cambridge. The 
reason for this is that Cambridge is highly specialised in specific R&D 
sectors and manufacturing related to these sectors, so that a high level of 
research-based manufacturing has been developed, cf. Figure 4.10. 
Oslo - Cambridge
24: Chemical/pharmaceutical
30: Office machines
31: Electro technical
32: Communication equipment
33: Medical/optical instruments
35: Aircraft/space craft
51: Wholesale
52: Retail
64: Telecom
72: Data processing
73: R&D
74: Technical consultancy
Employment 1999:
Oslo 50 800
Cambridge 40 800
0
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15000
20000
24 30 31 32 33 35 51 52 64 72 73 74
Oslo
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Figure 4.10: Oslo high-tech industrial structure compared with Cambridge 
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Of total high-tech employment in Cambridge (around 40 000), more than 
16 000 (42%) are employed in manufacturing, and close to 9000 (22%) in 
R&D. This means that around two thirds are in research and research-based 
manufacturing, while the similar figure for Oslo is 7000  (15%). Oslo has 
greater activity in data processing and software, and telecom and sales. 
However, this structure provides significantly less opportunity for developing 
uniqueness and competitive advantage. 
Trondheim in international comparison 
Trondheim may be labelled a ‘second level city’ without the functions of a 
capital. It seems reasonable to compare it to cities that are in a similar posi-
tion. Thus we have chosen Oulu, Finland and Linköping, Sweden for our 
comparative analysis. 
Oulu saw rapid expansion in high-tech activities during the 1990s, largely 
attributed to the success of Nokia which has its headquarters in the city. In 
fact, employment in the city expanded by more than 130 per cent between 
1993 and 1999, from 4800 to 11 300. Employment in Trondheim grew by 50 
per cent in the same period.34 Although this is  significant, it is far below the 
performance of Oulu. 
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Figure 4.11: High-tech industrial structure of Trondheim, Oulu and Linköping 
                                                 
34 This is just a rough estimate, due to missing statistics during the first half of the 1990s, it is 
not possible to provide an exact figure. 
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The difference between Oulu and Trondheim is clearly illustrated in 
Figure 4.11, which shows that more than 7000 people in Oulu are employed 
in the manufacture of communication equipment. The driving force behind 
these statistics is Nokia. In other sectors, particularly R&D and consultan-
cies, Trondheim outperforms Oulu, however, important R&D activities are 
most likely taken care of by manufacturing companies in the case of Oulu. 
The situation in Linköping resembles Oulu in many respects. Linköping 
also has a very strong base in manufacturing, but unlike Oulu, it is split 
between two industries, i.e. communication equipment and aircraft. In the 
first case, the most important company is Ericsson, in the latter the main 
company is SAAB. In addition, Linköping is also characterised by a strong 
data processing and software sector, which is about twice the size of 
Trondheim’s. Trondheim, on the other hand, has a stronger R&D sector. 
Summary 
The general conclusion from these comparisons is that high-tech industries in  
Oslo and Trondheim are outperformed by their counterparts in leading 
European cities. There is no single factor that can explain these weaknesses. 
As illustrated earlier in this report, the evolution of high technology industries 
is the result of complicated processes based on interaction between different 
actors. However, certain factors seem more import than others. 
The manufacturing sectors of Oslo and Trondheim are not well devel-
oped. Compared to other cities, larger companies that serve as drivers of 
industrialisation are missing in the Norwegian cities. In the case of Oslo, 
there are a few larger manufacturing companies, but the potential that 
seemed to exist in this field during the 1980s, has gradually fragmented. With 
a few exceptions, leading international companies that can serve as drivers, 
are also missing. In the case of Trondheim, the absence of larger firms, 
national as well as international, is striking. 
This situation may partly reflect the inability of the two cities to attract 
international high-tech companies to the area, in contrast to Dublin, Cam-
bridge and Sophia Antipolis. Although Oslo has attracted a few  multina-
tionals, it is not because of the attractiveness of the local area per se, but 
because of an interest in exploiting local market opportunities. As we have 
seen, most multinationals in Oslo are in reproductive and distributive 
functions, and do not contribute to developing uniqueness and competitive 
advantage.  
Another explanation for the lack of larger manufacturing companies, may 
be related to less capacity for developing indigenous firms, i.e. as a result of 
spin-offs from universities or existing firms. However, reliable statistics on 
 125  
spin-offs in Oslo and Trondheim are not available, making judgement difficult. 
As we have seen, the number of spin-offs has also been a constraint to 
development in Dublin and Sophia Antipolis. Whereas in the case of Cam-
bridge, this mechanism has been very important. Clearly Oslo and Trondheim 
lag behind Cambridge in this sense. 
It is widely recognised that the unavailability of risk capital, particularly in 
the early stages of development, may represent an important barrier to 
development. As commented on earlier, there are weak traditions in this field 
in Norway, and the Norwegian venture capital market is immature. 
Traditional venture capital companies have been late in developing compared 
to other countries. A number of factors may contribute to this situation. 
There are a limited number of highly profitable Norwegian firms and 
‘successful’ entrepreneurs with capital resources available to invest in new 
firms. The situation may also be related to government policies which have 
allocated less money to the risk capital market. Furthermore, the situation 
may be explained on the background of limited growth in R&D funding. In 
particular, there has not been a clear focus on processes of commercialisa-
tion and how research institutions and intermediate institutions may be 
designed in order to improve these processes. 
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5 Evolution, technology and the role of small 
firms 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we gave an overview of high-technology industries in 
Norway and their regional distribution, followed by a presentation and 
discussion of high-technology evolution in Oslo and Trondheim. In this 
chapter we will go into more detail by analysing empirical data obtained from 
Oslo and Trondheim. The data are based on two different approaches:35 
First, to illustrate key evolution mechanisms related to high-technology 
businesses and the commercialisation of specific technologies, we present 
details related to one particular case on the development of businesses based 
on Internet technology during the 1990s in Oslo. This case illustrates how 
complicated evolutionary processes can be, with a mixture of competing and 
collaborating actors related in many different ways. 
Second, to give a more representative view of the role of small high-tech 
firms, we present data based on a survey of firms in Oslo and Trondheim. 
Although these data, to a large extent, are cross sectional, retrospective data 
on evolution is also included in order to reflect important aspects of 
evolutionary processes. These data also illustrate aspects of the firms’ 
innovative behaviour. 
 
5.2 Case: Evolution of Internet-based businesses in Oslo 
When the company Oslonett started in 1991, it was the first Norwegian 
company to develop commercial activities based on Internet. Oslonett was 
started by a group of 16 partners, all with backgrounds in information tech-
nology from the University of Oslo (see Box 5.1). Their start-up triggered 
                                                 
35 The following is based on two papers: 
Steinsli, J. and O.R. Spilling 2002: On cluster evolution and the role of small firms: The case of 
Internet development in Norway. Paper prepared for the 12th Nordic Research Conference 
on Small Business, Kuopio, Finland, May. 
Spilling, O.R. and J. Steinsli 2002: On the Role of High-Technology Small Firms in Cluster 
Evolution. Paper for the Tenth Annual High-technology Small Firms Conference, 
Enschede, The Netherlands, June. 
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diverse development, which may be characterised as a ‘chain reaction’. 
When the group met ten years later for the tenth anniversary of their start-up, 
the original company was no longer in existence. Their original business idea, 
which had turned out to be very successful, had been developed and 
restructured, split into different fields and transformed into different 
organisations. What was once the core of a small and growing company 
during the early 1990s, was now spread, diffused and merged with other 
ideas and concepts in many different businesses. The group was no longer 
working together; they had all moved into different organisations, working as 
entrepreneurs, employees in various companies, and professors and scientists 
at the University. 
 
Box 5.1: The Pizza Gang 
On the 12th of December in 1991 a group of 16 people met for a pizza meeting in 
seminar room 3B in the Informatics Building at the University of Oslo. The 
organiser of the meeting was Kjell Øystein Arisland, who had invited some of his  
colleagues - a graduate student, a few doctoral students and other technicians and 
researchers from the Department of Informatics, the Norwegian Computing Centre 
and the University IT Centre, all institutions located at the University of Oslo.  
The meeting went on in an informal atmosphere; the colleagues enjoyed the 
pizza, although the important issue of starting up a new company was on the 
agenda. For a long time Kjell Øystein Arisland had been considering the idea of 
starting up a new firm which would exploit opportunities he thought would emerge 
in the field of Internet. In spite of his young age (around thirty years), he was 
already an experienced entrepreneur. He had carefully selected colleagues he knew 
well from his work as Assistant Professor at the Department of Informatics, and he 
was ready to present his vision for a new business opportunity. He asked his 
colleagues to participate as partners in the new company on the condition that 
they contributed a share of NOK 5000 (approximately Euro 620) in cash and 
committed themselves to a minimum of one month’s work during the coming year 
with no guarantee for payment. Everybody accepted the invitation, and they 
decided to establish the new company Oslonett. 
 
From Steinsli and Spilling 2002 
 
The start-up of Oslonett was based on knowledge of the emerging Inter-
net technology and infrastructure. The business idea was to sell Internet 
access and provide services related to the net. Their innovations included the 
development of the search engine Kvasir, the establishment of market places 
on the net, and a system for the distribution of online result services for sports 
events. 
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The start-up of Oslonett was closely related to previous events. In addi-
tion to being based on the emerging Internet technology, is was also based on 
previous entrepreneurial experiences of the key founder, i.e. the person who 
invited the 16 partners to the start-up meeting. Employed as Assistant 
Professor at the University, he had one day per week at his disposal. To-
wards the end of the 1980s he had started two new companies within data 
technology and communication, both with colleagues from the University. 
The first company went bankrupt in 1988 due to market problems. However, 
the second company was started immediately afterwards and still exists. One 
of the partners took over the remains of the first company and started new 
companies based on these resources (Figure 5.1). 
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1991----
University of Oslo:
Dep. of Informatics
-----------
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Computing Centre
------------
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Oslonett – the Start
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Computers
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Figure 5.1: Start-up of Oslonett. 
 
It soon became clear that the partners of Oslonett did not have the re-
sources necessary to provide a direct link to Internet, so a strategic alliance 
was established in 1992 with the company TelePost, which had capital to 
invest in infrastructure, while Oslonett possessed the requisite expertise in 
Internet technology. 
In 1994, Internet technology had a breakthrough in the market, and larger 
companies, in particular, started to show interest in the use of the technology. 
At the time, Oslonett had around one thousand access customers; they had 
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thirty full-time and twenty part-time employees; and their turnover had grown 
from around 500 000 NOK in 1992 to 4.3 million NOK in 1994. 
However, being competitors in the same market, relationships between 
Oslonet and TelePost became tense, and the cooperation between the two 
companies disintegrated. Oslonett had great potential for growth, but com-
petition was stiff, and they needed more ‘muscle’ to manage the necessary 
investments. First, they looked for a partner, but in 1995 the whole company 
was sold to Schibsted, a leading Norwegian private publishing house, which 
was considering utilising Internet technology.  
Oslonett was restructured into Schibstednett. By buying Oslonett, 
Schibsted obtained important advantages. Firstly, they got a significant 
number of customers (7000 in 1995). Secondly, they acquired an established 
access net. Thirdly, they secured access to a group of people with unique 
competence in Internet technology (six of the entrepreneurs behind Oslonett 
remained in the company). But Schibsted also contributed with valuable 
knowledge and with its extensive publishing experience, was able to improve 
the quality and design of Oslonett’s various web services. They also 
contributed to the further development of the market for using the Internet as 
a market place and as a new medium of communication. 
At this time there were two large actors in the Norwegian market, i.e. 
Telenor Online (formerly Telepost) and Schibstednett. TelePost had changed 
its name to Telenor Online and was fully owned by Telenor, the leading 
Norwegian telecom company. Telenor Online created the web portal 
Scandinavian Online, inspired by American Online, and Schibstednett had 
SN-Horisont as their portal. Clearly, this situation could not last, and after a 
period of tough competition, they agreed first to merge the two companies, 
and then to split their activity into two separate companies: Scandinavia 
Online AS and Nextel (later Nextra). Scandinavia Online – or SOL - 
delivered Internet services, while Nextel provided Internet access. The name 
of their common web portal was Scandinavian Online.  
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Figure 5.2: The main actors in the development of Internet technology. 
 
Scandinavian Online had the ambition to become the largest Internet 
portal in Europe, and soon established companies in Sweden and Denmark, 
and later in Finland. The Internet market did not, however, grow as fast as 
expected, and after years with deficits, the company was forced to undergo 
significant processes of restructuring in 1998 and 1999, but still without being 
profitable. In 2000, after a new round of restructuring, SOL was listed on the 
Stockholm and Oslo stock exchanges. The following year, the Swedish 
company ENRIO bought SOL, including the rights to the Internet portal SOL 
and the former Oslonett product Kvasir (search engine). In 2001 SOL was 
the leading Internet media company in the Nordic region. 
During the same period, NEXTRA developed to become Norway’s main 
Internet access provider with 75 per cent of the private market and 35-40 per 
cent of the business market in 2001. NEXTRA is now integrated in Telenor 
(cf. Figure 5.2 and Box 5.1) 
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Box 5.1: The main direct or indirect actors in the development of 
Internet technology in Norway.  
A. University based institutions. 
The Norwegian Computing Centre (Norsk regnesentral) 
A research and consultancy company owned by the University of Oslo. One of 
the first milieu in Norway with expertise in Internet technology.  
Department of Informatics 
Part of the University of Oslo. One of the very first milieu in Norway which got 
access to the Internet through the university’s network. 
University Centre for Information Technology 
Part of the University of Oslo. 
B. Private and public ‘background players’  
Telenor (The Norwegian Telecommunication Company, previously named 
Televerket). 
A company 100% owned by the Government. 
Telenor established TelePost Communication with Postverket in 1991. Telepost 
changed its name to Telenor Online in 1995, parts of Telenor Online’s activities 
were transferred to NEXTEL, later NEXTRA. 
Today Telenor is one of Norway’s leading Internet companies. 
Posten Norge AS (The Norwegian Mail Company, previously named Postverket.) 
Posten Norge AS established TelePost Communication with Telenor in 1991 (see 
below). They sold their part of the company to Telenor in 1995 when it became 
clear that the company would focus on Internet. Posten had at that time just taken 
over Statens Datasentral (the Government’s computing centre) and wanted to 
continue their e-mail business through this company. 
Schibsted 
Leading Norwegian private publishing house. Schibsted bought Oslonett in 1996 
and gave the new company the name Schibstednett.  
C. Companies directly involved in the development. 
The companies are listed in order of ‘appearance’. 
Oslonett 
Norway’s first commercially based Internet company. Established in 1991. Bought 
by Schibsted in 1995. 
Schibstednett 
Oslonett was acquired by Schibsted in 1995 and renamed Schibstednett.  
TelePost Communication 
The company was started in 1991 by Telenor and Posten to deliver electronic 
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message services. The ambition was to become the dominating company offering 
electronic mail in Norway. Posten and Telenor owned 50% each in the new 
company. Telepost based their e-mail service on the X-400 technology. 
- The management of TelePost was not satisfied with the X400 technology. After 
some resistance by their owners, the board of TelePost eventually accepted that 
TelePost started an Internet business. During the summer of 1993, TelePost 
became the first commercial company in Norway to offer direct Internet access 
through permanent lines to businesses. TelePost changed its name to Telenor 
Online in 1995, later NEXTRA.  
Telenor Online 
Owned by Telenor, started in 1995. The company provides Internet access as well 
as online services, such as the Internet portal Scandinavian Online. The company 
was restructured into NEXTRA.  
Scandinavian Online AS (SOL) 
Started in 1995.  
The SOL group developed into the leading Internet media network comp any in the 
Nordic region. SOL was listed on the Stockholm stock exchange and on the Oslo 
stock exchange. 
Enrio 
Enrio is Northern Europe’s leading provider of directory services online and 
offline, with operation in 23 countries. Enrio was listed on the Stockholm Exchange 
O-list in 2000 and has been expanding rapidly in the international market. 
NEXTRA (former NEXTEL) 
In 1996 Schibsted and Telenor agreed to merge the two companies Schibstednett 
and Telenor Online. The company was then split into two divisions, one was 
named NEXTEL and was based on providing Internet access. The company was 
renamed NEXTRA. 
 
Oslonett and the companies that followed have led to a number of new 
spin-off companies. One group of spin-offs derived from Schibstednett and 
Scandinavian Online. The main companies in this group were Schibsted 
Interactive and SOL System. Schibsted Interactive later led to the 
establishment of Bokkilden, which is now one of the leading Internet based 
bookstores in Norway. SOL System, an operational unit outsourced from 
SOL in 1998, is based on Oslonett’s technology; two of Oslonett’s founders 
worked for this company. Sol System later became SOL ABB which 
developed ‘Alt om København’ and ‘Alt om Stockholm’. Part of SOL 
System was acquired by Infostream, a company which had been merged 
with Intervett, a spin-out from Oslonett, at an earlier stage. 
A second group of spin-offs was started by the Oslonett founders them-
selves, such as Intervett, Internet Service, Candleweb and Morell Software. 
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Nine of the co-founders established other companies after 1991, either alone, 
together with colleagues from Oslonett, or with others (Figure 5.3). Several 
of Oslonett's entrepreneurs became serial entrepreneurs.  By 2002 Oslonett’s 
‘family tree’ had branched considerably. As shown in Box 5.2, In total, the 
18 partners behind Oslonett have been involved in setting up a total of 14 
companies. Many of these companies have merged with other companies, 
which in turn have spun-out new companies. 
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Figure 5.3: Spin-offs related to the process around Oslonett. 
 
A significant number of the 18 original Oslonett partners point to the 
positive experience with Oslonett as an important source of inspiration for 
further participation in business development. The success of Oslonett 
demonstrated that it was possible to establish a business. Furthermore, selling 
Oslonett to Schibsted provided financial means that could be used as risk 
capital in new companies. 
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Box 5.2: Career pattern of the persons taking part in the start-up of 
Oslonett. (List to be completed.) 
The following 16 persons participated in the ‘pizza meeting’ and became partners 
of Oslonett on the 12th of December, 1991. (Title in brackets indicate formal 
position at the time of start-up.) Listing in alphabetical order. 
1. Arisland, Kjell Øystein (Assistant Professor at the Department of 
Informatics) 
Initiator of the ‘pizza meeting’ and the main organiser of the start-up of Oslonett. 
Previous start-ups:  
Oslo VLSI AS, 1985-1988, together with Arne Kinnebergbråthen (se below) 
and two other people, the company went bankrupt in 1988. 
Oslo VLSI Broker AS, 1988- ; was based on the remains of OSLO VLSI AS. The 
main founder was Arne Kinnebergbråthen, Arisland participated in a minority 
position. 
Computers and Learning AS, 1988 – 
Partner in Oslonett until 1994. When the firm was sold to Schibsted, he left the 
company and went to work at Computers and Learning. In 1994 he took a year’s 
sabbatical to Canada. Later start-ups:  
Candle Web AS, 1995 – 
Polygons AS, 1999 -  
Click walk AS, 1999 -  
2. Berg, Yngvar (Employed at the Department of Informatics) 
Left Oslonett when it was sold in 1994, continued working at the University and is 
now Professor at the Department of Informatics. 
3. Ellefsrud, Anders (Engineer at the Department of Informatics) 
He never had a permanent job in Oslonett, but was employed by Scandinavian 
Online (SOL) when Schibstednett was reorganised to SOL in 1997. He later 
followed as an employee when SOL was restructured and activities transferred to 
the following firms: 
SOL System (outsourcing of the operation unit of SOL) 1998 –  
Infostream ASP (SOL System was acquired by Infostream) 1998 –  
Basefarm, 2000 - (this company was set up by a group of partners who 
previously worked in SOL System 
Since 1997, when Ellefsrud started as an employee at SOL, he has been working at 
the same desk in spite of being employed at four different companies. 
4. Hannemyr, Gisle (Employed at the Norwegian Computing Centre) 
When Oslonett was sold to Schibsted, he followed the company to Schibstednett 
and SOL; he became manager of SOL with special responsibility for development 
activities. After a few years, he left his job, and returned to the University to finish 
his PhD in Informatics, where he still works as a researcher at the Department of 
Informatics. Since he returned to the University, he has participated in other start-
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ups: 
Morell Software 
Valid Sign 2000 -  
He has also worked for Schibsted Interactive Studio, which was a ‘think thank’ for 
developing new business ideas. One well known company to result from this is 
Bokkilden, an Internet based bookshop. 
5. Holen, Hans Petter (Employed at the University IT Service Centre) 
He followed Oslonett to Schibstednett, for a short period he worked for Telenor 
Online before he returned to SOL, later  to SOL System and Infostream ASP where 
he was central in the development of the Internet portals SOL in Sweden (SOL 
ABB), ‘Alt om Stockholm’ and ‘Alt om København’. He is now head of the 
technical unit at Tiscali Norway, an International company providing operation of 
databases. 
6. Karlsen, Tore Solvar (Employed at the Norwegian Computing Centre) 
He was the first among the 16 partners of Oslonett to be employed by the 
company, and was manager of Oslonett from 1993 until the company was sold and 
converted to Schibstednett. He was also employed by Schibstednett for a short 
period of time, where he worked with internal systems development, before 
returning to the Department of Informatics, where he conducted research on the 
development of the next generation of Internet Services, before he was employed 
by Telenor, the main Norwegian telecommunication company. At Telenor he 
works with establishing Internet provision in Russia and other Easter European 
countries. 
7. Kinnebergbråten, Arne (Employed at the Department of Informatics). 
Previous entrepreneurial experiences:  
Oslo VLSI AS, 1985-1988, with Kjell Øystein Arisland (see above) and two 
other people.  The company went bankrupt in 1988. 
Oslo VLSI Broker AS, 1988- ; was based on the remains of OSLO VLSI AS. 
Kinnebergbråthen was the main founder, while his previous partner Arisland 
participated in a minority position. 
Computers and Learning AS, 1988 – , minority position, main partner: Arisland 
Mizar Data, 1988 – investment company 
Mira Investment Company 1991– investment company 
He developed specialist competencies in financial issues, and assisted the 
partners in Oslonett in this field. 
8. Kjærnsrud, Steinar Arne (Head of the operation unit at the Department of 
Informatics) 
He had a special role in setting up most of the web services provided by Oslonett, 
including the Kvasir search engine and web services developed for the Winter 
Olympics at Lillehammer in 1994. He also developed Internet courses that were 
later was sold through Intervett, se below. He left Oslonett when the company was 
sold, and then started: 
Intervett, 1994, which was started with a friend, Knut Jærstad. In 1998 Intervett 
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started to look around for a partner, and Intervett and the company Infostream 
(established in 1989) merged in 1998. Infostream later became Norway’s first 
Internet company on the Norwegian stock exchange in 2000. Infostream was in 
2000 bought by a French company, Integra, which again later was bought by 
the American company Genuity: Today the name of the former Infostream is 
Manamind: 
9. Knudsen, Terje (PhD student at the Department of Informatics) 
He left Oslonett when the company was sold in 1995, went back to the Department 
of Informatics, where he still works as a senior engineering officer in charge of the 
data systems of the Department.  
10. Lande, Tor Sverre (Assistant Professor at the Department of Informatics) 
When Oslonett was sold, he followed the new company and was a member of the 
board of Schibstednett until 1997. He returned to the Department of Informatics, 
where he is now a Professor. He has also been involved in other start-ups: 
Skilling Systemer AS 1996 – (specialised technical consultancy services) 
Internet Service AS 1994 – (with Otto Milvang, see below) 
Toumaz 
11. Milvang, Otto (Engineer at the Department of Informatics) 
When Oslonett was sold, he started a new company: 
Internet Service AS 1994 – (with Tor Sverre Lande, see above) 
Axicon 1991 – (with a colleague from the Norwegian Computing Centre). 
12. Neset, Leif Arne (Engineer at the Department of Informatics) 
After Oslonett was sold and converted to Schibstednett, he continued working in 
the new company until 1996. He then left and was employed by Bærum KabelTV, a 
local cable TV company which has recently restructured and now operates under 
the name alfaNETT. 
13. Næss, Sigbjørn (PhD student at the Department of Informatics) 
He finished his PhD after the sell out of Oslonett and continued at the Department 
of Informatics as an Assistant Professor, and he is still in this position. He also 
works part-time for NERA Satcom, a leading Norwegian electronics company. 
14. Oslo, Kjetil Otter (employed at the University IT Service Centre) 
He only participated in the start-up of Oslonett as a partner. He has worked at the 
University during the whole period, where he is responsible for the University’s 
data- and telecom network. 
15. Thomassen, Jens (Engineer at the Department of Informatics) 
He followed Oslonett to Schibstednett and SOL. For a short period he went back 
to the University, before he started working for the company Metamerge 
(established in 1998). Metamerge is a consultancy service on systems and 
software. 
16. Tvedten, Knut (Graduate Student at the Department of Informatics) 
After the sell out of Oslonett, he was employed by the company Sysdeco Mapmill.  
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Recently, this company went bankrupt, and he is now considering starting a new 
related company with some of his former colleagues. 
 
In addition to the above mentioned 16 partners that started Oslonett,  two person 
were invited and joined as partners in 1994: 
17. Martmann-Moe, Erling (employed at the Norwegian Computing Centre) 
He worked with Oslonett and Schibstednett until 1996. He then became CEO of 
New Media Science which later was merged and restructured into the new 
company Cell. Today he works as an independent consultant and is a partner in 
Alliance Venture. He also established Martmann-Moe Nye Medier in 1997, and 
consultancy services on systems and software. 
18. Aas, Gisle (employed at the Norwegian Computing Centre) 
He worked with Oslonett and Schibstednett and later SOL, but left SOL in order to 
start his own consultancy firm, and work towards the international Pearl 
development milieu. He is now working for ActiveState in Canada. 
 
5.3 The role of different actors 
The case of Oslonett serves as an illustration of how complex and diversified 
processes of evolution are, and how they are characterised by a complicated 
interplay between a large number of actors, whose roles vary over time. 
Even in this fairly narrow field of technology, a large number of actors have 
been involved. 
Private actors in the form of entrepreneurs and established companies 
are found at the core of the cluster and serve as the main drivers of the 
evolutionary process. However, the presence of various institutions is also 
essential to the functioning of clusters and innovation systems. 
In the case described here, the University of Oslo was the cradle for de-
velopment. Competencies available at the Department of Informatics and the 
National Computing Centre, provided the knowledge base for the new 
Internet technology. Later, the knowledge resources of two other research 
institutions also were important. However, development could not have taken 
place without the presence of actors with entrepreneurial capacity, i.e. with 
the ability to see the commercial potential of the technology and to take steps 
to organise new ventures to exploit these opportunities. Entrepreneurs in the 
Schumpeterian sense played a crucial role as agents of change (Schumpeter 
1934/1996, Eliasson 2000). 
The first stage of development may be characterised as technology-
based or technology-driven in the sense that it was the technologists that 
identified the opportunities. Although their motive was to exploit commercial 
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opportunities, their recognition of the potential of the technology was probably 
the main driving force. All the founders of Oslonett had basic knowledge in 
the field of information and communication technology. 
Oslonett’s business concept may be identified as a radical innovation –  
based on Autio’s typology of technology-based companies as innovators 
(Autio 1995), the firm may be classified as ‘paradigm innovator’.36 Obviously 
the role of Oslonett was to explore an emerging technology as well as an 
emerging market. During the first stage of development, i.e. as long as 
Oslonett existed as a formal unit of operation, the main orientation of the firm 
was more towards technology than the market. 
The assumption of technology driven development, is further supported 
by the absence of financial actors. The founders of Oslonett did not 
collaborate with financial actors, because they considered it unlikely that 
anyone in finance would be able to understand the business concept and the 
commercial opportunities. Basic funding for the initial development of 
Oslonett was provided by the partners’ own financial resources, and 
supplemented by an investment of their spare time in the venture and by 
selling consultancy services.  
The next stage of development serves as an example of the limited ca-
pacity of technology-based entrepreneurs. With limited financial resources, 
the founders of Oslonett faced problems in following up their venture. By the 
end of 1994, the activity of the company had expanded to the equivalent of 
forty full-time employees, and more financial resources were required both to 
manage growth in general, and, in particular, to make investments that would 
allow them to further exploit opportunities. 
A new organisation was required; it was time for a shift from technol-
ogy-driven development to finance-driven development; the technologists 
gradually left this particular business arena to continue with activities in other 
businesses or institutions, and more formally dressed businessmen took over. 
This also implied a shift from small, entrepreneurial firms to a dominance of 
larger firms in the evolution of this particular field of business. 
This case also showcases the different roles that small and large firms 
may have in the development and application of new technology. One aspect 
of this is the role of small firms in creating variation and testing out new busi-
                                                 
36 The classification of Autio is based on a combination of two dichotomies; novelty of 
market (established-emerging) and novelty of technology (established-emerging). Based on 
these two dimensions, Autio suggested the following four categories of innovators 1) 
application innovators (established technology, established market), 2) market innovators 
(established technology, emerging market), 3) technology innovators (emerging technology, 
established market), and 4) paradigm innovators (emerging technology, emerging market). 
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ness ideas.  In this way small firms contribute to the experimental economy 
(Metcalfe 2000). Larger firms, then, acquire successful business concepts 
and provide for the further commercialisation and exploitation of the market. 
As demonstrated in this case, the larger players Schibsted and Telenor, and 
later other multinational companies, played an important role in taking 
development further when Oslonett no longer had the required resources. 
The case also illustrates the extent to which new and small firms spin out, 
create variation and contribute to the continuity of processes of evolution. 
Typically, most new firms remain small; it is only in a minority of cases that 
high potential business concepts are developed. 
 
5.4 The role of small firms in cluster evolution 
As a next step in our analysis of the role of small high-technology firms, we 
will present data obtained through a survey based on representative samples 
of high-technology firms in Oslo and Trondheim.37 
As illustrated in the previous sections of this chapter, the best way to 
analyse cluster evolution, is through a longitudinal approach. By nature, a sur-
vey based on questionnaires is cross sectional and only provides information 
on specific actors at a certain point in time. However, longitudinal studies 
require a lot of resources. One is constrained to perform some kind of cross 
sectional analysis, and from this try to reconstruct what has happened. In 
doing so, we have drawn upon previous analyses of the Cambridge region 
(Keeble et al 1999). 
The relevant populations of high-technology firms in Oslo and Trondheim 
were identified through the databases of Statistics Norway and CreditInform.  
All firms in the specified industrial and service sectors with more than two, 
and less than a hundred employees in 1999 were selected. A sample of these 
firms were contacted by telephone, and questionnaires were sent to those 
willing to participate. This resulted in a total of 117 acceptable responses, and 
a response rate of 39 per cent on average (see Table 5.1). Although we 
would have preferred a response rate of minimum fifty per cent, the actual 
response rate may be regarded as acceptable considering ‘normal’ rates for 
these kinds of surveys.  
 
                                                 
37 The survey was organised in collaboration with the Centre for Value Creation at The 
Norwegian School of Management BI. The questionnaire (in Norwegian), is presented in the 
Appendix. 
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Table 5.1: Total population of firms, firms contacted and responses 
 Oslo Trondheim Total 
Total population 288 145 433 
Contacted 200 103 303 
Not willing to participate 23 6 29 
Received responses 81 36 117 
Non-responses  96 61 157 
Response rate 41% 35% 39% 
 
Based on the idea that companies tend to specialise in different fields and 
in different functions, the firms have been classified according to the main 
functions they cover cf. Table 5.2.. The classifications used are based on a 
value chain and production system perspective,  
 
Table 5.2: Surveyed Firms classified according to their functional roles. (N=117). 
 Standard products to end user 19% 
 Specialised products to end user 23% 
 Subcontractors 12% 
 R&D-services 15% 
 Software and system development 24% 
 Data and information services 17% 
 Consultants  57% 
 Sales 27% 
Comment: More than one answer possible, number of responses adds up to more 
than 100%. 
 
The data show that many firms have more than one role in the production 
system. In fact, among the 117 firms that responded to the survey, only 52 
(44%) reported one function; two functions were reported by 36 companies 
(31%); and the remaining 29 companies (25%) reported three or more 
functions. Thus, a significant share of small high-tech firms are based on 
what we may call multifunctional activities. 
In this respect there is no significant difference between the companies 
in Trondheim and Oslo, and in general, there are strong similarities between 
firms in Oslo and Trondheim in terms of sectoral and size distribution. 
However, there is a significant difference in the market orientation of the 
firms, as a significantly higher share of firms based in Oslo are exporters 
(Table 5.3). In total, 53 per cent of these companies produce goods or ser-
vices for export, while the similar share of Trondheim based companies is 30 
per cent.  
When comparing the cluster structure in terms of the location of the most 
important customers, suppliers and competitors, there are significant differ-
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ences between Oslo and Trondheim. In Oslo, 70 per cent of companies 
surveyed report that their most important customers are in the local area, 
while only 28 per cent of the Trondheim companies claim the same. Similarly, 
the firms in Oslo report that 58 per cent of their most important suppliers and 
62 per cent of their most important competitors are located in the local area, 
while, in contrast, the shares in Trondheim are 32 and 23 per cent 
respectively. 
This clearly points to the conclusion that the Oslo cluster is much more 
complete than is the case of Trondheim. This is to be expected, considering 
the significant difference between Oslo and Trondheim in terms of cluster 
size and total activity in high-technology fields. 
 
Table 5.3: Market orientation and location of customer, suppliers and competitors 
of firms in Oslo and Trondheim 
 Oslo Trondheim Significant 
difference*) 
Export companies (%):   * 
Non-exporters 47 70  
Exporting less than 50% 45 18  
Exporting more than 50%  8 12  
 
Location of  most important customers (%): 
   
*** 
Regionally (in the cluster) 70 28  
Elsewhere in Norway 20 50  
Internationally 11 22  
 
Location of most important suppliers (%): 
   
** 
Regionally (in the cluster) 58 32  
Elsewhere in Norway 14 46  
Internationally 28 21  
 
Location of most important competitors (%): 
   
*** 
Regionally (in the cluster) 62 23  
Elsewhere in Norway 20 53  
Internationally 18 23  
*) Level of significance indicated as: *: <.05;  **:<.01; ***<.001 
5.4 The role of small firms in cluster evolution – the dynamic 
view 
The majority of firms included in this survey are of recent origin. Around 
sixty per cent were established during the 1990s, and around one third were 
established in 1996 or later. Mostly, the firms have been developed 
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independent of other organisations (Table 5.4); close to sixty per cent of the 
companies report that their business idea was developed independently, while 
a smaller share, 29 per cent, report that the idea was developed in other 
companies or institutions. Ten per cent of the firms were established in 
collaboration with other firms or organisations. 
A significant share of the founders (75 per cent %) previously occupied 
positions in other firms, either as managers (33%) or in non-managerial 
positions (42%). Among the remaining founders, only twelve per cent were 
employed in the university and R&D sector, while the rest were either 
unemployed or students. 
It is important to note that the founders were asked to provide infor-
mation about what they were doing immediately prior to the start-up. When 
asked about their general background, the share of founders with a back-
ground in R&D increased to 26 per cent, while the most significant group in 
this case turned out to have a background in marketing (50 %); 29 per cent 
had a management background; and 28 per cent had a background in pro-
duction. Since a team rather than an individual entrepreneur starts many of 
the companies, different backgrounds may be combined, and the percentages 
add up to significantly more than a hundred. 
 
Table 5.4: Development of the business idea. 
Development of the Business Idea Oslo Trondheim Total 
- Independent 57.5 54.3 56.5 
- In another company or institution 28.8 11.4 23.5 
- In collaboration with another company 10.0 31.4 16.5 
- Other 3.8 2.9 3.5 
Total 
(N) 
100.0 
(80) 
100.0 
(35) 
100.0 
(115) 
 
Table 5.5: The role of the main founder before start-up. 
Role of the main founder before start-up %
 - Unemployed 7.7
 - Student 3.4
 - University/R&D 12.0
 - Employed (not manager) in another company 41.9
 - Manager of another  company 33.3
 - No information 6.0
Total 
(N) 
100.0
(117)
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There are two aspects that need to be commented on. First, a fairly large 
number of the companies report that their business idea was developed in-
dependent of other organisations; thus just a small share of the start-ups may 
be regarded as spin-outs from existing organisations. Instances of spin-outs, 
in the sense that they grew out of an active incubator organisation, are fairly 
modest since less than a fourth of the companies report this kind of process. 
Another issue of special interest, is the role of universities and R&D in-
stitutions as incubators of new firms, and the extent to which one can talk 
about direct spin-outs from these institutions. In the literature on cluster 
evolution, this is regarded as a very important mechanism (Keeble and Wil-
kinson 2000, Segal Quince Wicksteed 1990 and 2000). According to our data, 
links to these institutions are rather weak. Among those reporting that their 
business idea was developed in another organisation, the vast majority specify 
that the idea was developed in another firm, mostly larger companies, while 
only a few cases report that the incubator organisation was a university or 
R&D-institution. As a matter of fact, only eleven companies (9%) report 
being developed in the context of a university, a science park or research 
institute. 
Based on these findings, one may question whether there is a relationship 
between Norwegian academic institutions and the business community; 
obviously, the findings do not indicate a very impressive link. However, it is 
important to have a differentiated perspective on this. One thing is a direct 
link in terms of direct spin-outs of new firms from academic institutions; 
another is the total influence or contact pattern, which may prove to be 
something much more substantial when one takes into account the total 
number of links between academic institutions and new firms. This may be 
discussed along two dimensions. 
First, there may be indirect links. Founders may have a background from 
an academic institution, even though it has not directly served as an incubator 
organisation. In the survey, twelve per cent of the companies reported that 
their founders were employed in an academic institution prior to start-up.  
When asked about the general background of their founders, as many as 26 
per cent reported that at least one of their founders had an R&D back-
ground. 
Second, links to academic institutions may be even more indirect as the 
commercialisation of academic knowledge may go through several stages of 
firm formation and processes of sequential entrepreneurship, as is clearly 
demonstrated in the case of Oslonett (discussed in previous sections of this 
chapter). 
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Third, other links between academic institutions and the business com-
munity may be provided through the employment of former students, or by 
different forms of informal contact. Thus, it is not easy to make a total as-
sessment of the interface between the academic institutions and the business 
community. 
However, this should not be an excuse for not analysing the opportunities 
for improving relationships and taking more advantage of the potential for 
more spin-off firms (RITTS 2000).  
To follow up on different aspects of evolutionary processes, the firms 
were asked to what extent they had been involved in, or contributed to, dif-
ferent types of processes. Data in Table 5.6 show that diverse processes 
have been at work. More than twenty per cent have been through a merger 
with another company; the same share have acquired another company par-
tially or fully. As many as 32 per cent have contributed to the start-up a new 
firm, and in 27 per cent of the cases employees have left the firm to start a 
new business.  
The phenomenon of licensing out production rights does not seem to be 
important to these firms, as only 11 per cent report having licensed out pro-
duction rights.  Five per cent have licensed in similar rights. 
Altogether, however, the data indicate that patterns of development are 
complex.  Evolution is diversified and constituted by a number of 
restructuring processes, including: forming new independent organisations, 
spinning out new businesses from existing ones, and restructuring through 
mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Table 5.6: Share of firms reporting different types of evolutionary processes: 
Merged with another company   23.9 
Acquired other companies (partially or fully) 22.2 
Licensed in the right to other production  5.1 
Developed and licensed out production rights  11.1 
Contributed to a new start-up 31.6 
Employees have left to start new business 26.5 
N (117) 
 
5.5 Small firms and innovation 
According to our data, there is a high level of innovative activity amongst the 
firms surveyed. In total, close to 60 per cent of the companies reported 
having organised R&D-activities internally during the past year. A significant 
share of the firms also acquired R&D-services externally. When asked about 
innovative activity, virtually all the firms reported having performed some kind 
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of innovation during the last three years, only seven per cent did not report 
any kind of innovative activity (Table 5.7). Mostly, innovation activities are 
product- and service-oriented. 65 per cent of the firms developed new 
products or services; 70 per cent improved products and services. In total, 
close to 80 per cent of the companies were involved in some kind of product 
and service related innovation. Significant shares were also involved in other 
forms of innovation, among which the application of new software or system 
solutions were most frequently mentioned. Two thirds of the companies have 
applied new software or system solutions. 
 
Table 5.7: Share of firms with R&D-activities and innovation activities (N=117). 
R&D activity last year: (%) 
- Own R&D activity 58 
- Acquired R&D-services 25 
- New products or services 65 
- Improved products or services 70 
- Process innovation 41 
- Innovation in marketing/sales 29 
- New markets 45 
- Applied new technology 44 
- Applied new software or system solutions 67 
 
When analysing the importance of different actors in the innovation 
process, a typical picture is revealed; firms report that key contacts for the 
innovation process are organised along the value chain, with customers and 
suppliers as the most important partners (Figure 5.4). Interestingly, 
competitors are also considered important to the innovation process, implying 
that there are significant contacts and flows of information between firms 
even though they compete in the same market. 
Other groups of actors are considered less important; consultants, 
universities and research institutes, public agencies, banks and other capital 
providers get low scores. However, these scores are based on the averages 
for all firms, and there may be significant variations between different firms 
regarding which actors are important. We have two comments related to this. 
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Figure 5.4: Importance of different actors in the innovation process. 
 
First, it may be asked why universities and R&D institutions score so 
low. As discussed earlier, links between firms and institutions may be indi-
rect, so many firms do not recognise them as being important to the inno-
vation process. However, a small share of the firms, i.e. around 15 per cent, 
report that these institutions are of high or very high importance. Thus, for 
some firms there is close interaction. 
Second, the role of capital providers needs to be addressed. It will be of 
no surprise that banks, in general, are of less importance to the innovation 
process. More interesting is the finding that venture capital as well as private 
investors also score very low. However, it should be kept in mind that these 
actors are generally less involved in start-ups. In fact, the data show that only 
seven and fourteen per cent, respectively, give high or very high importance 
to venture capital or private investors in the innovation process. 
The general conclusion is that all types of actors present in the innovation 
system may be important to innovation processes, but the extent to which 
specific firms collaborate with different actors varies considerably. 
To shed more light on processes of innovation and the role of small firms, 
a factor analysis has been carried out in order to identify a potential structure 
of innovative behaviour among small firms. Based on an analysis of the 
pattern of contacts with different actors in the innovation process, three 
factors were identified, which provides a basis for grouping the firms 
according to their role in the innovation system (Table 5.8). The three groups 
may be identified as 1) the R&D-based innovator, 2) the competition-based 
innovator and 3) the supplier-based innovator. 
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Table 5.8: Factors for identifying different types of innovators 
 Component 
 1 2 3 
Standard Suppliers     0.820 
Specialised Suppliers     0.768 
Customers   0.603 0.316 
Consultants    0.793   
Competitors   0.769 0.241 
Universities/R&D 0.658     
Venture Capital 0.803     
Private Investors 0.771     
Banks 0.389   0.346 
Public Programs  0.650     
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalisation. 
 
In the case of R&D-based innovators, the innovating firms have strong 
links to R&D institutions and obviously work in close interaction with these 
institutions. Interestingly, this group also has close connections to providers of 
risk capital. i.e. venture capital and private investors as well as public 
agencies that provide financial resources. It is likely that this group is oriented 
towards radical innovations which require access to significant financial 
resources. 
The second group comprises competition-oriented innovators, which has 
strong links towards their customers, competitors and consultants; other links 
are of less importance. The third group consists of supplier-based innovators, 
which has strong links towards their suppliers. Interestingly, standard suppli-
ers score slightly higher than specialised suppliers. 
In total these groups of innovators cover different and complementary 
parts of the innovation system. It would be of interest to conduct more re-
search into this area, in order to further develop the typology and obtain more 
detailed insights into the characteristics of these different groups of 
innovators. 
Comparing the data on innovation activities for firms located in Oslo and 
Trondheim, no significant differences are revealed, leading us to the 
conclusion that processes of innovation are similar in the two regions.  Ap-
proximately the same number of firms are involved in the same types of 
innovation activities, and, on average, the importance of different actors turns 
out to be much the same.  
When a factor analysis of the firms is performed separately on the two 
cities, virtually the same types of factors are identified, thus indicating that the 
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typology suggested here is fairly robust. However, this should be further 
investigated by a larger and preferably more detailed data set. 
Although the process of innovation turns out to be virtually the same in 
the two cities, the data reveal significant differences between Trondheim and 
Oslo regarding whether actors of importance to the innovation process are 
located in the city or not. Not surprisingly, firms located in Oslo report that 
significantly higher shares of actors important to the innovation process are 
located in the region. Thus, firms in Oslo have the advantage of local 
competitors, suppliers, customers and different service providers compared to 
their colleagues in Trondheim. There is only one important exception, 
university and R&D institutions; the Trondheim firms report closer links to 
these local institutions than is the case for Oslo. This indicates that, in 
general, the Oslo cluster has a more developed local environment, with the 
exception of links to the university and R&D sector, which seems to be more 
developed in Trondheim. 
 
5.6 Comparisons with Cambridge 
In our survey of Oslo and Trondheim we applied questions similar to those in 
a study conducted in Cambridge. Comparative data is presented in Table 
5.9.38 
In Cambridge, 88 per cent of high-technology SMEs were identified as 
spin-offs or new start-ups. In Oslo and Trondheim 80 per cent of the high-
technology firms were either spin-offs or new start-ups. Compared to Cam-
bridge, the share of spin-outs and new start-ups are slightly less in the Nor-
wegian study. However, the relatively large number of new start-ups and 
spin-outs among the surveyed high-tech firms, both in Cambridge and in 
Norway, implies a considerable diffusion of embodied knowledge in the 
‘incubating’ firms or institutions. 
In Cambridge, 70 per cent of the high-tech firms were founded by en-
trepreneurs who had formerly worked for another company, while 25 per 
cent of the chief founders were employed either by a university or a research 
institution prior to start-up. In the Norwegian study 75 per cent of the 
founders had previously been employed by another firm, while 12 per cent 
had a background from a university or research institute. The role of the 
university as a generator of new business ideas, therefore, seems more 
                                                 
38 The data for the Cambridge region is based on a survey undertaken in 1996 by the ESRC 
Centre for Business Research, referred to here as the CBR survey. The survey covers 50 
technology intensive SMEs, based on a stratified random sample designed to produce a 
representative balance of high-tech firms between manufacturing and services (Keeble et al 
1999). 
 149  
pronounced in Cambridge than in Oslo and Trondheim, but the difference is 
not as great as one might expect, given the focus on Cambridge University as 
a generator of the high-tech milieu in Cambridge.  
 
Table 5.9: Comparison of data for Cambridge and Oslo and Trondheim  
 Cambridge Oslo and Trondheim 
Spin-outs 
  
By another firm  12%  
As a spin-off  32% 23.5% 
As an independent start -up 56% 56.5% 
In collaboration with another 
company or institution 
 16.5% 
Other  3.5% 
Total 100% 100% 
Previous employment of founder prior to start-up 
 
Manager/employee in another 
company 
 
70% 
 
72% 
Employed by university/ research 
laboratory 
 
25% 
 
12% 
Self employed/unemployed/ 
student 
5% 11% 
No information  6% 
Total 100% 101% 
Actors of importance to the innovation process*)  
Customers Important Important 
Standard suppliers Some importance Important 
Competitors Important Important 
Specialised Suppliers Some importance Some importance 
Consultants  Little importance Little importance 
University/Research institutes Important Little importance 
Public agencies n.a. None or little  
Banks n.a. None or little  
Private/informal investors n.a. None or little  
Venture Capital n.a. None or little  
Location of actors of importance in the innovation process 
 
 Main actors located in 
the rest of the UK. 
Among those located 
in the Cambridge 
region, the University 
and customers most 
often mentioned as 
important. 
Oslo: main actors in 
the region.  
Trondheim: main 
actors of importance 
located nationally.  
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*) The questions asked in the Oslo/Trondheim study are not exactly comparable to the Cam-
bridge study. The rating of the factors of importance in the Cambridge region is based on our 
judgement. 
 
 However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, these results may under-
estimate the importance of the universities. Many firms may have indirect 
links to a university, since first generation spin-outs may serve as incubators 
for a second generation of spin-outs etc. This seems to be the case in 
Cambridge; the Norwegian case of Oslonett also indicates a similar pattern.  
In Cambridge, the University has also been of importance in cases where 
the parent companies have not spun-out of the University, as the University 
has constituted a basic reason for the organisation concerned to stay in the 
Cambridge region (Segal Quince Wicksteed 1985). We can identify this 
effect to a lesser extent in Oslo and Trondheim. 
The role of different actors in the innovation process are similar in 
Cambridge and Oslo/Trondheim. In general it is relationships with customers 
and suppliers together with competitors that are the most important, although 
there are some minor differences. In the Cambridge survey, universities are 
noted as being important to the innovation process, while this is not the case 
in Norway, pointing to the different role of the university in Cambridge versus 
Oslo and Trondheim. 
The two studies vary regarding the location of the most important ex-
ternal sources for the innovation process. In Cambridge a higher proportion 
of important firms or institutions are located in the rest of UK or globally, 
than in the Cambridge region. Among the sources rated as important; 
university resources are reported to be located within the Cambridge region. 
But also in this case, universities located elsewhere in the UK were often of 
greater importance than those located in Cambridge. 
Therefore, national and global innovation networks are more important 
than local networks in the case of Cambridge. In the study of the Norwegian 
high-tech SMEs, the results differ between Oslo and Trondheim. In Trond-
heim national or international actors are more important than regional actors 
(with the exception of the university and R&D institutions). In Oslo, on the 
other hand, the most important actors in the innovation process were located 
in the local region. 
 
5.7 Summary 
According to current theory on innovation systems and cluster evolution, 
knowledge is the most important resource in the economy, and learning is the 
most important process (Lundvall 1992). In line with this, processes of 
collective learning are essential for cluster evolution (Capello 1999, Lawson 
and Lorenz 1999; Longhi 1999; Longhi and Keeble 2000; Keeble and Wil-
kinson 1999), i.e. there are processes going on in which different actors in 
various ways contribute to learning, for instance through entrepreneurial and 
innovative activities. 
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The formation of new firms provides a significant contribution to pro-
cesses of evolution. Generally, and at any time, a large number of entrepre-
neurs introduce new businesses. Each entrance of a new firm, and each step 
of development in an existing firm, may be regarded as a contribution to the 
evolution of the system as a whole. From this perspective each new step may 
be regarded as based on previous events and adding new knowledge to the 
system. 
The role of small high-tech firms is essential to these processes. Based 
on a static view, small firms on average account for about fifty per cent of all 
high-technology employment in Norway, but sectoral differences are 
significant. Based on a dynamic view, small firms show a diversified pattern, 
and contribute to evolution in different ways; partly through independent 
start-ups or spin-outs from other firms or organisations; partly through being 
part of the process of restructuring, for instance in the case of mergers and 
acquisitions. In this way small firms contribute to the development of the 
capitalistic system, as described among others by Bahrami and Evans (1995) 
and Metcalfe (2000). 
Small high-tech firms are highly innovative, and virtually all of the firms 
that participated in the survey were involved in some kind of innovative 
activity. Most of them were product-oriented in their innovation, but a 
significant number were also involved in process innovation, market 
innovation or the implementation of new technology or systems solutions. 
Based on the perspective of collective learning, the nature of ‘success’ . 
may be reflected on. While the common understanding of success is often 
related to profit and growth at the firm level, the perspective of cluster 
evolution leads to a focus on ‘performance’ and ‘success’ at an aggregate 
level. i.e. it is the development of the business community as a whole that is 
of interest. From this perspective, ‘failures’ at the individual level in terms of 
closures and bankruptcies may provide as important a contribution to the 
process of collective learning as ‘success’ at the individual level. The point is 
to what extent mechanisms in the local economy facilitate sharing of 
knowledge and experiences, and in this way create a process of collective 
learning. 
Given that the capitalist system is not working as a predictable me-
chanical clock, but is highly unpredictable (Metcalfe 2000), the role of small 
firms (as well as larger firms, although they may take somewhat different 
approaches) is to take risks, test out new ideas, develop new knowledge and 
thereby contribute to processes of learning. It is about a process of trial and 
error, about making experiments in which the outcome is unpredictable. This 
calls for the ability to adapt and be flexible. A characteristic feature of the 
system is that of flexibility at the system level, from which evolution may be 
regarded as a constant process of recycling and transfer of resources 
between different business concepts. ‘The short life cycle of many high-
technology firms may be helpful for sustaining the long-term innovative 
capability’ (Bahrami and Evans 1995). 
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6 Cluster Evolution and Policy 
Possibly the biggest risk in cluster analyses and cluster policies is 
that policy makers and researchers tend to focus on ‘high-tech’ 
clusters and the obvious success stories that abound. This is a 
major risk as it is usually forgotten that the rise of such clusters in 
the first place is the result of a combination of an often unique mix 
of mostly strongly localised factor conditions and development 
trajectories built up over decades that cannot be replicated 
overnight. The mechanisms and experience built up in clusters - no 
matter whether these are labelled as high-, medium- or low-tech - 
are valuable capacities. As long as clusters have built-in mecha-
nisms to renew and re-invent themselves over time, this is a very 
precious asset. Therefore, characterising clusters as low- or 
medium-tech might be misleading. Hauknes ... shows how know-
ledge-intensive a cluster like agro-food has become; the more so if 
one does not overlook the non-technological knowledge involved in 
innovation. 
(Hertog, Bergman and Charles 2000:414) 
6.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters we have analysed cluster evolution. Through different 
cases we have demonstrated how diverse patterns of evolution may be. One 
aspect of this diversity is the role of policy in cluster evolution. An important 
point of departure for our discussion, is that there is no simple recipe for 
‘successful’ cluster policies, and clearly no ‘formula’ for creating a cluster 
from scratch by political measures. As indicated earlier in the report, no 
theory can explain why clusters emerge in some areas and not in others, but 
based on empirical studies of clusters that are evolving, a lot of knowledge 
has been developed on what characterises different clusters and what drives 
this evolution. 
A cluster almost by definition represents some kind of success story, and 
most analyses of clusters have focused on the most successful cases.  
However, one should not expect that copying policy strategies that have been 
successful in one place will lead to similar success in another region. 
Development in a particular area is often based on long traditions and a 
unique mix of mostly localised factors (Hertog, Bergman and Charles 2000, 
cf. quote above). Thus, development in one place cannot be replicated else-
where. Rather than formulating copy-cat strategies, policy makers should 
focus strategy on the specific qualities of the cluster in question, and design 
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strategies for developing competitive advantage based on uniqueness (Porter 
1998). 
Keeping this reservation in mind, there is a lot to learn from policy 
applied elsewhere.  As discussed earlier in this report, even though the role of 
different factors may vary, the same types of factors are at work. Likewise, 
similar policy measures have been applied in diverse environments. 
The purpose of this chapter is first to summarise theory in the field of 
cluster policy and then to summarise the role of policy in the three cases of 
Cambridge, Dublin and Sophia Antipolis. Based on this, and on observations 
of the situation in Oslo and Trondheim, policy issues related to the future 
development of the two Norwegian cities will be discussed.  
 
6.2 The role of policy in cluster evolution 
The main role of policy is not to ‘create’ clusters, but to facilitate the evolu-
tion of clusters by supporting the basic mechanisms of cluster evolution, and 
intervene, if possible, in fields where mechanisms are not working properly. 
This means that it is the specific situation in each case that is the basis for 
strategy formulation and the design of specific policy measures. It is of cru-
cial importance that these processes are developed in close interaction with 
local authorities and the key actors of the cluster. 
As Porter has been very influential to our understanding of clusters, his 
policy framework may serve as a natural point of departure for this discus-
sion. According to Porter (1998), an understanding of industrial development 
in terms of cluster dynamics provides a basis for redefining the roles of 
governments at the national as well as local level. Porter proposes a policy 
framework based on his cluster model, illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
The main idea underlying Porter’s framework is that policy may have a 
role in supporting or facilitating cluster upgrading by influencing mechanisms 
of importance to the cluster, for instance by supporting the development of 
cluster specific infrastructures or institutions, and services crucial to the 
functioning of the cluster as a whole. 
Combining Porter’s ideas with recent approaches based on innovation 
systems, the OECD has developed different frameworks in a number of 
studies (Remøe 2000). One important approach used is to identify systemic 
and market failures and implement measures to compensate for these failures 
and inefficiencies, as suggested in the framework presented in Table 6.1. 
Although structured differently, the table shows many similarities between 
the OECD framework and Porter’s framework above, for instance in the 
focus on developing adequate institutions for improving the knowledge base, 
and strategies for networking and improving interaction between different 
actors. 
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Figure 6.1: Porter’s framework for analysing government influences on cluster up-
grading (Porter 1998:251) 
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Table 6.1: OECD framework for responding to systemic and market failures 
Systemic and market failures Policy response 
Inefficient functioning of markets Competition policy and regulatory reform 
Informational failures Technology foresight 
Strategic market information and strategic cluster 
studies 
Limited interaction between actors 
in innovation systems 
Broker and networking agencies and schemes 
Provision of platforms for constructive dialogue 
Facilitating co-operation in networks (cluster 
development schemes) 
Institutional mismatches between 
(public) knowledge infrastructure 
and market needs 
Joint industry-research centres of excellence 
Facilitating joint industry-research co-operation 
Human capital development 
Technology transfer programmes 
Missing demanding customer Public procurement policy 
Government failure Privatisation 
Rationalise business 
Horizontal policy making 
Public consultancy 
Reduce government interference 
Source: Remøe 2000. 
 
In line with this framework, a number of other authors have also dis-
cussed policy issues, but more specifically related to cluster evolution and 
how policy measures affect mechanisms of evolution (cf. for instance Garn-
sey 1998, Keeble and Wilkinson 1999 and 2000, Kuijper and van den Stappen 
1999). Although it is not possible to determine conclusive growth mechanisms 
of high-tech clusters, the success of a particular cluster is context specific, 
the following factors are often regarded as important (Saxenian, 1989): 
· A research university  
· Supply of venture capital 
· Public investment devoted to research and procurement 
· A quality of life that will attract and retain footloose engineers 
and scientists 
· The absence of trade unions 
· A science park 
· Adequate infrastructure. 
In her study of the high-tech milieus of Oxford and Cambridge, Garnsey 
(1998) refers to an almost identical list of factors which are commonly 
thought to stimulate the growth of high-technology based firms. 
According to Garnsey’s list, public policies can influence high-technology 
development in various ways, both through direct public funding of 
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universities and science parks and through more indirect measures like 
regulations and tax measures. 
The role of venture capital has received substantial interest as a factor of 
importance for the growth of high-tech firms. The existence of market failure 
in the provision of risk capital, due to asymmetric information, has been 
discussed in economic literature for a long time. In particular, this is related to 
start-ups, as the entrepreneurs’ limited tangible assets and high risk reduce 
their opportunity for collateral-based lending from banks (Murray 1998). 
Therefore, venture capital is an important source of financing for early stage 
projects with high risks and potential for substantial returns. 
Clearly, public policies can play a role in providing venture capital through 
direct funding or through specific tax measures that stimulate more private 
investment in venture capital. However, in studies of high-tech regions, 
venture capital does not seem to be a sufficient factor in itself for stimulating 
high-tech development. The success of venture capital provision also depends 
on complementary, techno-commercial networks to assist the subsequent 
development of new firms (Murray, 1998). Saxenian (1989) has also 
discussed this, and points to differences in the development of the venture 
capital industry in Britain and USA. In Britain, venture capital is a result of  
government tax legislation, while in the US, the venture capital industry grew 
from a base of successful entrepreneurs with first hand experience in regions 
like Silicon Valley. Therefore, they were able to provide start-ups with 
invaluable advice and access to networks and strategic resources. 
Institutional investors, on the other hand, tend to maintain an arm’s length 
relationship with young entrepreneurs. Many of them are in the venture 
capital business primarily for tax advantages, and are only interested in 
supplying firms with money; not with ideas, guidance, industry contact or 
managerial resources. 
Another important strategy to stimulate cluster evolution, is to set up 
science parks. Science parks are perceived to be a key factor in the produc-
tion and diffusion of new knowledge, and serve as an important link between 
industry and academia. Such institutions provide great political visibility, but 
are of less value in the absence of mechanisms to ensure the diffusion and 
commercialisation of research findings. Thus, the effectiveness of science 
parks has in some cases been questioned (Saxenian1989, Oakey 1999). 
The need for a better understanding of how knowledge is shared and 
diffused in the economy, is discussed by Garnsey (1998) and Keeble and 
Wilkinson (2000). Given the complexity of the innovation process, they 
emphasize that how knowledge is shared and diffused depends on both in-
stitutionalised and cultural factors. In order to facilitate development in a 
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region, they argue, it is necessary to undertake a thorough mapping of the 
linkages between various actors and institutions to get an understanding of 
the innovation system and bottlenecks in the system. Furthermore, according 
to Garnsey (1998), it is necessary to understand how the system is animated 
by key agents, like entrepreneurs, who form productive enterprises that 
develop interdependent activities in conjunction with other local institutions. 
Individuals appear to be the key source of learning as they move from unit to 
unit of the system and exchange information and expertise. But also new 
spin-offs from universities and from other firms seem to be an important 
source of diffusion of knowledge (Keeble and Wilkinson 1999). 
Based on her studies of Cambridge, Sophia Antipolis and Silicon Valley, 
Garnsey (1998) points to the importance of diverse investment sources as 
being more likely to stimulate sustained expansion in new areas and industries 
than reliance on one major source of investment. Furthermore, it is important 
to identify and facilitate local ‘champions’, i.e. individuals with a strong 
influence on high-tech development; and to adjust policies to local needs. 
In a comparative study of the growth of regional clusters of high-tech-
nology firms in Cambridge, Oxford, Grenoble, Sophia Antipolis, Munich and 
Gothenburg, Keeble and Wilkinson (2000) have pointed to a growing need to 
shape the knowledge infrastructure and channels of technology transfer to 
meet changing requirements. This requires a reduction of supply side 
constraints on the flow of information and knowledge, and an increase in the 
capabilities and motivation of SMEs to absorb and use effectively new 
science and technology. A complementary development is the need to foster 
closer relations between firms to encourage technology diffusion and 
collective learning. Although this activity can and does occur without policy 
intervention, the case studies suggest that policy has an important part to play 
in promoting partnerships and creating channels for learning. Their research 
also suggests that policies need a locality and industry specific orientation if 
they are to contribute to building the relationships of trust and confidence 
essential for effective networking. 
Based on their results, the following areas for policy development are 
suggested (Keeble and Wilkinson 2000): 
· Diffusion of knowledge from the science and technology base, for in-
stance by reducing barriers between industry and university by 
supporting technology consultants helping small firms to utilise 
knowledge from the university 
· Support networking and collective learning processes by for instance 
supporting research collaboration between local SMEs 
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· Business support for high-technology SMEs, for instance through 
education and training facilities targeted at their specific needs and 
development 
· Policies targeted to the specific needs on the regional level in order to 
develop policies targeting the specific challenges in each region. 
Both Garnsey (1998) and Keeble and Wilkinson (2000) emphasize the 
danger of lock in effects caused by strengthening local and regional networks 
and collective learning. Innovation trends can be self-reinforcing, but they can 
also be restraining, or can set off counteracting forces. In stimulating high-
tech development, it is therefore necessary to ensure that firms build national 
and international networks.  
The strategies and incentives discussed above have been influential 
among policymakers, and in policy development it has often been implied that 
once these prerequisites are met, innovation and growth will follow. It seems, 
however, clear that high-tech development does not automatically occur once 
these factors are in place. The case of the different patterns of development 
in Oxford and Cambridge is just one example that high-technology industry 
does not automatically develop around a well-known research university 
(Lawton Smith and Garnsey 1998). 
In general, it may be summarised that studies of high-tech regions in 
Europe do not provide us with a straightforward recipe for generating dy-
namic high-tech regions. Many of the same factors are important, but how 
these factors combine, and which factors are the most important driving 
forces vary both between regions and over time within the same region. 
 
6.3 Policy approaches in Cambridge, Dublin and Sophia 
Antipolis 
In chapter three we reviewed the evolution of high-technology clusters in  
Cambridge, Dublin and Sophia Antipolis.  The role of different actors was 
also summarised (cf. Table 3.7). These cities’ case histories confirm what 
has been emphasised repeatedly in this report; that development in each 
place is unique and depends on the specific mix of preconditions and actors 
operating in the milieu. This also applies to policy approaches. When the 
three places are compared, we find great differences in the importance of 
policy at the local as well as the national level.  The role of specific policy 
measures varies significantly as well. 
In chapter three the role of policy in the three case was only briefly 
mentioned. In this section we will go into more detail and discuss the role and 
importance of different policy measures. In order to facilitate this discussion , 
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we have made an overview of the most important growth generating factors 
and how these have been influenced by policy measures in Table 6.1. 
In Cambridge, public policy has been of less importance in terms of direct 
influence on development. Instead development has been characterised by 
indigenous resources and their dynamics. In particular, the role of Cambridge 
University has been important, both as an attractive knowledge base that has 
served to attract a number of leading companies and scientists to the area, as 
well as an important source of spin-offs of new firms and the development of 
institutions to facilitate the development of high-technology firms. 
However, behind this development one can identify the impact of national 
policies, for instance in terms of a well-developed university structure, and 
national strategies for R&D, which have been important as a basis for 
current development. But the clue to this development has been local actors 
and their ability to take initiatives and organise adequate activities and in-
stitutions at the local level. 
Local planning authorities have also played an important role, initially by 
representing a barrier to development, and later by allocating more land for 
industrial purposes, but still with significant restrictions. However, restrictive 
planning policies have been an important precondition in order to retain the 
qualities of the Cambridge area that make this area such an attractive place 
to live. 
In Dublin, the growth of the ICT cluster may mainly be explained by the 
large number of international companies which have found Ireland an 
attractive location for specific types of industrial activity. However, this 
would probably not have happened unless it had been stimulated by national 
policy, which, by combining significant tax incentives and a high level of 
investment in physical infrastructure and human capital, succeeded in making 
the country attractive as a location for high tech industrial activity. EU 
membership and substantial EU funding have been important preconditions. 
In recent years, there has been a significant shift in policy in order to increase 
indigenous development and innovation. 
The development of the high-tech cluster in Sophia Antipolis is an ex-
ample of a technology policy initiated by the state with an intended regional 
goal. Through strict planning regulations and by relocating prestigious state 
research institutes, an attractive infrastructure for a high-tech milieu has 
developed. However, this development could not have taken place without 
local initiatives; in this case one individual, a community entrepreneur, has 
played a crucial role. Furthermore, the attractive location of the area has 
been important, not least because a well developed infrastructure (airport) 
serves the region. 
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In all three cases, public policy has played a role, although this role has 
been weaker in Cambridge. It is, however, important to keep in mind that 
successful development in these regions has also depended on other factors. 
It is for instance less likely that the French technopole strategy would have 
been successful if implemented in the UK or Ireland. 
As Table 6.1 shows, direct policy interventions are similar in the three 
regions, in the sense that there are many similar strategies and programs that 
have been implemented. However, the mix of elements and the degree to 
which central and local authorities have been directly involved, has varied. It 
is, for instance, interesting to note that ‘soft’ infrastructure like networks, 
business clubs and other arenas in which entrepreneurs and business people 
can meet, are less developed in Dublin. 
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Table 6.1: The role of policy in Cambridge, Dublin and Sophia Antipolis. 
Main factors of growth Policy measures Policy roles and impacts 
Cambridge   
· Cambridge University and its 
scientific quality 
· Cambridge University Science 
Parks 
· Spin-offs from the University 
· Spin-offs from large firms 
· Key entrepreneurs 
· Culture for innovation 
· Attractive location and  
       proximity to London 
Funds: No initiatives only directed towards high-tech firms, but Cambridge firms can obtain support  
       for R&D and soft investments through national and European funds 
 Facilitating agencies and organisations: Some organisations like the Business Link programme pro-        
vide one stop shop for business support and counselling. A range of business clubs provide 
opportunities for informal discussions and networks.-  
Technology transfer organisations: Industry and liaison office promotes and reinforces contacts 
between Cambridge University and industry.  
Science parks/innovation centres: Cambridge Science Park and St Johns Innovation centre have been 
important. Both initiated by Cambridge University Colleges.  
Venture Capital: Various seed capital funds, venture funds and a networks of business angels.  
Planning/infrastructure: Cambridge is restricted to tight planning controls that restrict further 
development. 
Public policy is perceived to have little 
direct importance for the development 
of the high-tech cluster in Cambridge. 
 
Public sector has played an important 
indirect role as financiers of the uni-
versity and also as founder of a CAD 
centre (computer aided design) 
Dublin   
· EU membership 
· Human capital 
· Multinational companies 
· Tax incentive 
· Infrastructure 
· Attractive location inside EU 
for mainly US based compa-
nies 
Tax incentives. Favourable tax schemes in order to attract multinational companies, later incentives 
for private investments in new start-ups 
Funds: Funding is available through European, national and regional sources. Special initiative to 
support high potential start-ups 
Facilitating agencies and organisations: Enterprise Ireland (main offices and regional offices) and 
local development agencies (Enterprise boards), several industrial parks. 
Technology transfer organisations: Programs in advanced technology (PAT), University Industry 
Programmes  
Innovation centres: Several small innovation centres developed over the last few years 
Planning/infrastructure. Substantial investments in telecommunication and transport infrastructure, 
partly financed by EU funds. 
Public policy has played an important 
role in attracting MNE to Ireland. Some 
evidence of increased indigenous 
development of high-tech industries.  
General positive political environment 
towards business development. 
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Sophia Antipolis   
· Attractive location 
· Science park 
· Key community entrepreneur 
· International companies 
· Large national companies 
· National research institutes 
· Infrastructure, proximity to 
Nice International Airport 
 
Funds: Funds for SMEs available through European, national and regional sources. Few direct ini-
tiatives to high-technology firms. Support is given to research and innovation 
Facilitating agencies and organisations: Chambre de Commerce de la Cote D’Azur was established 
in 1996 to help start-ups with access to the various types of public funding. Local business 
clubs 
Science park: International science park of Sophia Antipolis – established in order to provide attrac-
tive location of high-tech firms (part of the French technopolis programme) 
Planning/infrastructure: Partly a greenfield site developed under strict planning regulations in order 
to create an attractive international environment for high-tech firms 
Decentralisation: Larger state owned companies and national research institutes have established 
research departments in the Sophia Antipolis science park 
Public policy has been very important; 
based on a combination of centrally 
based technopole strategy and local 
planning initiatives to design a large 
science park. 
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6.4 The role of policy in the cases of Oslo and Trondheim 
Not surprisingly, many of the same policy elements as in the previous cases 
have been of importance in facilitating high-tech development in Oslo and 
Trondheim. 
The policy field most important to development, is in the area of research 
and higher education. To take the latter first, universities and other institutions 
of higher education have played pivotal roles in Oslo as well as Trondheim: in 
Trondheim, the University of Science and Technology; in Oslo primarily the 
University of Oslo. R&D policy has also been important, particularly in the 
case of Oslo where most of the major national research institutions are 
localised. As discussed in the presentation of Oslo, these institutions have 
deliberately been concentrated in the three core areas of Gaustadbekkdalen, 
Kjeller and Ås. Trondheim has also been favoured through national research 
policies, in particular through the development of SINTEF which has worked 
in close interaction with the University of Science and Technology. 
National policy has also played a major role in the next step of devel-
opment, i.e. the evolution of various institutions and programs for commer-
cialisation and technology transfer. Virtually all funding of science parks, 
innovation centres and other schemes is obtained directly or indirectly from 
the central government. Local and regional authorities have played minor 
roles. Science parks, however, have been developed in cooperation between 
local and regional government and higher education institutions, research 
institutions and private actors. The state has played a role through SIVA. 
As Norwegian policy measures are in line with what has been imple-
mented other places, an explanation for the relatively poor performance of 
Norwegian high-technology industries may not be found in the policy in-
struments per se, but rather in the strength and priorities given to these policy 
fields. Over the last few decades, the main driving force in the Norwegian 
economy has been the oil sector, and the main policy focus has also been on 
this sector. As briefly commented on in the cases of Oslo and Trondheim, 
this development has partly diverted R&D focus from other industrial sectors, 
in particular the high-tech sectors. Furthermore, expansion in the oil sector 
has had a profound impact on the rest of the economy, and contributed to 
making it less competitive internationally. 
Although the main causal relationships are not straightforward, the 
situation around policy and high-technology industrial development in Norway 
may be characterised by the following three tendencies; 1) policy measures 
have been implemented later and to a lesser extent than in the leading 
European clusters, 2) the industrial environment has turned out to be less 
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dynamic and less likely to generate synergies in interaction with the insti-
tutional structure, and 3) the main focus of Norwegian industrial policy has 
been on rural areas, rather than growing urban areas. 
Regarding the first point, although Oslo and Trondheim now have a rich 
flora of institutions for research and mediation between R&D and industry, 
initiatives for developing this structure were taken fairly late, compared to 
other places. For instance, while visions and plans for Sophia Antipolis were 
developed around 1970, and the Cambridge Science Parks were established 
in 1974, initiatives for the predecessors of Oslo Science Park were not taken 
until 1985, and the Park was first in place in 1990. Similarly, SINVENT in 
Trondheim was not started until 1985. Furthermore, most of the other 
initiatives for setting up innovation centres and incubators and related 
programs for commercialisation, were taken during the late 1990s. Also, 
awareness of the vital role of risk capital developed late, and institutions for 
providing risk capital were not in place until the second half of the 1990s. 
There is still a long way to go before an adequate financial infrastructure is in 
a position to provide, in particular, seed money and early stage risk capital. 
Regarding the second point, there is a general problem of little industrial 
dynamism and less entrepreneurial capacity in Norwegian high-tech 
industries. In particular, Trondheim has suffered from a poor industrial en-
vironment around the academic institutions, and there has been less synergy 
due to this. Multinational companies are virtually absent in Trondheim, and 
there are relatively few large national companies. Opportunities for creating 
spin-off firms have been limited.  
The situation in Oslo may be characterized in similar terms, although the 
industrial environment is much richer. Multinational and large national 
companies are present in the capital city, but as discussed earlier, their 
activities are biased towards service and distribution, rather than R&D.    
In general, neither Trondheim nor Oslo seems to be an attractive location 
for international companies to set up R&D related activities in order to take 
advantage of the local knowledge base.39 With the exception of the IT 
Fornebu project, this problem has hardly been addressed in the political 
arena.40  
                                                 
39 According to a survey from 2001, Oslo is ranked at the bottom of a list of 50 European 
cities as the least attractive city for investments. Source: Dagens Næringsliv 28 Sept 2001. 
The ranking was determined through an analysis based on statistical indicators, by Jones Lang 
LaSalles. The first cities on the list were Paris, Dublin, Helsinki and London.  
40 IT Fornebu is discussed in the final sections of this chapter. 
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The third point reflects a traditional focus on rural development in 
Norway. The purpose of policies implemented has been to slow down the 
growth of the cities in an attempt to stop the flow of people from the coun-
tryside into the larger cities, rather than stimulating further growth in urban 
areas. An illustration of this is, for instance, that the national incubator pro-
gramme first and foremost is an incentive to develop rural economic activity.  
6.5 High-tech firms and the role of policy 
We will now turn to the issue of how high-tech firms perceive the importance 
of different factors relevant to policy. The data presented in the following are 
obtained from the survey presented in chapter 5. First, we will look at how 
firms assess the importance of other local actors.  Data are compared for 
firms located in Oslo and Trondheim, cf. Figure 6.1. 
As illustrated in the figure, customers are by far the most important local 
actors to be in contact with, followed by suppliers, business colleagues, 
businesses in related industries and universities and R&D institutions. It 
should be noticed that the data reflect local contacts, i.e. actors located in the 
region with whom it is important to have contact. On the whole, firms in Oslo 
perceive local contacts as more important than do firms in Trondheim, 
probably because the local business environment in Oslo is much richer than 
in Trondheim. However, there is one important exception to this, i.e. 
university contacts. A significantly higher share of high-tech firms in 
Trondheim regard the University as an important local actor than do their 
counterparts in Oslo. This may reflect the fact that the University in Trond-
heim has traditionally had strong links with SINTEF, and that a significant 
number of high-tech firms in Trondheim started as spin-offs from SINTEF or 
the University.  
Regarding policy implications, it should be noted that local contact with 
venture capital, private investors, public agencies and local authorities is 
regarded as relatively less important. This may be an indication that these 
actors do not play an important role in the local environment. 
Concerning bottlenecks to future development, access to highly educated 
labour is ranked first (Figure 6.2). More than 50 per cent of all companies 
report that a lack of highly educated labour will be the most important barrier 
to future development. 
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Figure 6.1: Importance of local actors for high-tech firms in Oslo and Trondheim 
1= Not important, 4= Very important  
 
 
Given the importance of employees with higher education, this result is 
not very surprising. In this context, however, it is noteworthy that access to 
R&D services is not regarded as an important bottleneck. This might, of 
course, imply that the firms in question regard the R&D services available as 
sufficient for their future development. Many high-tech firms are also part of 
international networks, and are therefore not dependent on local R&D 
services. This result may also imply that many high-tech firms do not take 
advantage of R&D services in general. 
The second most important factor is risk capital. Approximately 25 percent of 
the firms surveyed think that a lack of risk capital will be a hindrance to 
future development. The insignificance given to the importance of contacts 
with local capital providers (cf. Figure 6.1), may be surprising. However, it 
may also be understood as an indicator that the venture capital function is not 
well developed in Norway 
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Figure 6.2 Perceived bottleneck to future development for high-tech firms in Oslo 
and Trondheim 
 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that hard infrastructure is given more em-
phasis for future development than soft infrastructure. 15 per cent of the 
companies have listed lack of public support as a bottleneck to future de-
velopment. 
In order to develop a further understanding of the importance of various 
factors, the firms surveyed were asked what factors they would consider as 
important if they were to relocate. As shown in Figure 6.3, telecommunica-
tions are regarded as the most important factor, while proximity to important 
customers and access to cheap premises were the second and third most 
important factors. Therefore, it seems like a well-developed infrastructure is 
more important than access to innovation resources such as universities and 
R&D institutions. 
It is also interesting to note the importance of cheap premises. This may 
be explained by the fact that many of the firms are new and cannot afford 
expensive facilities. However, in terms of policy implications, it is interesting 
that high-tech firms do not perceive location in an incubator as important. 
On the whole, our results show little variation between firms in Oslo and 
Trondheim, however, the importance of being part of a dynamic milieu is 
ranked as more important to the Trondheim firms than their counterparts in 
Oslo. This may reflect that more firms in Oslo already regard themselves as 
part of a dynamic milieu than do firms in Trondheim. 
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When considering these results, it is important to keep in mind that only 
28 percent of the firms surveyed had concrete relocation plans. Among 
these, a significant majority planned to move within the region, while only a 
fraction were considering moving abroad. 
Figure 6.3: Factors of importance if relocating 
1 = not important, 4= very important 
 
One of the striking results from the survey is the firms’ indication that 
universities and R&D institutions are of little importance to their develop-
ment. The majority do not regard these institutions as important local part-
ners; they are not seen as bottlenecks for future development; and they are 
not considered in the case of relocation. The university is, however, important 
as provider of qualified graduates to high-tech firms, an issue left unexamined 
by this study. 
It may, then, be queried whether these kinds of institutions are less im-
portant to the evolution of high-technology clusters in Norway than various 
theoretical and empirical studies of high-tech growth and development sug-
gest. In both Cambridge and Sophia Antipolis the importance of the know-
ledge infrastructure as a driver of growth is generally acknowledged.  How-
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ever, in both Cambridge and Sophia Antipolis other factors such as key en-
trepreneurs and an attractive location were given importance. In Cambridge 
the development of local networks and a collective regional learning capacity 
(Keeble et al 1998) have been additional growth factors. In Dublin, on the 
other hand, universities and research institutes are not regarded as important 
for the growth of high-tech firms, illustrating the possibilities of developing 
high-tech industry without strong links to university and research institutes. 
As discussed in chapter three, this has had important implications for the 
structure of the high-tech industry in Dublin; the long-term sustainability of 
the Irish strategy is uncertain. 
In the case of Oslo and Trondheim, the survey results reflect the domi-
nant structure of high-tech industries. As discussed earlier in this report, this 
structure does not include a large number of R&D-based businesses, but 
rather companies within distribution, consultancy and data processing.  These 
types of firms do not require close contact with universities or research 
institutes. 
Although the inherent structural weakness of high-tech firms in Norway 
is generally recognised, the data examined in this study may underestimate 
the extent to which there are contacts or links between industry and the 
university and R&D sector in general. We have four observations to make 
regarding this. First, knowledge accumulated in research institutions and 
universities may be diffused through spin-offs, and when the spin-offs are 
realised, it may no longer be necessary to maintain contacts. Second, links to 
academic institutions may be even more indirect as the commercialisation of 
academic knowledge may go through several stages of firm formation and 
processes of sequential entrepreneurship, as demonstrated in the Oslonett 
case in Chapter 5. Third, links between academic institutions and the business 
community may be maintained through alumni employed by the firm.  Fourth, 
different forms of informal contact between R&D institutions and industry 
may be upheld through, for instance, personal networks, articles or seminars. 
Thus, it is not easy to make a total assessment of the interface between 
academic institutions and the business community. But this should not be an 
excuse for not searching for greater potential for spin-offs from the academic 
milieus in Oslo and Trondheim. 
The role of risk capital seems important to firms in Oslo and Trondheim, 
even if the results give a mixed picture. Although the lack of risk capital is 
regarded as an important bottleneck for future development, venture 
capitalists are not regarded as important local actors or as a reason for 
relocating. Evidence from the other three regions confirms the relatively 
minor importance of venture capital compared to other factors. In Cambridge 
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the role of previous entrepreneurs as financiers of new start-ups has been of 
some importance, but venture capital is not regarded as the main factor 
behind development in any of the three regions. In terms of policy 
implications, and as discussed in previous sections, the success of venture 
capital is dependent on the ability of the venture capitalists to provide 
additional benefits to the entrepreneurs.  
According to the survey, it is important for high-tech firms in Oslo and 
Trondheim to be part of a dynamic milieu, possibly reflecting the importance 
of the regional collective learning capacity as suggested by theoretical 
approaches. Proximity to the most important actors in the innovation process, 
such as customers and suppliers eases communication and enhances shared 
learning. The importance and advantages of being part of a dynamic milieu is 
also identified as an important factor for the development of the high-tech 
cluster in Cambridge. Through a wide range of business networks and clubs, 
informal discussions are facilitated. Furthermore, the mobility of employees 
and many new start-ups and spin-offs contribute to the transfer and diffusion 
of embedded knowledge in the region (Keeble et al 1999). 
Provision of physical infrastructure is also rated as important for high-
tech firms, which is also confirmed by other studies. In Cambridge and 
Dublin congestion problems are regarded as a threat to further development, 
nevertheless, proximity to airports and major cities is seen as advantageous in 
both Cambridge and Sophia Antipolis. 
 
6.6 Policy implications 
The main impediment to high-tech development in Oslo as well as Trondheim 
is quite simple; it is the absence of leading international industry combined 
with little focus on commercialisation in leading university departments and 
research institutes. Partly, this is the result of a national policy which does not 
focus sufficiently on developing the knowledge base for future industrial 
development.  It is also the result of a weak culture for commercialisation 
and mediation between academia and industry. Furthermore, it is the result of 
a weak industrial culture which has not been able to demonstrate sufficient 
dynamics and legitimise stronger emphasis on high-tech related initiatives and 
priorities. 
Norway lags far behind the other Nordic countries in R&D invest-
ments,41 and is significantly below the OECD average. Admittedly, R&D 
                                                 
41 In 2001, Norway spent 1.6% of GDP on R&D activities, while Sweden spent 4.3%, 
Finland 3.4%, Denmark 2.4% and Iceland 3.0%. 
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policy measures face complicated issues related to operationalisation, yet it 
seems reasonable to conclude that over the last few decades, strengthening 
the knowledge base has not been the primary concern of any Norwegian 
government. Despite acknowledgement of the importance of research for 
industrial development, R&D and innovation budgets have repeatedly been 
among the first budgetary expenditures cut by the Government in attempts to 
balance the budget. The present Government has announced that R&D 
investment in Norway should reach the OECD average by 200542. Thus far, 
the Government has taken interesting initiatives to expand public R&D 
budgets and stimulate private actors to increase their research and innovation 
activities. The Prime Minister has also signalled that an integrated national 
plan for innovation will be put into effect. However, it remains to be seen to 
what extent this will be persistent policy, and not just temporary rhetoric. 
A discussion of policy implications may take place along the following 
lines:  
6) Strengthen the knowledge base 
7) Strengthen the capacity for commercialisation 
8) Develop more research-based industrial activity 
And, as local organisation is crucial for implementing policy, two more points 
should be added: 
9) Develop regional organisation(s) that can facilitate information and 
communication between actors and provide the necessary regionally 
based initiatives 
10) Develop appropriate physical infrastructure. 
Strengthen the knowledge base  
A solid knowledge base is imperative for development. As we have seen, 
particularly in the case of Cambridge, a high quality academic environment 
with open links to industry may serve as an important driving force for high-
tech industrial development. In Cambridge as well as Sophia Antipolis, the 
strength of the local knowledge base has been important for attracting 
international companies to the area. 
                                                 
42 Prime Minister Bondevik in his inaugural speech to the Parliament 23 October 
2001: ‘The government will gradually increase Norwegian research efforts to at least 
the average OECD level by 2005. A significant part of the growth will go to basic 
research. Tax incentives will be offered to companies for research and development.’ 
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In the case of Oslo and Trondheim, and more generally Norway, inter-
nationally leading research groups seem to be missing; neither Oslo nor 
Trondheim has demonstrated sufficient quality to attract multinational 
companies to the area. As discussed earlier, the majority of multinational 
companies in Oslo are there for other reasons than taking advantage of the 
local knowledge base; for the most part, they are present to exploit market 
opportunities. 
In order to strengthen the knowledge base there are no alternatives to 
expanding national R&D budgets, stimulating and building research centres of 
excellence, and ensuring a good mix of basic and applied research. Fur-
thermore, priority should be given to specialised fields in which Norway either 
has, or may develop, competitive advantage. R&D efforts should be 
concentrated in programs and research centres that are capable of taking a 
lead internationally. The new programme for centres of excellence is 
therefore a promising start. Of 13 centres, 6 were placed in Oslo and 4 in 
Trondheim. 
As demonstrated in the case of Cambridge, it is important that these re-
search activities be organised with open links to, and in interaction with, 
relevant industries. However, one should also be aware of possible lock-in 
effects, i.e. one should not be restrained by current industrial structures and 
allow influential companies to set the agenda. It is important to keep in mind 
that in the long run, ‘new’ industries and companies yet to come will be the 
most important target groups for the future industrial implementation of the 
knowledge base. 
Strengthen the capacity for commercialisation 
One main reason, perhaps the most important, for Norway’s poor perfor-
mance in the field of high-technology, is the inability to commercialise re-
search. From the perspective of high-technology evolution, the culture for 
entrepreneurship is limited, particularly in the sense that relatively few 
entrepreneurs are able to develop companies with potential for high growth. 
In particular, the disparity between Oslo and Trondheim, on the one hand, 
and Cambridge on the other, is related to spin-offs effects. Over the years, 
an impressive number of new companies have spun out of, directly or 
indirectly, Cambridge University (Segal, Quince and Wickstead 1985) 
Entrepreneurial culture and the capacity for commercialisation is em-
bedded in localised factors, and it is not easy to replicate such a culture of 
innovation among scientists. A number of strategies have to be implemented. 
First, universities and other institutions of higher education should become 
more entrepreneurial, i.e. students should be offered programs in en-
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trepreneurship, and stimulated in other ways to consider a potential future 
career as an entrepreneur, as an alternative to traditional careers as employ-
ees in large firms or the public sector. In particular this applies to students in 
science, engineering and business economics. However, there is hardly a 
discipline which does not provide opportunities for commercial activity, so 
there should be optional programs for students in all disciplines. Entrepre-
neurship programs, business contests (like, for instance, Venture Cup) and on 
campus incubation facilities for students may be important instruments to 
stimulate entrepreneurial attitudes and behaviour. 
Second, R&D institutions, i.e. university departments as well as inde-
pendent research institutes, should develop clear policies of commercialisation 
and entrepreneurship by implementing mechanisms that identify all potential 
opportunities for commercialisation and explore these opportunities in a 
systematic way. Developing systems for handling intellectual property rights 
(IPR) is an important part of this. With regard to this, the Norwegian 
Parliament has recently passed a law that gives universities the rights of 
commercial exploitation of results obtained from research. Interesting pro-
cesses are underway at all four Norwegian universities to implement this by 
organising, for instance, industry liaison offices and developing systems for 
surveillance and testing commercial opportunities. It remains to be seen what 
kind of organisational solutions will be chosen, for instance, whether they will 
be in the form of in-house functions or organised externally in collaboration 
with a science park or an innovation centre. 
Third, more capable institutions and programs for mediating and bro-
kering between the institutional knowledge base and industry should be de-
veloped. As mentioned earlier, a number of institutions have developed in  
Norway recently, including science parks, innovation centres and incubators.  
Various programs for stimulating technology transfer and contact between 
knowledge institutions and industry have also been organised. The issue of 
how this structure should be organised in the future, is related to quantitative 
capacity as well as quality. Regarding quantity, programs for funding science 
parks and innovation centres (i.e. FORNY and related programs) are too 
limited and should be expanded. Regarding quality, serious questions may be 
raised regarding segments of this new structure. It is important to undertake 
evaluations and benchmarking in order to improve the operation and further 
development of this institutional structure. 
Fourth, the risk capital function needs to be developed. Partly, this is 
about cultivating the venture capital market, which may be characterised as 
immature. More importantly, it involves developing funding mechanisms for 
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early stage development, i.e. seed capital funding, in which public funding as 
well as informal investors and business angels are important. 
Survey results indicate that high-tech firms do not view venture capi-
talists as important actors in the innovation process, nevertheless, lack of risk 
capital is rated as an important bottleneck for future development. However, 
evidence from other high-tech regions shows that the kind of actors that 
provide capital makes an impact. In Silicon Valley, and to a certain extent in 
Cambridge, risk capital for start-ups has been provided by local business 
angels willing to invest on the long-term, and able to provide valuable advice 
and access to strategic networks. It seems likely that risk capital provided by 
institutions without the same 'hands on' approach is not as conducive to the 
success and development of viable high-tech firms. Norway has a long way 
to go in this area.   
Research based companies 
We have commented on the small share of research-based companies in the 
Norwegian high-tech structure. There are, in relative terms, few companies 
with R&D activity, and few companies in close contact with R&D institu-
tions. In Cambridge the number of entrepreneurs with a background from 
either a university or research institute is almost twice as high as in Oslo and 
Trondheim. The need for more research-based companies and increased 
cooperation between research institutions and industry in Norway is obvious. 
However, as stated in a white paper submitted by the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade, 'firms evolve, they are not decided'.43 
However, successful strategies along the lines indicated above, will 
contribute to development in the right direction. Strengthening the capacity of 
commercialisations, spin-offs from academic institutions and the research 
units of private companies will increase the number of research-based 
companies. If necessary, procedures for recruiting and selecting new 
business ideas, should be biased towards research-based ideas.44 
Furthermore, the minor relevance of universities and research institutes 
to small high-tech firms may be explained by limited opportunities for small 
firms to finance and utilize research, compared to larger firms. An issue for 
further analysis might therefore be to find policy measures which will 
stimulate interaction between small firms and research institutions, as well as 
between small firms and large firms. 
                                                 
43 Government White Paper on Industrial Development, St. meld. nr 41, 1997-98. 
44 There are indications that little business passing through the current system of innovation 
centers and incubators is research-based. 
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Another way to develop the knowledge base of a cluster, is related to the 
ability to attract the research activities of multinational companies. A 
successful strategy of developing centres of excellence may, in conjunction 
with other measures, contribute to making Oslo and Trondheim more 
attractive for foreign investments. 
The IT Fornebu project represents the only serious attempt to address 
the issue of cluster formation in Norway, but thus far it has not been suc-
cessful. There may be many reasons for this, one obvious reason is timing, 
i.e. the project was finally realised during a downturn in the ICT sector.  
However, the idea of developing a new centre in a greenfield area like 
Fornebu may have been flawed at the outset. Although Fornebu lies just 
outside Oslo, there are strong indications that even closer proximity is ne-
cessary for actors in a cluster to obtain synergies, i.e. ‘next door’ or ‘on 
campus’ localities. As shown on the maps (Figure 4.3 and 4.4) of Oslo, high-
tech sub-clusters have developed in different parts of the city. A better 
location for the new centre would most likely have been in Gaustabekkdalen, 
providing close proximity to the university campus and its research centres. 
The IT Fornebu initiative has been met with great scepticism in the ICT 
community of Oslo. These prejudices will not be easily overcome even 
though IT Fornebu is part of a national network of science parks and inno-
vation centres, and formal agreements on collaboration with the University of 
Oslo and the research institutes in Gaustadbekkdalen have been made. 
Local organisation 
As discussed earlier in this report, successful development of a cluster is 
heavily dependent on local preconditions and the ability of local actors to take 
adequate initiatives and develop appropriate organisational structures. In 
order to improve the situation in Norway, it is therefore necessary to take 
different approaches in Oslo and Trondheim. Policy measures should meet 
the specific challenges in the respective region, and local actors are instru-
mental in this respect. 
Regional policies are best developed by persons with proximity to the 
region, not least in order to identify key persons of importance for de-
velopment. Both in the case of Cambridge and Sophia Antipolis, specific 
individuals have played central roles.  If possible, such persons should be 
stimulated and supported. However, in order to develop policy measures 
designed for the specific challenges in each region, it is necessary to un-
dertake a more thorough analysis of the most relevant bottlenecks in the two 
regions. 
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In the case of Oslo, the RITTS programme at the University of Oslo, has 
been instrumental in identifying future policy issues, not least in order to 
create a common regional understanding of opportunities and threats for 
future development. To a large initiatives stemming from the University have 
been about creating industry specific arenas and improving networks, and 
developing consensus on future strategies. Small budgets for industrial 
development have impeded the implementation of policy measures of any 
financial significance.  
Adequate infrastructure 
Our survey of high-tech firms in Oslo and Trondheim illustrates the impor-
tance of a well-developed physical infrastructure. Although this was not 
perceived as a very serious bottleneck for the future development of the 
companies participating in the survey, provision of an adequate  infrastructure 
should be a clear priority of central government as well as local authorities. A 
clear policy implication, therefore, is to provide a well-developed 
telecommunications and transport infrastructure. Furthermore, land should be 
allocated for further industrial development, preferably centrally located. 
Likewise office facilities should be made available to allow for expansion in 
current companies. In particular, office facilities for new companies at 
reasonable prices, may be important.  Easy access to an airport, with direct 
connections to the most important strategic gateways in the world also seems 
to be of great importance. 
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